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Soviet Jews in the United States

by STEVEN J. GOLD

SINCE THE MID-1960s, over 280,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union have settled in the United States.[1] They constitute the largest single group of Jewish immigrants to enter the United States since the 1920s. Although they share kinship ties with the many American Jews whose roots are also in the precommunist Russian empire, their lives have been shaped by different forces: the Bolshevik revolution, the suffering and losses of World War II, and the unique conditions of life in a communist state, including, for Jews, discrimination and persecution. Like American Jews, contemporary émigrés are distinguished by high levels of skill and education, are urban and disproportionately professionals. Unlike most American Jews, they have had minimal exposure to formal Jewish training and Jewish religious life, and no experience with a highly organized Jewish community.

In terms of settlement and absorption, their experience differs from that of earlier Russian immigrants in the extensive resettlement services they receive from both Jewish agencies and the government. These address the basics of housing, employment, and health, as well as language training and acculturation into both American and Jewish society.

Enormous resources have been invested in this immigration, by both the U.S. government and the organized Jewish community. The process began with the political struggle to win the right for Jews to emigrate and now includes the panoply of agencies and programs devoted to easing their way into new lives as Americans and as Jews. Approximately 20 years have passed since serious immigration began, time enough to begin to evaluate

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Note: I wish to acknowledge the help of the following persons in preparing this article: Yoav Ben-Horin, Richard Bernard, Barry Chiswick, Linda Gordon, Pini Herman, Bethamie Horowitz, Ariela Keysar, Igor Kotler, Michael Lichter, Mark Littman, Fran Markowitz, Harvey Paretzky, Bruce Phillips, David Preddy, Miriam Prum Hess, Jeffrey Scheckner, Len Schneiderman, Gila Shabanow, Marcia Tabenken, Madeleine Tress, Mia Tuan, and Roger Waldinger.

[1] HIAS, Annual Statistics, 1965–1993. From 1988 to the present, persons from the former Soviet Union have been the largest refugee nationality to enter the U.S. For example, during fiscal year 1992, Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, home to the nation's biggest Soviet Jewish community, was the number one destination for refugees arriving in the United States. The nearly 15,000 refugees who settled there were approximately double the number opting for the second most popular county of destination—Los Angeles—home to another major Soviet refugee community. Mark Littman, *Office of Refugee Resettlement Monthly Data Report for September 1992* (Washington, D.C., Office of Refugee Resettlement).

how Soviet Jews have fared and are faring, how well they are integrating into American society, and to what extent the hopes and expectations of American Jews have been realized—to see their beleaguered co-religionists free to be Jews in ways that were denied them in the USSR.

SOURCES OF DATA

Relatively little research has been carried out on Soviet Jewish émigrés. The paucity of research is striking when compared to the burgeoning literature on earlier Jewish migrants as well as on contemporary immigrant and refugee groups such as Cubans, Koreans, Vietnamese, Mexicans, and Chinese. Further, given the enormous efforts expended by the American Jewish community over the last 25 years to rescue Soviet Jewry, it is surprising that so little energy has been devoted to investigating the fate of this sizable population whose very presence represents the culmination of years of heroic effort. The lack of federal research may reflect the government's view of Soviet Jews as a group that adjusts fairly rapidly, that has the benefit of Jewish community help in resettlement, that poses no serious social problems, and thus requires little special attention. On the Jewish side, it has been suggested that communal agencies have been wary of research because findings both negative and positive could present problems, e.g., criticism of the agencies or reduction in federal funds.[2] It seems equally likely that agencies pressured by the immediate demands of resettling new arrivals were unable or unwilling to use limited human and financial resources for this purpose. From a practical standpoint, research on Soviets is difficult because once émigrés leave the resettlement program, they are hard to follow up, especially if they move to another locale.

Still, a growing body of research on Soviet Jews does exist.[3] It consists of many small pieces that do not lend themselves to easy comparisons or synthesis. Studies were conducted at various times over the last 20 years, using different questions, with samples representing different locations. Research undertaken through different organizations reflects disparate interests. Studies supported by religious agencies, for example, address chiefly religious concerns. Reports funded by federal government agencies, such as the INS (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service), the Bureau of the Census, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) downplay ethnic

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[2] Barry R. Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States: An Analysis of Their Linguistic and Economic Adjustment," *International Migration Review* 27, no. 102, Summer 1993, pp. 260–85.

[3] Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the term "Soviet Jews" is used for convenience. The term "Russian Jews" is not used because it applies to only a portion.

and religious questions and may not even distinguish among Jews, Armenians, Pentecostalists, and other migrant groups from the former USSR.

Still another body of research on Soviet Jewish émigrés has been carried out by academics—historians, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and others. Their studies reflect the particular theoretical and methodological concerns of the researcher's particular scholarly discipline. Statistical and quantitative studies are helpful for assessing the general trends of Soviet émigrés' status in the United States, their income, synagogue membership, age, and so forth,[4] but are less likely to capture the rich, complex, and often contradictory nature of the Soviet Jews' experience. Studies of this sort tend to suffer from small sample sizes and from the fact that those willing to cooperate with a researcher may not be representative of the entire community, a well-known phenomenon among recent immigrants. Finally, there is good reason to question the validity of former Soviets' responses to telephone surveys, since they are noted for their distrust and manipulation of bureaucrats.[5]

Other studies use qualitative methodology, whereby the researcher involves him or herself with émigrés over a period of time. Using this approach, the subtle and complex experience of Soviet Jews' lives is explored and recorded. Further, participant observation methods are well suited for observing émigrés over time as they adjust to life in the United States.[6] However, such techniques are limited in their ability to represent a broad cross-section of the population and may be especially subject to the researcher's personal biases and style of relating to subjects.

A third body of information on Soviet Jewish émigrés applies neither qualitative nor quantitative research methodologies, but rather conveys the

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[4]The two nationwide studies of this type are Rita J. Simon, Julian Simon, and Jim Schwartz, *The Soviet Jews' Adjustment to the United States* (Council of Jewish Federations, 1982), also published in Rita J. Simon, ed., *New Lives: The Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel* (Lexington, Mass., 1985); and Barry A. Kosmin, *The Class of 1979: The "Acculturation" of Jewish Immigrants from the Soviet Union* (North American Jewish Data Bank, CUNY Graduate School and University Center, 1990).

[5]See Hesh Kestin, "Making Cheese from Snow," *Forbes*, July 29, 1985, pp. 90–95; Wayne Di Francisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and Covert Participation in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3, 1984, pp. 603–21.

[6]See Fran Markowitz, "The Not Lost Generation: Family Dynamics and Ethnic Identity Among Soviet Adolescent Immigrants of the 1970s," paper presented at the Wilstein Institute for Jewish Policy Studies Conference, Soviet Jewish Acculturation—Beyond Resettlement, Palo Alto, June 1991; idem, *A Community in Spite of Itself: Soviet Jewish Emigres in New York* (Washington, D.C., 1993); Steven J. Gold, *Refugee Communities: A Comparative Field Study* (Newbury Park, Calif., 1992); Annalise Orleck, "The Soviet Jews: Life in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn," in *New Immigrants in New York*, ed. Nancy Foner (New York, 1987), pp. 273–304. The present author has conducted fieldwork with Soviet Jews in California from 1982 to the present. Several quotes and observations contained in this article have their origins in this research.

experience and outlook of persons who work with émigrés. A number of articles by religious and community service professionals published in the *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* fall into this category.

In addition to the above, the present study draws on two relatively recent data sources. One is the 1990 U.S. census, specifically the data on Soviet émigrés from the two largest locations of their settlement, New York City and Los Angeles County.[7] These two locations account for about 45 percent of post-1965 migrants in the 1990 census.[8] In addition, a comparison of descriptive statistics of these two populations shows a very high degree of similarity.

The question of the Jewish proportion of former Soviets in the census requires some clarification. According to the 1990 census, 336,889 persons born in the USSR reside in the United States. Although the census does not provide information on religion or ethnicity, HIAS, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, the major Jewish resettlement agency, reported a figure of 173,535 Soviet Jews resettled by it from 1966 through 1990.[9] (The 1990 National Jewish Population Study found 160,000 USSR-born Jews in the United States.) Others entered the country under different auspices or programs, and still others came to this country prior to World War II. Thus, estimating conservatively, somewhat over half of the census's Soviet population nationwide is presumed to be Jewish, and some experts believe it is higher. Additionally, we have increased the likelihood that the tabulations for New York and Los Angeles represent a population with a high fraction of Jews by excluding Armenians (the other major group of post-1965 immigrants from the former USSR) from our analysis.[10]

The second data source is the 1991 New York Jewish Population Study, the data for which were released early in 1994. This is the most recent and most comprehensive survey of a sample of Jews from the former Soviet Union—who were interviewed by Russian-speaking interviewers—and is thus a primary source of information.[11]

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[7]Data were drawn from the 1990 census (5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample).

[8]Office of Refugee Resettlement Program (hereafter ORR), *Report to Congress 1990*, p. 10.

[9]According to Linda Gordon, a demographer currently employed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, with years of previous experience at the Office of Refugee Resettlement, HIAS data on Soviet Jews are an accurate and reliable source.

[10]According to the 1990 census, 41,995 persons born in the USSR migrated to L.A. County from 1965 to 1990. Of these, 28,267 (67 percent) were Armenians (i.e., they reported Armenian ancestry or spoke Armenian at home). In contrast, of the 60,044 post-1965 émigrés from the former USSR in New York City, only 543 (1 percent) were Armenian. After the late 1980s, the fraction of Armenians entering the U.S. as refugees declined.

[11]Many of the findings from this study have been published in Bethamie Horowitz, *The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study* (United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1993). For the present study, computer runs were made from the data tape, made available by the North American Jewish Data Bank.

This article utilizes all the sources described to present what can be considered an interim report on Soviet Jews in the United States—who they are, how they are faring, and the nature of their relationship to the larger Jewish community.

MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT

The Migration Process

The exodus of Jews from the USSR has been shaped by a complex of factors involving developments within Soviet society, foreign relations—chiefly with the United States—and the impact of international public opinion.[12] Because of an official policy that discouraged emigration, few Jews left the country before 1970. In the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet policy on emigration loosened considerably, but remained unpredictable. Thus, from 1976 to 1979, the pace of emigration increased rapidly, then dropped steadily through 1986, then began to climb again, reaching its highest levels ever in the years 1989–1992. (See table 1.) Peak years of entry for these two periods were 1979, when 28,794 arrived, and 1992, when 45,888 Jews from the former Soviet Union entered the United States.[13]

One of the factors influencing emigration was the rise of a Soviet Jewry movement, within the USSR itself and in the worldwide Jewish community. Following the Six Day War in 1967, Soviet Jews—long isolated from their Jewish peers elsewhere—experienced a surge of Jewish self-consciousness and identification with Israel. Endemic anti-Semitism and growing discrimination in higher education, employment, and other areas contributed to the pressure to consider leaving. Among Jews in other countries, the prospect of "rescuing" Soviet Jewry ("Let my people go!") ignited a passionate and effective advocacy movement that succeeded in enlisting the support of most Western governments. On the Soviet side, a desire to develop trade and financial ties with the West, and the linkage by the U.S. Congress of trade and emigration produced greater openness to the idea of emigration.

Under Soviet law, emigration was at least theoretically permitted for reasons of family reunification or national repatriation; however, permission was not granted automatically, and restrictions could be imposed. By and large, those Jews pressing most insistently to leave sought to join family in Israel. Within the Soviet Jewry advocacy movement, the rescue of Soviet

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[12]A number of specialists have analyzed the reasons for the fluctuations in Soviet policy. See, for example, Robert O. Freedman, ed., *Soviet Jewry in the 1980s: The Politics of Anti-Semitism and Emigration and the Dynamics of Resettlement* (Durham, N.C., 1989).

[13]ORR, *Report to Congress 1990*; HIAS, Annual Statistics, 1965–1993.

Jews was always viewed in Zionist terms, it being understood that the Jewish state would be their new home. In the early 1970s, Soviet Jews began requesting and receiving from relatives in Israel *vyzovs*, affidavits for exit visas, and growing numbers of applicants were approved. Up to 1974, nearly 100 percent of these emigrants went to Israel. By the late '70s, however, more and more emigrants were "dropping out" at the transit station in Vienna, opting to go to some other country instead, chiefly to the United States, which accorded most of them refugee status. By the late 1970s, the proportion going to Israel had fallen to one-third; by the late 1980s, less than 10 percent chose to settle in the Jewish state. However, by 1989–90, when the mass exodus of the current wave reached its peak, many more Soviets went to Israel (258,032) than to the United States (68,021). This trend has continued, although the proportion going to Israel has decreased. In 1993, roughly twice as many (69,132) went to Israel as to the United States (35,581).

Some authorities claim that Israel simply became a less attractive destination after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and that reports of work and housing difficulties in Israel discouraged many. Another factor was the change in the composition of the emigration stream in the late '70s. Those choosing Israel were primarily from Georgia, Central Asia, and the Baltic states—areas in which Jews had retained more of Jewish life and culture and a commitment to return to Zion. By contrast, those from the heartland—Russia and Ukraine—were the most Russified and the most distant from Jewish life and identification and had no religious or Zionist motivation.[14]

The change in the direction of the emigration in the 1970s gave rise to conflict between the Zionist and Israeli factions, on one side, and those supporting freedom of choice for the emigrants, on the other. The tension eased in the early 1980s, as emigration virtually dried up. It could have become a problem again in the late '80s, when the Soviets opened the doors wide, and large numbers of Jews began to express an interest in leaving. However, the United States stopped accepting individuals with exit visas for Israel who were "dropping out," and instead established its own system for processing would-be immigrants. This system established an unofficial annual limit of 40,000 Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union and gave first priority to those applicants who already had close relatives living in the United States. Soviet Jews were required to apply from Moscow—thus eliminating the dropout option. (Jews also had the opportunity to enter with parole status, but this would deny them any refugee benefits.)[15]

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[14]Zvi Gitelman, "The Quality of Life in Israel and the United States," in Simon, *New Lives*, p. 47.

[15]Elaine Woo, "Anticipated Reunion Turns into a Nightmare for Soviet Emigre," *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 24, 1989, pp. B1, B12; *New York Times*, "Visa Applicants Deluge

When interviewed on the subject, Jews from the former Soviet Union cite several reasons for their preference for the United States over Israel, among them greater economic opportunity, a higher level of national security, and the fact that there is no compulsory military service. (For a group who paid a great human price in World War II, the latter considerations are of major significance.) Some émigrés assert that they feel more comfortable in the secular and pluralistic United States than they would in Israel, which they refer to as "an Orthodox country."[16] Finally, some Russian Jews say they are accustomed to being part of a big nation and prefer exchanging one superpower for another, as opposed to moving to a tiny country whose total population is less than that of their former city of residence.

The number of all Soviet refugees currently permitted to enter the United States (Jewish and non-Jewish) is limited to 50,000 a year. Priority is given to selected groups of former Soviets whom the U.S. Congress has identified as likely targets of persecution. These include Jews, Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian Catholics, and followers of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Eligible persons with close legal-resident relatives (parent, spouse, children, siblings, grandparents and grandchildren) in this country are granted priority for entry. Members of these denominations who have immediate relatives (parent, spouse, or unmarried minor child) who are U.S. citizens must apply as immigrants rather than refugees.[17]

The Resettlement Process

Since the mid-1970s, a number of programs have been adopted by Congress to encourage the smooth adjustment of refugees from several nations, including the former Soviet Union. The most important of these is the Refugee Act of 1980 (Public Law 96–212), reauthorized in 1991. This legislation was intended to provide "transitional assistance to refugees in the United States," to make "employment training and job placement available in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as

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Embassy in Moscow," Oct. 3, 1989, p. 4; Madeleine Tress, "United States Policy Toward Soviet Emigration," *Migration* 3/4, nos. 11/12, 1991, pp. 93–106.

[16]Gold, *Refugee Communities*. According to the 1991 Jewish population study of New York, the fraction of former Soviet Jews who have seriously considered living in Israel exceeds the rate of all Jewish New Yorkers by only 11 percent. (30 percent of post-1965 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union have considered living in Israel, while 19 percent of the entire Jewish community have done so.)

[17]The number of former Soviets currently entering the U.S. as immigrants (not refugees) is rather small, accounting for only about 4 percent of all former Soviet arrivals in 1991. However, INS officials expect this number to grow in the future. Linda Gordon, INS statistician, personal communication, Sept. 1993; *New York Times*, "Visa Applicants Deluge Embassy in Moscow," Oct. 3, 1989, p. 4; Washington Processing Center (Instructions for application for refugee status), ND.

possible," to offer refugees English-language training, and to ensure "that cash assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as to not discourage their economic self-sufficiency."[18]

The services enabled by the Refugee Act of 1980 as well as other legislation are delivered and administered by a diverse network of government, religious, nonprofit, and profit-making agencies and organizations. A major role in the resettlement of refugees is carried out by 13 voluntary agencies, or VOLAGS, which are funded by charitable contributions and by the federal government. Refugee cash assistance (RCA) is distributed by county welfare departments.

While the largest numbers of refugees in recent years have been resettled by the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), nearly all Soviet Jews as well as members of other groups have been resettled by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS).[19] HIAS, in turn, works through a national resettlement network composed of local Jewish family service agencies and federations, and in New York with the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA), the largest Jewish resettlement agency in the country. The HIAS model of resettlement coordinates centralized policy-making, administration, and data collection with the provision of service at the local level, which allows each community the flexibility required to help clients according to local conditions and needs. For example, HIAS mandates certain program standards, such as reunion with relatives and "earliest appropriate job placement" in order to "avoid fostering reliance on public and private institutions." However, actual service provision is carried out by the professional staff members of local agencies in coordination with family members already residing here and community volunteers. "Consequently, the nature of programs developed within each community is often unique to that community's specific environment."[20]

FUNDING RESETTLEMENT

All resettlement agencies receive Reception and Placement Grant funds of roughly equivalent per capita amounts through the Department of State. In addition, agencies are eligible for Matching Grant funds through the Department of Health and Human Services, to cover expenses beyond the

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[18]Section 311, quoted in Michael Murray and Associates, *A Report on Refugee Services in San Francisco* (Center for Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement, San Francisco, 1981).

[19]See Timothy J. Eckles, Lawrence J. Lewin, David S. North, and Dangole J. Spakevicius, "A Portrait in Diversity: Voluntary Agencies and the Office of Refugee Resettlement Matching Grant Program" (Lewin and Associates, 1982), p. 42.

[20]ORR, *Report to Congress 1993*, pp. C-10, C-11.

initial basic services.[21] Because the agencies working with Soviet Jews are highly centralized and integrated, long established, and well funded, they tend to be in a better position than agencies devoted to other ethnic and nationality groups to raise funds needed to quality for Matching Grants. As a result, a higher proportion of newcomers resettled by Jewish agencies benefit from Matching Grant funds (fewer, for example, being placed on welfare). In fiscal 1992, the Matching Grant Program (then administered by the Council of Jewish Federations, but since 1994 by HIAS) received almost $34 million to resettle almost 34,000 refugees, of whom 90 percent were Soviets. During the same year, four other agencies received a total of $5.2 million to resettle just over 5,000 refugees who were members of other ethnic and nationality groups.[22]

In addition to HIAS, resettlement of Soviet Jews is underwritten by local Jewish communities and agencies and by the social service departments of the states in which they settle. Finally, to help defray costs of resettlement, so-called anchor families—established relatives of recently arrived émigrés—are expected to contribute money or in-kind services to the resettlement agency. If families are unable to contribute, other community resources are utilized.

HIAS itself is funded by a combination of government funds, allocations from Jewish federations throughout the United States and Canada—especially New York UJA-Federation—and by other sources, such as memberships, contributions, and repayments of loans from migrants. In 1992, HIAS's total expenses were $10.3 million, while its income was $15.5 million. Income included $10 million from government, $2.3 million from Jewish federations, and $2.3 million from contributions and bequests.[23] More recently, because of difficult economic conditions in the United States, both public and private funds for refugee resettlement have become more scarce, resulting in cutbacks in many programs.[24]

As refugees, émigrés are entitled to a series of benefits including health care, housing assistance, job and language training, and public assistance. Local agencies may also offer supplementary services such as job placement, aid with social adjustment, assistance in opening small businesses, and a variety of cultural and religious activities. Because of the constitutional separation of church and state, resettlement activities with a religious con-

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[21]Eckles et al., "Portrait in Diversity"; HIAS, *Financial Statement and Auditor's Report*, Dec. 31, 1991; HIAS, Annual Statistics, 1965–1993.

[22]ORR, *Report to Congress 1993*, p. 29.

[23]HIAS, *Financial Statement and Auditor's Report*, Dec. 31, 1992.

[24]Len Schneiderman, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, *FY 91–92 Actual Expenses and FY 92–93 Resettlement Projections*, Summer 1993.

tent may not be supported with governmental funds.

The period of eligibility for these benefits was 18 months in the early 1980s, but it has gradually been scaled back to 8 months. Support in the first month is provided to émigrés by the U.S. Department of State Reception and Placement Grant. For many refugees, resettlement activity in the second through fourth months is funded through the Matching Grant Program, as noted above, with funds furnished in equal parts by Jewish federations and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The next four months of benefits are delivered by the social service departments of the states in which refugees reside. After eight months of residency in the United States, émigrés no longer have special entitlements. Their applications for governmental or Jewish community services are treated (and funded) in the same manner as would be the case for U.S. citizens.[25]

AGENCIES OFFERING SERVICES

Depending on the community, services to Soviet Jews are available from a number of coordinated agencies and may vary both in terms of benefits available and quality of services provided. Intake services, vocational and language training, and health care are often accessible from public agencies and community colleges or adult schools. The Jewish Family and Children's Service provides counseling, financial aid, and case management. The Jewish Vocational Service offers job placement and occasionally job training. Jewish community centers (JCCs) and YMHA/YWHAs deliver social and recreational activities, and the Bureau of Jewish Education contributes a variety of religious and cultural activities. Many synagogues, Jewish camps, and Jewish day schools have developed programs on their own or in concert with Jewish federations to welcome émigré families. For example, in Los Angeles, Chabad has used its own resources as well as those from the Jewish federation and the city of West Hollywood to support several Soviet émigré programs. Jewish agencies for the elderly extend services such as health care, transportation, housing, and social activities to the many aged Soviet refugees. Local families, communities, and synagogues provide émigrés with a whole variety of volunteer services including home visits, informal job and language training, transportation, invitations to religious services and Sabbath dinners, housing, furniture, and other benefits.

Just as the services available to Soviet émigrés vary according to the resources of the local Jewish agencies resettling them, benefits available through state and local sources also vary. For example, due to state regula-

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[25]Miriam Prum Hess, Refugee Acculturation Coordinator, Jewish Federation Council of Los Angeles, personal communication, Sept. 1993; Schneiderman, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Summer 1993.

tions, a refugee family of four living in California in 1989 was eligible for $734 monthly in AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) benefits. The same family living in Texas received a maximum of $221. Further, while two-parent, indigent families are eligible for AFDC in California, they are not in Texas.[26]

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Size: Through the end of 1993, HIAS resettled a total of 289,719 Soviet Jews in the United States. This figure refers only to Soviet Jews who have come to the United States over the last 28 years, not to the size of the current Soviet Jewish community, which is harder to estimate. For one thing, the number of émigrés has been diminished by mortality. Because former Soviets are an elderly population, their mortality rate is undoubtedly fairly high. At the same time, Jews from the former Soviet Union have given birth to an unknown number of American-born children, who are part of the Soviet émigré community and consequently contribute to its size. Finally, there is the question of whether all those resettled can be considered Jewish. For example, an extended family whose members include an intermarried couple and the non-Jewish spouse's parents contains at least three non-Jews, who nevertheless have been resettled and counted by HIAS as Jews.[27] In sum, while there is no definite figure for the size of the Soviet Jewish community, an accepted estimate is around a quarter of a million.

Origins: The greatest number of resettled Soviet Jews come from the Russian and Ukrainian republics of the Soviet Union, which also have the largest Jewish populations. However, while the Russian Republic has the largest number of Jews, Ukraine is the major source of émigrés. Of the 194,047 Soviet Jews who entered the United States between 1980 and May 1993, 42 percent (81,421) were from Ukraine, 24 percent (46,391) from the Russian Republic, 13 percent (24,437) from Belarus, 6 percent (12,591) from Uzbekistan, 6 percent (11,113) from Moldova, 2 percent (4,715) from Azerbaijan, and 2 percent (4,486) from Latvia. The remainder (4 percent) came from other Soviet republics or had unknown origins.[28] (See table 2.)

Age: Soviet Jews are consistently reported as being the oldest of refugee

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[26]Ruben Rumbaut, "The Structure of Refuge: Southeast Asian Refugees in the United States, 1975–1985," *International Review of Comparative Public Policy* 1, 1989, p. 103.

[27]Bethamie Horowitz, "Where Do Jewish New Yorkers Come From?" New York UJA-Federation, 1993.

[28]Simon et al., "Soviet Jews' Adjustment"; Rita J. Simon and Melanie Brooks, "Soviet Jewish Immigrants' Adjustment in Four United States Cities," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 60, no. 1, 1983, pp. 56–64; Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; HIAS, Annual Statistics, 1965–1993.

groups entering the United States, and there is reason to believe that their average age has been slowly rising. Between 1983 and 1991, the average age of all Soviet refugees entering the United States was 31.[29] Allowing for about 20 percent non-Jews in this population—a generally younger group—the average for Soviet Jews was undoubtedly somewhat higher. According to HIAS, the median age of entering Soviet Jews in 1993 was 35.5; this compares to a median age for all entering refugees (from all countries) of 28 years. The Soviets' age distribution also differs significantly from that of the total refugee population. For example, the former includes 12.5 percent young children; the latter 20.2 percent. In the older age category (65 and over), the Soviet Jewish proportion is 17.5 percent, compared to 8 percent in the total refugee population.[30] Females tend to be older than males, due to greater life expectancy and the impact of World War II.

Male/female ratio: There have consistently been slightly more females than males in the Soviet Jewish émigré population, averaging around 53 percent, compared with a more equal distribution in the total refugee population.[31]

Family size: Family size for Soviet Jews tends to be small. Rounding statistics, three-person nuclear families are consistently reported. Based on anecdotal evidence, it appears that a fair number of émigré families are having more than one child in the United States.[32]

Family type: Soviet Jewish families are usually intact and often include three generations. Prior to the removal of migration restrictions in the late 1980s, Soviet emigration policy fostered the exit of multigenerational families. When a Soviet citizen applied to emigrate, "consent from both parents for permission to leave was also required regardless of the individual's age or nature of relationship to the parent. When parents provided consent, they too were viewed as 'traitors' and they too were harassed," thus increasing the likelihood that they themselves would emigrate.[33] Accordingly, a very high proportion of Soviet Jewish families are multigenerational and, as noted above, they include a very elderly population.

Intermarriage: Soviet survey data suggest that Soviet Jews value marital endogamy (marrying within one's own group) far more than other Soviet ethnic and nationality groups. Nevertheless, they display relatively high

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[29] ORR, *Report to Congress 1992*, p. 48.

[30] HIAS, *Statistical Abstract FY 93*, Feb. 1994, p. 14.

[31] ORR, *Report to Congress 1987*; HIAS, ibid.

[32] Eckles et al., "Portrait in Diversity," p. 26; Rita J. Simon, "Refugee Families' Adjustment and Aspirations: A Comparison of Soviet Jewish and Vietnamese Immigrants," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6, no. 4, 1983, pp. 492–504; HIAS, *Annual Statistics 1979–1991*, 1991.

[33] Diane Drachman and Anna Halberstadt, "A Stage of Migration Framework as Applied to Recent Soviet Emigres," *Social Work with Immigrants and Refugees*, ed. Angela Shen Ryan (New York, 1992), p. 67.

rates of intermarriage.[34] The 1979 Soviet census "shows that an estimated 33 percent of the Jewish population of the RSFSR [Russian Republic], 19 percent of the Jews in the Ukraine and 14 percent of the Jews in Byelorussia live in mixed families." Most recently, Sergio DellaPergola has estimated the rate of outmarriage of Jews in the USSR as of the late 1980s to be between 45 and 54.9 percent, or approximately the same rate as in the United States.[35]

The data on Soviet Jews' marriage patterns in the United States are limited. In Kosmin's 1990 study of émigrés living in the United States at least eight years, 87 percent were currently married, and the reported rate of mixed marriages was somewhere between 8 and 12 percent. (This is considerably lower than the known rate for all Soviet Jews, and may simply reflect the small sample size or that this is a case of selective migration.) Finally, attitudinal data from the 1991 New York Jewish population study indicate that Jews from the former Soviet Union are much less tolerant of intermarriage (with non-Jews) than is the larger New York Jewish community. While 60 percent of all New York Jews report that they would accept, support, or strongly support their child's marriage to a non-Jew, only 33 percent of former Soviets would accept or support such a union, while 58 percent would oppose it. However, if the non-Jewish spouse were to convert to Judaism, acceptance or support of the marriage climbs to 70 percent. By comparison, 84 percent of all Jews polled in New York would then support the marriage.

PATTERNS OF RESETTLEMENT

Geographic Distribution

While we know the total number of Soviet Jews who have been resettled in the United States, we have less specific information about the size of populations in various localities. We do know that rates of secondary migration (émigrés who leave their initial place of settlement in the United States for another destination) are relatively high, especially for those initially settled in small communities in the Midwest and South. For example, as of 1990, according to the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco,

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[34]Rasma Karklins, "Determinants of Ethnic Identification in the USSR: The Soviet Jewish Case," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10, no. 1, 1987, pp. 27–47.

[35]Benjamin Pinkus, "National Identity and Emigration Patterns Among Soviet Jewry," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 15, no. 3, 1985, p. 11; Sergio DellaPergola, "Israel and World Population: A Core-Periphery Perspective," in *Population and Social Change in Israel*, ed. C. Goldscheider (Boulder, 1992), p. 55. See also Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population," AJYB 1993, pp. 434–37.

about 10 percent of the Bay Area's Soviet Jewish population were secondary migrants. Similarly, the Jewish Federation of Chicago estimates that about 2,000 of its 16,500 émigrés are secondary migrants.[36]

Chiswick's analysis of 1980 census data determined that 36 percent of post-1965 Soviet immigrants resided in the New York Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 16 percent in Los Angeles/Long Beach, 7 percent in Chicago, 4 percent each in San Francisco/Oakland and Boston, and 3 percent in Miami. In all, these six SMSAs accounted for 70 percent of Soviet immigrants.[37]

State-level data from the 1990 census reveal that 30 percent of USSR-born American residents (Jews and non-Jews) live in New York, 23 percent in California, 6 percent each in New Jersey and Illinois, and 5 percent each in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Hence, 80 percent of those born in the Soviet Union reside in seven states. (See table 3.) As noted above, there is no sure way of knowing what proportion of these are Jews. Los Angeles, for example, is the major point of settlement for Soviet Armenians. Analysis of the 1990 census reveals that only 33 percent of post-'65 former Soviet residents in Los Angeles county are *not* of Armenian ethnicity. In contrast, only about 500 of the more than 60,000 post-'65 former Soviets in New York City are of Armenian ethnicity.[38]

CHOICE OF LOCATION

The Jewish communal resettlement process is predicated on the assistance and participation of family members already resident in this country. Thus, the initial choice of settlement location for a new émigré is based primarily on the presence of "anchor" relatives in a given community. If there are no relatives, or if relatives are unwilling or unable to help out, newcomers are referred to other communities. There is some correlation between the size of a city's Jewish community and the number of émigrés resettled there. At the same time, the size of a given community's Soviet Jewish population is influenced by newcomers' decisions to leave the initial place of settlement for other locations through secondary migration. Apart from the presence of family or friends, secondary migrants generally select a given city because of preference for the climate or the availability of jobs or cultural amenities.

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[36]Anita Friedman, "Status Report on Soviet Jewish Resettlement in the San Francisco Bay Area," Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma Counties Emigre Program, 1990; Joel M. Carp, "Absorbing Jews Jewishly: Professional Responsibility for Jewishly Absorbing New Immigrants in Their New Communities," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 66, no. 4, 1990, pp. 366–74.

[37]Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States," p. 275.

[38]ORR, *Report to Congress 1991*, and 1990 census.

Research reveals that certain émigré communities in the United States are disproportionately drawn from specific cities or regions of the USSR. For example, the North Shore of Massachusetts has a heavy representation of émigrés from the Russian Republic. Kosmin suggests that Odessans settle in Cleveland; those from Kiev move to Philadelphia; and Jews from Minsk and Azerbaijan migrate to Baltimore. Markowitz as well as Simon and Brooks found that Chicago has a heavy representation of émigrés from the heartland Ukrainian cities of Kiev and Kharkov, as well as Minsk in Belarus. Even neighborhoods within a single city may develop a regional focus. Barber discovered that, despite the existence of a lively (and largely Ukrainian) émigré community in Brooklyn, professionals from Moscow and Leningrad self-consciously created their own enclave, a lengthy subway ride away in Manhattan's Washington Heights.[39]

Regional differences reflect differences in cultural and other background factors as well as the ways in which émigrés view and relate to each other. In general, those from the former Russian Republic—Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)—consider themselves to be culturally superior to other émigrés. Ukrainians have lower status. Odessans are seen as skilled in deal-making, and not as refined as Russians. Émigrés from the Baltic republics, which have been under Soviet hegemony only since the 1940s, are much more likely to know Yiddish, while those from the less cosmopolitan eastern regions of the USSR are less assimilated (to Russian culture) and accordingly are noted for their religiosity and stable family and community structures.[40]

While regional differences are often overcome in the United States, connections with communities of origin still hold some sway among Soviet Jews, especially among those of eastern and Sephardic origins.[41] Hence, regional differences, along with those based on social class, former occupa-

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[39]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, p. 16; Jewish Family Service of the North Shore, Mass., *Social Needs Survey of Immigrants to the North Shore from the Soviet Union*, 1990; Markowitz, "The Not Lost Generation," p. 47; Simon and Brooks, "Soviet Jewish Immigrants' Adjustment"; Jennifer Barber, "The Soviet Jews of Washington Heights," *New York Affairs* 10, no. 1, 1987, pp. 34–43.

[40]Barber, "Soviet Jews of Washington Heights"; Gold, *Refugee Communities*; Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*; Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Immigrants and American Absorption Efforts: A Case Study in Detroit," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 55, no. 1, 1978, pp. 77–82; Mitchell Serels, "The Soviet Sephardim in the United States," New York: Yeshiva University, 1990; Marilyn Halter, "Ethnicity and the Entrepreneur: Self-Employment Among Former Soviet Jewish Refugees," in *New Migrants in the Marketplace: Boston's Ethnic Entrepreneurs*, ed. Marilyn Halter (Amherst, Mass., in press).

[41]According to the 1991 Jewish population study of New York, 8 percent of post-1965 Jews born in the former Soviet Union are of Sephardic ethnicity, 70 percent are Ashkenazic, and 22 percent are unsure of their ethnicity. This distribution is nearly identical to that of the larger New York Jewish community.

tion, and educational level contribute significantly to the development of both connections and antipathies among Jews from the former Soviet Union. As Zvi Gitelman notes:

> If the unsophisticated American social worker can't tell the difference between the Leningrad accent of a scientist and the Latvian accent of a technician, the immigrants themselves certainly can. Thus, the immigrants themselves will resist attempts to get them to "cooperate," to associate with and help people with whom they feel they have little in common.[42]

OBTAINING U.S. CITIZENSHIP

Soviets show a higher propensity to naturalize and do so more rapidly than the other major refugee groups (Cubans and Southeast Asians) that have entered the United States in recent years. From 1980 through 1991, almost 60,000 persons born in the USSR became citizens. This represents about 57 percent of those who arrived in the country between 1975 and 1985 as refugees.[43] The former Soviets' rapid naturalization provides members of this group with opportunities for political participation, eligibility for jobs and scholarships, and a higher priority ranking when assisting relatives to gain entry into the United States.[44]

Employment and Economic Factors

As a group, Soviet Jews are highly educated and experienced in technical and professional fields. Simon and Brooks, in a nationwide sample, found the average educational level to be 13.5 years, and a study of émigrés in Massachusetts' North Shore found that 97 percent of adults had a bachelor's or higher degree and a professional occupation prior to migration. The average educational level of Soviet Jews exceeds that of the U.S. population by a year and is among the highest of all immigrant groups entering the country.[45] Data from the 1990 census are consistent with Simon and Brooks's estimate. Average education was above 13 years for Soviet-born persons in both New York City and Los Angeles, and 58 percent of former Soviets in New York City and 72 percent in Los Angeles County had one or more years of college. (See tables 4–5.)

Surveys indicate that Soviet Jewish émigrés generally experience rapid

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[42]Gitelman, "Soviet Immigrants and American Absorption Efforts," pp. 74–75.

[43]ORR, *Report to Congress 1993*, p. 61.

[44]According to the 1991 Jewish population study of New York, 33 percent of post-1965 Jews born in the former Soviet Union are registered to vote.

[45]Simon and Brooks, "Soviet Jewish Immigrants' Adjustment"; Jewish Family Service of the North Shore, "Social Needs Survey"; Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 43.

economic adjustment. Average family income in 1989 for those in the United States 8 years or more was $34,000. In the North Shore of Massachusetts, 63 percent were making over $30,000.[46]

These findings appear to be supported by the 1990 census, which shows that, with the exception of recent arrivals (those in the country three or fewer years), the income of all Soviet émigrés was relatively high, particularly in Los Angeles. Employed Soviet men residing in New York City who arrived between 1975 and 1981 earned on average $32,000 annually in 1990—more than all foreign-born men ($25,871) but less than both native-born white men ($45,677) and all foreign-born white men ($36,224). In Los Angeles, Soviet men were making over $43,000 on average—more than both all foreign-born white men ($41,527) and all foreign-born men ($24,083) and only slightly less than the average for native-born white men ($46,285). Employed Soviet women who entered the United States between 1975 and 1981 made about $22,500 in New York—about the same as all foreign-born white women ($22,991) and more than all foreign-born women ($19,048), but less than native-born white women ($31,114). In Los Angeles, Soviet women earned approximately $26,000 on average, about the same as native-born white women ($26,473) and more than both foreign-born white women ($23,388) and all foreign-born women ($16,376). As might be expected, recently arrived Soviet men and women made much less in 1990 than those émigrés with longer tenure in the country. (See table 6.)

While the average income of Soviet immigrants suggests a generally successful merger into the American middle class, the economic profile of this population actually includes a wide range, from poverty to significant wealth. For example, in June 1991, about 30 percent of refugees (Jews and non-Jews) from the former USSR who had been in the United States for a year or less were receiving cash assistance. Among Soviet Jewish émigrés in the United States eight years or more in 1989: 42 percent of households in New York and 36 percent in Los Angeles were making less than $20,000 per household; 50 percent in New York and 48 percent in Los Angeles were earning $20,000–$60,000; 8 percent in New York and 16 percent in Los Angeles were earning over $60,000.[47] Soviet Jews in Los Angeles proudly describe the financial success of their community as they refer to the many emigrants who own homes in Mount Olympus, an affluent neighborhood adjacent to Beverly Hills.[48]

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[46]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Jewish Family Service of the North Shore, "Social Needs Survey"; Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States," p. 274.

[47]ORR, *Report to Congress 1992*, pp. A-18, A-19; Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, pp. 24–25.

[48]Si Frumkin, "Who Are the Russians?" *Jewish Journal* (Los Angeles), Nov. 19–25, 1993, p. 17.

LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION

Labor-force participation rates for Soviet Jews in the United States have generally been quite high. However, with the large numbers arriving since 1990 and the depressed economic conditions they encounter in many receiving communities, a sizable fraction of recent arrivals are underemployed.

The 1990 census determined that the labor-force participation rate for all Soviet immigrants in New York City (arriving since 1965) was 76 percent for men and 57 percent for women. Excluding recent arrivals, the labor-force participation rate was 89 percent for men and 68 percent for women. Roughly similar trends were evident in Los Angeles, where the labor-force participation rate for Soviet immigrant men was 79 percent and 63 percent for women. Excluding recent arrivals, the rate was 88 percent for men and 71 percent for women. Excluding those in the United States three years or less in 1990, unemployment rates were quite low, less than 7 percent for men or women in New York and Los Angeles. (See table 7.)

DEPENDENCE VS. SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Data from the 1990 census show that 14 percent of Soviet-born men and 13 percent of Soviet-born women (aged 24–65) in New York City and 7 percent of Soviet-born men and 11 percent of Soviet-born women in Los Angeles County were on SSI, AFDC, or General Relief in 1990. However, excluding recent arrivals, dependency rates decline to 5 percent for men and 10 percent for women in New York and 5 percent for men and 9 percent for women in Los Angeles. Clearly, once settled, refugees are able to reduce their rates of dependency. (One exception is the over-65 age group, a large fraction of which receives SSI.) (See table 8.) Data produced by the Council of Jewish Federations[49] show that the self-sufficiency rate for Soviet Jews after four months was 24.6 percent for those arriving in 1990, 23.8 percent for those entering in 1991, and 18.3 percent for those arriving in 1992. In general, it appears that émigrés arriving in smaller cities had a better chance of being self-supporting after four months than those who settled in larger cities. For example, Baltimore achieved an 80-percent-plus rate of self-sufficiency among Soviet Jews after four months in the years 1989–1992. By contrast, the four-month self-sufficiency rate for Los Angeles émigrés was between 22 percent and 12 percent for the same years; émigrés coming to New York achieved four-month self-sufficiency rates around 5 percent after 1989. The difference between smaller and larger community size may be related to the relative ease of placement when agency staff have more

[49]Harvey Paretzky, *An Employment Profile of Soviet Jewish Refugees in the United States* (Council of Jewish Federations, 1993).

manageable caseloads. In addition to community size, other factors, such as the state-determined availability of public assistance, may also influence self-sufficiency rates. The fact that New York and California have much more generous benefit programs than does Maryland may partly explain the higher rates of self-sufficiency evident in Baltimore as compared with Los Angeles and New York.[50] (See table 9.)

Although the combination of large numbers of émigrés entering the United States and the recession since 1990 have made initial job-finding difficult for former Soviets, their dependence on RCA (refugee cash assistance) actually declined between 1990 and 1991. To quote from the Office of Refugee Resettlement *Report to Congress 1993*: "The RCA utilization rate for the Soviets is the lowest of any large group (28 percent) and represents a dramatic decrease from the previous year (50 percent), when a surge of arrivals in the winter and early spring of 1991 contributed to heavy RCA utilization."[51] The high skill levels of émigrés, their motivation to find work, and the assistance provided them by agencies and community members can be credited for this impressive performance.

AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT

As the above statistics demonstrate, Soviet Jews in the United States appear to be successful in finding jobs and earning a good living within a relatively short period after arrival. One problem they confront, however, is an inability to meet their previous level of occupational prestige. For example, a study of New York's Soviet Jewish community found that, while 66 percent had professional, technical, and managerial occupations in the USSR, only half of these, 33 percent, found similar jobs in the United States.[52] Data from the 1990 census offer similar findings, tabulating professional, technical, and managerial employment rates at 34 percent for men and 37 percent for women in New York, and 47 percent for men and 41 percent for women in Los Angeles. (See table 10.)

Highly skilled Soviet Jews have problems finding appropriate American jobs because they lack job-related licenses and certification, have limited English-language skills, or because certain Soviet occupations are simply not in demand. For example, there are few American job opportunities for classical accordion players, coaches of sports seldom played in the United States, or engineers who designed tundra-friendly (and by U.S. standards, hopelessly outdated) structures for the Siberian oil industry. A large pro-

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[50]Council of Jewish Federations, *Immigration Data*, 1993; Harvey Paretzky, personal communication, Sept. 14, 1993.

[51]ORR, *Report to Congress 1993*, p. 24.

[52]Paretzky, *Employment Profile*.

portion of recent Soviet Jews are able to adapt to the U.S. economy by finding jobs in the skilled trades, bookkeeping and accounting, computer programming, and engineering.[53] (See table 11.)

Self-employment is the traditional means by which many immigrant Jews have supported their families. This long-standing pattern characterized the German Jews of the 1850s and the Eastern Europeans of the 1880–1920 era, and applies to contemporary Israelis and Iranians. The literature on Soviet Jewish émigrés includes several descriptive accounts of émigré entrepreneurship. Former Soviets gravitate toward various types of enterprises, including engineering companies, restaurants and grocery stores, retail trade, and construction and real estate. In a study of Soviet émigré businesses in Boston, Halter determined that, while a relatively small fraction of Soviet Jews enter self-employment, they tend to be successful. In describing business owners, she noted a preponderance of women proprietors, an individualistic (rather than communal) entrepreneurial style, and a high degree of compatibility between entrepreneurship and their Soviet-based, secular Jewish identity.[54]

In the 1980s, taxi companies in New York and Los Angeles employed many Soviets, but émigrés often leave this risky occupation after only a few years. In Los Angeles, two taxi cooperatives enabled émigrés to develop the connections, skills, and capital sources that allowed their eventual movement into more extensive self-employment activities.[55] The Moscow-born vice-president of one cooperative described his experience as typical for a Soviet Jewish cab owner:

> When I got here first, I got a job in East L.A. in a garment factory. I worked very hard by the way, always sweating. Just moving around cloth—I sure wasn't satisfied. And then I found out about cab association. It's got 201 members, 94 are Russians. And I found out I can make a little more money driving a cab. I worked as a lease driver at first, and in 1978, I bought my own cab. Now I lease it at nights to other Russian driver.
>
> I'm not going to drive my cab for all my life. I'm planning for the future to go to some kind of different business—a shop or restaurant. My wife already has a beauty parlor.
>
> So that's why we have so many Russians. Most of them—like me—are business-minded people. Driving a cab is a start. In the future, a lot of them will go into

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[53]Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *Jewish Identification and Affiliation of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in New York City—A Needs Assessment and Planning Study*, 1985.

[54]Kestin, "Making Cheese from Snow"; Nancy Lubin, "Small Business Owners," in *New Lives*, ed. Rita J. Simon, pp. 151–64; Orleck, "Soviet Jews: Life in Brighton Beach"; Steven J. Gold, "Refugees and Small Business: The Case of Soviet Jews and Vietnamese," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11, no. 4, 1988, pp. 411–38; Gold, *Refugee Communities*; Halter, "Ethnicity and the Entrepreneur"; Raymond Russell, *Sharing Ownership in the Workplace* (Albany, 1985).

[55]Russell, *Sharing Ownership*.

other businesses. A lot are already in businesses—stores, restaurants, body shops. They rely on partnerships.[56]

Through such business networks, Soviet émigrés obtain a variety of resources useful in opening and running a successful operation. Well-established entrepreneurs often give novices advice about contracts, licenses, and appropriate store locations.[57] Members also offer each other opportunities for investment. For example, in San Francisco, a Soviet Jewish realty company distributed information about available storefronts and supplied real-estate speculators with lists of homes that could be purchased and refurbished for resale. Soviet entrepreneurs also supplied one another with investment capital.[58]

For many members of the business subgroup, self-employment provides not only a source of income, but also a sense of personal and ethnic identity, a means of access to American society, and a social life. As such, ethnic identity and solidarity are reinforced through economic cooperation. Because these émigrés came from a secular society, their understanding of Jewish identity draws more from Jews' accomplishments than from religious teachings and practices. Many even see a predisposition toward business as a central component of Jewish ethnicity, priding themselves on an ability to survive under any and all conditions.

In Los Angeles, over 100 Soviet doctors formed a professional association. Because foreign medical graduates find it difficult to obtain certification in a specialty, they seldom obtain employment in hospitals or HMOs (health maintenance organizations). Instead, many enter private practice—a form of self-employment. Their offices are located adjacent to neighborhoods where Russian émigrés—who prefer to visit Russian-speaking physicians—live. Soviet émigré doctors happily accept their fellow refugees' government-provided health benefits. In turn, émigré doctors and dentists support self-employed Russian pharmacists, physical therapists, dentists, and the like. Finally, émigré doctors buy a large proportion of the advertising in the Russian-language print and broadcast media. For example, in 1991, 50 of the 108 advertisements in the 1991 Los Angeles Russian-language telephone directory offered various medical services.

Data from the 1990 census suggest that a sizable fraction of Soviets are self-employed. In New York, 15 percent are self-employed (21 percent of men and 8 percent of women), with higher rates in Los Angeles, where 25

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[56]Gold, *Refugee Communities*, pp. 202–03.

[57]Lubin, "Small Business Owners"; Halter, "Ethnicity and the Entrepreneur."

[58]Gold, "Refugees and Small Business"; Steven J. Gold, "Patterns of Interaction and Adjustment Among Soviet Jewish Refugees," *Contemporary Jewry* 9, no. 2, 1988, pp. 87–105; idem, "Nascent Mobilization in a New Immigrant Community: The Case of Soviet Jews in California," *Research in Community Sociology* 2, 1991, pp. 185–208.

percent (33 percent of men and 17 percent of women) are self-employed. (See table 12.) When compared to 1980 census data about various migrant groups, the Los Angeles figure puts Soviet Jews among those groups with the highest rates of self-employment. This is an impressive finding, considering that, as refugees from a communist nation, Soviet Jews lack two of the most essential resources for entrepreneurship—business experience and investment capital. On the other hand, the rate of entrepreneurship among Jewish immigrants to the United States has always been high, since it was viewed as a viable adjustment strategy.[59]

WOMEN IN TECHNICAL FIELDS

One economic asset of the Soviet Jews over natives or other immigrant groups is the unusually high number of women with professional and technical skills: 67 percent of Soviet Jewish women in the United States were engineers, technicians, or other kinds of professionals prior to migration. In contrast, only 16.5 percent of American women work in these occupations.[60] (See table 13.)

According to the 1990 census, 29 percent of all Soviet émigré women in New York City and 26 percent of Soviet émigré women in Los Angeles County work as professionals in the United States. In New York, a smaller proportion of Soviet-born men are employed in these occupations; however, Soviet-born men in Los Angeles exceed Soviet-born women's professional employment by 2 percent. (See table 10.)

Simon et al., using 1981 data, report that, despite their high rates of education and professional experience, Soviet Jewish women were still making less than 60 percent of Soviet Jewish men's income in the United States. Results from the 1990 census suggest that the income gap has not closed a great deal, although women who arrived in the United States between 1975 and 1981 and live in New York City make about 70 percent of their male counterparts' incomes. (See table 6.) Simon et al. also found that Soviet women are generally less satisfied with their work situation in the United States than are Soviet men. About 30 percent of women said their work

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[59]Gold, "Patterns of Interaction and Adjustment"; Boris Z. Gorbis, "Give Us Your Poor Homeless Organizations: A Review of California's Soviet-Jewish Organizations," in *New Voices: The Integration of Soviet Emigres and Their Organizations into the Jewish Communal World*, ed. Madeleine Tress and Deborah Bernick (Council of Jewish Federations, 1992), pp. 17–23.

[60]Simon, *New Lives*, p. 17; Rita J. Simon, Louise Shelly, and Paul Schneiderman, "Social and Economic Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Women in the United States," in *International Migration: The Female Experience*, ed. Rita James Simon and Caroline B. Brettell (Totowa, N.J., 1986), pp. 76–94; Eckles et al., "Portrait in Diversity," p. 29; *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1984*, p. 416.

situation was better than in the USSR, compared to 40 percent of men. In contrast, 49 percent of women called their work situation worse, while only 41 percent of men felt this way.[61]

Relations with Resettlement Agencies

Soviet Jews in the United States enjoy perhaps the best-funded and most professionally staffed resettlement system provided to any recent immigrants and refugees.[62] Soviet Jews generally have positive evaluations of the services they receive in resettlement. Gitelman found that 80.4 percent of émigrés to the United States rated their resettlement agencies as working "very well; well; or not badly" (versus 44.3 percent of Soviet Jews in Israel).[63] A New York-based study found that 71 percent of émigrés had a positive impression of NYANA (their major resettlement agency), while only 29 percent had a negative impression.[64]

Still, émigrés confront difficulties in adjusting to the United States, particularly in regard to what Simon et al. call "bread and butter issues": learning English, finding a job, earning enough money, and missing family and friends.

Unlike most immigrants, who have little experience in obtaining government services, former Soviets come from a society in which substantially more of life's necessities are distributed by government agencies than is the case here. Despite their experience in interacting with bureaucracies, however, former Soviets have to learn new ways of interacting with agencies in a dramatically different social context. A fairly large literature addresses Soviets' encounters with American-style bureaucracy in various areas of service provision, including cash assistance, physical and mental health, job placement, and community socialization.[65]

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[61]Simon et al., "Social and Economic Adjustment," p. 89.

[62]Eckles et al., "Portrait in Diversity"; GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office), *Soviet Refugees: Processing and Admittance to the United States*, GAO/NSIAD-90–158, 1990, p. 25.

[63]Gitelman, "Quality of Life," p. 62.

[64]Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, "Jewish Identification," p. 39.

[65]Steven J. Gold, "Dealing with Frustration: A Study of Interactions Between Resettlement Staff and Refugees," in *People in Upheaval*, ed. Scott Morgan and Elizabeth Colson (New York, 1987), pp. 108–28; idem, *Refugee Communities*; Fran Markowitz, "Jewish in the USSR, Russian in the USA," in *Persistence and Flexibility: Anthropological Perspectives on the American Jewish Experience*, ed. Walter P. Zenner (Albany, 1988), pp. 79–95; idem, *Community in Spite of Itself;* Meryl Brod and Suzanne Heurtin-Roberts, "Older Russian Emigres and Medical Care," *Western Journal of Medicine* 157, no. 3, 1992, pp. 333–36; Rochelle P. Stutz, "Resettling Soviet Emigres: How Caseworkers Coped," *Social Work*, Mar.-Apr. 1984, pp. 187–88; Dorsh de Voe, "Framing Refugees as Clients," *International Migration Review* 15, no. 1, 1981, pp. 88–94; Maria Coughlin and Regina Rosenberg, "Health Education and Beyond: A Soviet Women's Group Experience," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 60, no.

The difficulties involved in resettlement result from the near impossibility of the task at hand—delivering elusive elements of social membership on demand. No matter how well funded a resettlement agency nor how skillful its staff, the major goals of resettlement—economic self-sufficiency and cultural adjustment—are difficult to attain. Economic self-sufficiency is largely dependent on economic factors beyond any resettlement worker's control. Similarly, cultural adjustment, learning English, and coping with the mental trauma brought on by the refugee experience itself can only be achieved through the efforts of refugees themselves, expended over protracted periods of time.

Further complicating matters are the differences in cultural backgrounds of providers and recipients of services. For many refugees, resettlement staff are the first representatives of American society with whom they have any significant contact, and even the most basic interactions involve various forms of cultural conflict. Thus, to do their job at all, resettlement agencies, schools, and the like must socialize their clients in the ways of American society. In the words of one government resettlement report: "There are aspects of American life with which refugees must simply learn to cope."[66]

LANGUAGE

Soviet émigrés (with the exception of the elderly) tend to make excellent progress with language. Several studies found that, while about half spoke no English on arrival, within a few years upward of two-thirds or more rate themselves as "good" (or better) in the English language and a large proportion (50–70 percent) have taken English classes.[67]

JOB PLACEMENT

The development of economic self-sufficiency is one of the major responsibilities of the refugee resettlement system. Staff and clients alike agree that refugees should find jobs, but recently arrived refugees who lack compe-

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1, 1983, pp. 65–69; Nina Dorf and Fay Katlin, "The Soviet Jewish Immigrant Client: Beyond Resettlement," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 60, no. 2, 1983, pp. 146–54; Drachman and Halberstadt, "A Stage of Migration Framework," pp. 63–78; Joann Ivry, "Paraprofessionals in Refugee Resettlement," in Ryan, ed., *Social Work with Immigrants and Refugees*, pp. 99–117.

[66]Donald J. Cichon, Elizabeta M. Gozdziak, and Jane G. Grover, *The Economic and Social Adjustment of Non-Southeast Asian Refugees*, vol. 1: *Analysis Across Cases* (Research Management Corp., Dover, N.H., 1986), p. 87; Lewin and Associates, *Assessment of the MAA Incentive Grant Initiative*; ORR, *Report to Congress 1986*.

[67]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Simon, *New Lives*; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, "Jewish Identification"; Jewish Family Service of the North Shore, "Social Needs Survey," table 6.

tence in English generally have little understanding of the American economy and the means of finding jobs within it. Adding to the difficulty, many Soviet Jewish refugees entered the U.S. job market during the early 1980s and a decade later, in the late 1980s and early 1990s—periods marked by recession and high unemployment rates—when jobs were often scarce.

All the relevant factors—the need for jobs, the scarcity of job opportunities, and refugees' lack of understanding of American job-finding practices—must be confronted during face-to-face interactions in the job-placement units of refugee resettlement agencies, most commonly the Jewish Vocational Service. Émigrés are heavy consumers of job-placement services. According to data from the 1990–91 Jewish population study of New York, one in four post-1965 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union sought help in finding a job in the 12 months prior to the date of the survey. In contrast, only one in ten members of the larger Jewish community sought such services.

Because of the vast differences between Soviet and American procedures for finding employment, some recently arrived émigrés have particularly difficult interactions with American job-placement workers. Some émigrés interpret their interactions with the Jewish Vocational Service in light of past encounters with Raspredelenie, the Soviet state employment agency. Under this system, qualified workers simply showed their diplomas and credentials to the centralized placement office and were assigned appropriate jobs. Elements typical of the American job-search process, such as finding openings, dealing with employment services, preparing resumes, and selling one's self in interviews were nonexistent. Hence, émigrés are often overwhelmed by the complexity and uncertainty of the American process. Drawing upon their Soviet experience, in which desired services were often delivered by bureaucrats in exchange for favors, émigrés who are not referred to jobs of their liking sometimes assume that agency staff are holding out in order to receive a payoff.[68] Accordingly, émigrés have occasionally attempted to bribe staff or offer indirect payment in the form of contributions to the Jewish federation.

Émigrés have also tried to acquire jobs through Soviet-style political machinations involving "*blat*" (influence) and "*sviazy*" (connections). This quote from a job-finding class for émigré engineers at a California JCC illustrates a common émigré mind-set:

> All of this training, it's no good. This is what we should do. Do you know the director of the Jewish Federation? Does he make appointments with people like us? We will talk to him. He could go to the president of big engineering company, Jewish president, and tell him to hire some of us. There are only a few of us. He could hire one of us each week.[69]

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[68] Di Francisco and Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture."
[69] Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 147.

Émigrés like this see American institutions through the lens of their Soviet experience. Rather than following the suggestions of agency staff, they try to apply job-finding techniques that worked in the USSR.

The fact that many Soviet Jewish refugees are professionals only serves to intensify the conflicts with job-placement agencies. With university education and years of experience, they identify strongly with their previous occupations and are unhappy about accepting the lower-status positions to which they are often referred. Some Soviet Jews may be angered by their job-placement experience to the point of distancing themselves from the Jewish community. They may complain of inadequate guidance and career counseling, not enough personal involvement, and of being pushed to accept low-level jobs.

In the words of a Los Angeles Soviet Jewish activist, some of the complaints are justified, and some of the expectations are realistic. Yet for many, there is only a one- or two-time exposure to a counselor of family or vocational service. Those who are dissatisfied tend to view the whole Jewish community in America in a negative light.[70]

MENTAL HEALTH

Another area in which extensive cultural conflict and misunderstanding arise between resettlement staff and their Soviet Jewish clients is that of psychological therapy. When health assessments revealed that refugees suffer from a variety of mental-health problems, the government and resettlement agencies established mental-health programs specifically for this population. Unfortunately, Soviet Jews often lack the cultural prerequisites of a successful American-style therapy interaction, such as a willingness to confide in bureaucrats and a belief in the unconscious. Most refugees also do not see a connection between the process of therapy and the problems that, for them, are most pressing.

Social workers and therapists who work with Soviet refugees describe extensive conflicts based on mistrust, the stigmatized status of mental-health problems in the USSR, and the fact that mental illness was generally treated by medication rather than psychological therapy. "Depression, for example, is perceived in the Soviet Union as a biological entity and biochemical treatment is offered. A refugee client experiencing depression, therefore, expects to be treated with a pill. A service provider who attempts to deal with the depression through a commonly used method of talking therapy is not only perceived as strange but is also viewed as incompetent as the client doesn't receive what he/she thinks is needed."[71]

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[70]Ibid., p. 149.

[71]Drachman and Halberstadt, "A Stage of Migration Framework," p. 73.

Despite their generally negative impression of American-style therapy interactions, immigrants apparently do consume such services at a fairly high rate. According to the 1990–91 Jewish population study of New York, 11 percent of post-1965 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union sought personal, group, or family counseling in the previous year, compared with 17 percent of all New York Jews. However, former Soviets sought help with their children's emotional or behavioral problems at twice the rate of members of the Jewish community at large.

In sum, culture-based conflicts in several areas of service delivery are challenging to resettlement staff and clients alike. Moreover, since job placement, religious socialization, and mental-health services account for a significant portion of the encounters between Soviet Jews and American Jewish agencies, the images that the two communities often develop of each other in a hostile setting may overwhelm the mutual good will with which they began their relationship.

School and Social Adjustment

SCHOOL

School-aged émigrés are generally well educated and tend to excel in American schools. For example, in a 1991 comparison of the 12 largest immigrant groups in the New York City public schools, grades 3–12, who had been in the country three years or less, students from the former Soviet Union ranked first in reading scores, second in math, and fifth in English. Their reading and math scores were much higher than those of all students in New York schools, including the native-born. In addition, their mean increase in score over the previous year was the highest among all groups in both reading and English and among the highest in math.[72]

Despite their academic prowess, Soviet youth often experience frustration in American schools and may have difficulty working toward their own goals. Schools in the former USSR are generally more rigorous and accelerated than their American counterparts, with students attending a ten-year (most recently eleven) rather than a twelve-year system. Soviet students begin studying advanced subjects such as calculus and biology before Americans and consequently are years of ahead of Americans of the same age.[73]

Because of the lack of structural congruency between the two educational

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[72] *Test Scores of Recent Immigrants and Other Students, New York City Public Schools, Grades 3–12* (New York City Public Schools, Office of Research, Evaluation and Assessment, 1991).

[73] Steven J. Gold and Mia Tuan, "Jews from the Former Soviet Union in the United States," *New Faces of Liberty*, 1993.

systems, Russian students are frequently required to repeat earlier work, which tends to erode the high levels of achievement motivation they come with initially. Students' frustration is compounded by the fact that their limited English ability prevents them from expressing themselves or demonstrating their advanced knowledge.[74]

A few young émigrés who experience their years in American high schools as an unwarranted delay that prevents them from achieving preset life goals choose to follow an alternative educational path. Having discovered that junior colleges will often accept students without a diploma, they drop out to pursue what they see as the fast track to a college education. Some follow the correct procedures for withdrawal, while others simply stop coming to school. If their plans to obtain the AA degree are thwarted, such students find themselves lacking even basic English skills and a high-school diploma and accordingly find few options for employment.

FAMILY PATTERNS

Unlike most immigrant and refugee groups, which are characterized by a youthful population, many Russian Jewish families contain elderly individuals. Refugee families experience problems because the elderly have difficulties learning English, finding employment, and making their way in the United States. Families that have successfully adapted to American life express concern over the relative isolation of elderly family members.

Generational conflict, which exists among all immigrant families, may be aggravated by the gaps in levels of adjustment between the generations. For example, Sasha, a 35-year-old Russian Jew, was making $30,000 a year as a computer programmer two years after his arrival in this country in 1982. His position contrasted dramatically with that of his parents, who knew almost no English, did not drive, and were unemployed. Consequently, Sasha had to support them financially, serve as their translator, and provide transportation in addition to managing his own career and family life. To offer the parents some independence, the family resided in a Russian-speaking neighborhood, but this was far from his job, requiring Sasha to make an 80-mile commute.[75]

Many patterns typical of Soviet émigré families, including small size, employment of both parents outside the home, and the high priority placed on children's education facilitate their adjustment to American society. At

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[74]Gloria Zicht, "The Effects of Emigration on Soviet Jewish Children: Latency to Adolescence," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, Fall 1993, pp. 57–63.

[75]Gold, *Refugee Communities*. See S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure* (New York, 1956); and Carlos E. Sluzki, "Migration and Family Conflict," *Family Process* 18, no. 4, 1979, pp. 381–94.

the same time, certain family and cultural patterns pose difficulties in the new setting. In the former Soviet Union, parents tend to be highly involved in their children's lives. In contrast, the peer group, a central force in American adolescents' socialization, has relatively little influence. This is especially so among Jewish families, because parents feel their efforts are necessary to shield children from anti-Semitism and ensure chances for success. Carried over to the United States, this desire to protect children may foster excessive dependence and prevent émigré youth from dealing with American life on their own terms.[76] A San Francisco resettlement worker referred to this as she observed that many Soviet Jewish adolescents lack a life of their own:

> I have seen such cases of depressing loneliness in a 20-year-old boy or girl. It is easy if they live on the campus—that's a real chance to meet people. But many don't do it. They come and go to City College or a business school for a year.
>
> Then they go to work and they live with their parents. If they don't have friends among other immigrants, it's unbelievable. I know this one 22-year-old. She's beautiful, she's subtle. I think you would say she is a very intelligent young girl. She spends most of her time at work and then she spends time with her family. There is no outlet to go out because she doesn't know how to.[77]

In general, Soviets show a marked preference for social interaction with other émigrés, and this extends to the younger generation.[78] In a pilot study of dating behavior, for example, Fruchtbaum and Skager found that teenage émigré girls who had lived in the United States from 8 to 14 years (and so were quite acculturated) all "expressed their preference for Russian men as boyfriends and marriage partners," because they believed it would be easier to understand, trust, and become close with a young man with whom they shared a common background. The girls' parents openly encouraged them to date Russians. "The need for the boyfriend to be accepted by the parents and the family, and the importance of good communication between parents and the boyfriend were expressed by all of the participants."[79]

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[76]Michael Aronowitz, "The Social and Emotional Adjustment of Immigrant Children: A Review of the Literature," *International Migration Review* 18, no. 2, 1984, pp. 237–57; Phillis Hulewat, "Dynamics of the Soviet Jewish Family: Its Impact on Clinical Practice for the Jewish Family Agency," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 58, no. 1, 1981, pp. 53–60.

[77]Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 85.

[78]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, pp. 15–37; Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*.

[79]Simcha R. Goldberg, "Jewish Acculturation and the Soviet Immigrant," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 57, no. 1, 1981, pp. 154–63; Steven J. Gold, "Differential Adjustment Among New Immigrant Family Members," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 17, no. 4, 1989, pp. 408–34; Irene Fruchtbaum and Rodney Skager, "Influence of Parental Values on Dating Behavior of Young Russian Women: A Cross-Cultural Perspective," UCLA Department of Education, 1989, pp. 18–19.

COMMUNITY TIES

Soviet Jews have considerable social interaction with each other, but take part in few organized activities. They tend to live in geographically concentrated communities, which allows the many aged émigrés to mingle easily. Neighborhood networks of family and friends are important not only as sources of social connection but as resources for information and practical help.[80] The many ethnic small businesses in these areas direct their goods and services to émigrés. Various publications, especially *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York) and *Panorama* (Los Angeles), are available as well as Russian-language TV and radio. Émigrés are also frequent consumers of American media.[81]

As already noted, the Soviet Jewish communities are marked by divisions based on region of origin, educational level, occupation, and other factors. At the same time, Jews from the former Soviet Union, especially the great majority from the European republics, have many social similarities. They tend to be educated, urbanized, and Russian-speaking, and to share many common values. Generally more conservative than the Jewish and non-Jewish Americans near whom they reside, émigrés often complain about gays, minority groups, graffiti, the crime rate, drug use, pornography, and lack of discipline in schools. While retaining a fear of anti-Semitism, they nevertheless have a strong identity as whites and sometimes make disparaging comments regarding blacks and Asians. They are especially incensed by liberals (heavily represented in the American Jewish community) who oppose nuclear power, distrust the military, and demand civil liberties for social misfits.[82]

These views separate them politically from many of their co-ethnic hosts. Jews from the former Soviet Union have been described as "a community that is staunchly conservative Republican and is quite puzzled by the left-leaning liberalism of American Jews." A Soviet Jewish journalist commented on Soviet Jews' differences with their American counterparts: "Most American Jews are used to being liberals. But Russian Jews, having very tough experience, know what socialism does mean. They are very close to the right wing, politically. We have gotten involved with the campaigns. I think that almost everybody voted for Republicans."[83]

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[80]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Orleck, "Soviet Jews: Life in Brighton Beach"; Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*.

[81]Gold, "Refugees and Small Business"; idem, "Patterns of Interaction and Adjustment"; Orleck, "Soviet Jews: Life in Brighton Beach"; Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*.

[82]Gold, *Refugee Communities*; Leo Noonan, "Russians Go Republican," *Jewish Journal* (Los Angeles), Nov. 18–24, p. 31. Markowitz, in *Community in Spite of Itself*, describes how New York's Soviet Jews strongly supported Bernard Goetz, a white man who shot four black youths demanding money in the subway.

[83]Frumkin, "Who Are the Russians?" p. 17; Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 209.

RELATIONS WITH AMERICAN JEWS

It appears that Soviet Jews do not form many close relationships with American Jews or non-Jews. One reason is the cultural and linguistic gap between émigrés and American Jews, including the differences in social and political attitudes. Another, particularly in large metropolitan areas, is geographic separation—Soviet Jews tend to live in self-contained enclaves. A Soviet Jewish woman who had lived in the San Francisco Bay Area for ten years commented on the difficulty of developing friendships with Americans:

> From the beginning, everybody wants to be assimilated, to get out of this ghetto, and nobody wants to accept it that they are in a ghetto in the Richmond District, Sunset District. But after that, people get out and a lot of them probably didn't fill up their expectation and they had a problem socializing with Americans [Jews] and this is not their language. And after a while, they get back together and about 25 percent of the community still wanted to get out and 75 percent completely satisfied with what they have.[84]

Émigrés are also drawn together as they encounter the resentment that some American Jews harbor toward them. In interviews, émigrés bristled at American Jews' assertion that they should have settled in Israel or that because they lacked religious knowledge, they were not "real Jews."

> I remember, even when I didn't know the language so well, I could hear the question "How do you know you are a Jew if you didn't do this and you didn't know that." And "Why didn't they go to Israel?"
>
> I tell you, each family have some that died in the Ghetto. That's the kind of experience that you grow up with as a kid. Not long ago, we had a discussion on Jewish religious education with American Jews and we told them, "We are Jewish enough and sometimes more than enough."[85]

Soviet Jews who arrived prior to 1990 disliked being called "*noshrim*" (dropouts) for not settling in Israel. Whenever Jewish agencies discussed measures to force Soviets to settle in the Jewish state, émigrés expressed their displeasure, pointing out the hypocrisy of such statements, saying, "Let my people go, indeed!" In the words of a Los Angeles activist:

> This is a very sensitive problem, but we have to face it and be honest, because unfortunately, I have to say that I've heard a lot of statements on behalf of American Jews, okay, which I can only describe as a double standard. Why should they sit in Beverly Hills and accuse me of not going over to Israel and I left Russia with $120 and he has all the money in the world?[86]

The feeling of being rejected by American Jews provides Soviet Jews with yet another reason to turn toward fellow émigrés.

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[84]Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 208.
[85]Ibid.
[86]Ibid., pp. 162–63.

RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZATION

Émigrés generally avoid formal organizations. This is both because they lack experience in creating voluntary associations, and also because in the USSR, such entities were imposed by government bureaucrats rather than voluntarily created by members. Consequently, émigrés assume that persons who take leadership roles in communal activities do so only in order to obtain some personal benefit. According to a report on Soviet Jewish émigré organizations, émigrés "developed a very strong negative attitude toward such organizations and activities," and "the figure of the social activist acquired a permanent negative classification in the minds of many new immigrants."[87] Studies on both coasts describe émigrés' difficulties in creating viable associations.[88]

Nevertheless, several types of formal organizations have come into being: broad-based groups that seek to unite all Russian Jews or "new Americans"; veterans' associations; networks of entrepreneurs (as described above); professional associations; and groups involved with leisure and cultural activities, such as sports and music. In the religious sphere, the Chabad-Lubavitch organization has organized synagogues for Russian speakers in several localities. In different ways, these entities seek to help newcomers adapt to the United States, retain Russian-language culture, and develop a Jewish identity. They vary widely in terms of their emphasis on a Russian or Jewish cultural orientation, their financial well-being, stability, and relations with American Jewish groups.

In considering the communal life of Soviet Jews, it has been noted that the high levels of skill they possess—together with the many benefits they receive from the Jewish community and the U.S. government—may actually reduce their need to create mutual-aid associations of the type common among other migrant communities, including earlier cohorts of Russian Jews.[89] Consequently, by their very existence, resettlement services may offer a disincentive to group formation.

JEWISH IDENTITY AND BEHAVIOR

Jewish identity is a complex issue for Soviet émigrés. Although most have had little formal Jewish education (Kosmin reported 4 percent having had

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[87]Pavel Ilyin and Mikaella Kagan, "Finding a Niche in American Jewish Institutional Life—Soviet Jewish Emigre Organizations," paper presented at the Wilstein Institute for Jewish Policy Studies Conference, Soviet Jewish Acculturation—Beyond Resettlement, Palo Alto, 1991, p. 5.

[88]Gold, *Refugee Communities*; Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*.

[89]Eckles et al., "Portrait in Diversity."

one year prior to migration), many appear to have deep feelings of connectedness and a strong sense of ethnic or national identification as Jews.[90]

The Soviet émigré population is marked by generational variation in religious background. Three generations of Soviet émigrés in the United States—the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young—have each had a different experience with Judaism.[91] The elderly are often familiar with the traditional Eastern European Judaism that they learned from their parents or before the Stalinist crackdowns of the 1930s. Middle-aged Soviet Jews grew up in an atheistic environment that encouraged them to assimilate and deprived them of any Jewish content in their lives. An engineer in his forties describes his lack of Jewish knowledge:

> No Jewish culture at all . . . you know our family lost it completely. It was a shame. When we went to Vienna [after leaving the USSR], they were kind of sorting people who the agencies would be taking care of. And they looked at our family—we didn't look like Jews to them. And they started to ask questions what we know about Jewish life. Do we know any holidays? And we were so ashamed—we didn't know any. Then I remembered. When I was a little kid, my grandfather gave us Hanukkah gold—Gelt. I recalled getting presents. And I told them about the Hanukkah Gelt—they started to laugh like crazy.[92]

Finally, émigré children who have spent a few years in the United States have by now had some exposure to contemporary Judaism, since numerous religious activities, scholarships to Jewish camps, schools, and the like are made available as part of their resettlement program.

In general, Jewish identification among émigrés is secular or nationalistic rather than religious. Kosmin found that over 60 percent of émigrés surveyed felt that the meaning of being Jewish in America was "Cultural" or "Nationality," while less than 30 percent felt it was "Religious." The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies found similar results, with 79 percent favoring "Nationality," 62 percent "Culture/History; Ethnic Group," and 24 percent "Religion" as definitions of Jewish identity in the United States.[93]

Emigrés from the former Soviet Union are in various ways more "ethnic" than many American Jews in their involvement with other Jews, networks, and outlooks. In this sense—following the analysis of sociologist Herbert Gans—the Soviet Jews are at an earlier stage in their group identity. According to Gans, assimilated, third-plus-generation American white ethnics

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[90]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Markowitz, "Jewish in the USSR."

[91]Alexander Orbach, "The Jewish of Soviet-Jewish Culture: Historical Considerations," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 58, no. 3, 1980, pp. 145–53; Lionel Kochan, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917* (London, 1978).

[92]Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 36.

[93]Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985, p. 21; Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, p. 35.

(notably Jews) maintain "symbolic ethnicity" through self-selected, identity-related expressive behaviors, whereas first-generation individuals rely extensively on their own ethnic communities and networks for the fulfillment of basic needs.[94]

Evidence of the Soviet émigrés' strong ethnic ties can be gleaned from their responses to several questions in the 1990–91 New York Jewish population study (table 14). For example, Jews from the former Soviet Union are more competent in Yiddish, more likely to be members of Jewish community centers (JCCs) or YMHAs, and read more Jewish publications than all New York Jews. They are much more likely than all New York Jews to have close friends or immediate family living in Israel, to have Jews as their closest friends, and to believe that when it comes to a crisis, Jews can only depend on other Jews. Finally, as noted above, Jews from the former USSR have more negative views of intermarriage, even when the non-Jewish spouse converts to Judaism, than do all New York Jews. These measures suggest that, despite Russian émigrés' lower rates of Jewish education and religiosity than American Jews, their Jewish identity is expressed in a variety of other ways.

Soviet Jews in Brighton Beach (Brooklyn), for example, have created their own rituals, such as bar mitzvahs and weddings, that take place in Russian restaurants and feature Russian-speaking American rabbis. Symbolically blending and reconciling Jewish and American identities in the context of a Russian nightclub/restaurant, they demonstrate that the bar mitzvah child, and by extension the family and all others present, are fully accepted as Jews in America, and also, that being Jewish is worthy and fun.[95]

The 1991 Jewish population study of New York found that post-1965 émigrés are especially likely to be involved in certain Jewish community celebrations. For example, their rates of attendance at "activities that support Israel or Soviet Jewry," Purim carnivals, Israel Independence Day, and Holocaust commemorations all exceed those of the greater New York Jewish community. The high rates of former Soviets' involvement in these may be the result of effective programming by Jewish community agencies. (See table 15.)

Yiddish

Different studies report different levels of Yiddish knowledge among émigrés, depending in part on what exactly was asked. A 1985 New York

[94]Herbert Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 1, 1979, pp. 1–20.

[95]Markowitz, *Community in Spite of Itself*, p. 161.

study reported that 68 percent of émigrés understand, and 43 percent speak, Yiddish; the 1990–91 New York Jewish population study found that 42 percent of post-1965 Soviet Jewish émigrés speak Yiddish, in contrast to 38 percent of all Jews in New York. However, the percentage that can read or write the language is smaller, 13 percent or less. As might be expected, the elderly tend to have much more Yiddish ability. Krautman's Los Angeles study found that 50 percent understand Yiddish. Kosmin reported that 43 percent speak Yiddish. According to the 1990 census, 2.3 percent of émigrés in New York and 0.3 percent of émigrés in Los Angeles speak Yiddish at home, while 1.4 percent in New York and 1.9 percent in Los Angeles speak Hebrew at home.[96] (See table 16.)

Religious and Communal Participation

A number of surveys have explored Soviet Jews' participation in specific Jewish rituals and behaviors and found it to be roughly similar to that of American Jews. Émigrés who have been in the United States longer and are financially better off tend to be more involved in Jewish life.[97] (See table 17.)

SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP

Kosmin found that around 40 percent of Soviet Jews belong to synagogues, with Reform being the dominant affiliation. This finding is consistent with the 1990–91 Jewish population study of New York, which determined that 42 percent of post-1965 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union are dues-paying members of a synagogue or temple, the same proportion as in the larger New York community. The rank order of their membership—Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, and Reconstructionist—is the same as that of the larger community. In the New York study, the Soviets' pattern of synagogue attendance differs somewhat from that of other Jews: roughly 40 percent of Soviets attend only on High Holy Days, compared with 16 percent of all Jews; but the proportions saying they attend once a month or more are about the same. (See table 18.)

Krautman's 1990 Los Angeles study found that 28 percent of Soviet émigrés had belonged to a synagogue at some point during their stay in the

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[96]Jerry Allan Krautman, "A Study of the Acculturation and Jewish Identity of Soviet Jews Emigrating to Los Angeles Between 1972 and 1989" (MBA thesis, University of Judaism, 1990), p. 21; Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, p. 19; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985, p. 11.

[97]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, p. 53; Simon, *New Lives*, p. 36; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985, pp. 28–29, 38. In comparing the figures, Simon found lower rates on most practices. This may be due to the fact that her data were collected at an earlier date. The higher rates may also reflect the interviewees' perception of desired response.

United States, with far higher membership (42 percent) among those who came prior to 1980. In Los Angeles, Chabad was the most commonly cited form of synagogue membership, followed by Reform. For example, nearly all Soviet Jews in Los Angeles can name the two Russian Chabad rabbis, while far fewer are familiar with American rabbis or synagogues.[98]

OTHER JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to synagogues, Soviet Jews are most often involved with Jewish community centers. Kosmin, in a national sample, found about 20 percent with some JCC involvement. Krautman found that Los Angeles émigrés were most often involved with health and resettlement agencies, the Jewish Federation Council, and the JCC. The 1985 New York Federation study found the JCC and YM-YWHA were the most common Jewish affiliations, with 35 percent involved. In the 1991 New York study, 24 percent of post-1965 émigrés indicated participation in YM-YWHA activities, compared with 13 percent of all Jews. Asked whether they had heard of New York UJA-Federation, 89 percent of all Jews had, compared with 56 percent of Soviets.[99]

JEWISH EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN

Surveys reflect a strong interest on the part of émigré parents to promote their children's involvement in Jewish activities. When free or reduced day-school tuition is offered to recently arrived Soviet Jewish children, a large proportion accept. However, as fee waivers expire, many leave these schools. Émigré parents' desire to send their children to day school is motivated not only by religious goals but by concern about the lack of safety, attention, and discipline they associate with urban public schools. Barber asserts that Soviet Jews generally favor academic over religious training and often object to expending more than what they consider to be a minimal amount of time on Judaic studies.[100]

Kosmin found that 80 percent of 12-year-olds were being sent to some kind of Jewish education. He indicates that Jewish education is most directly associated with preparation for the bar or bat mitzvah, with participation falling off rapidly after age 13. Income is significantly correlated with

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[98]Krautman, "Study of the Acculturation . . . Los Angeles"; Gorbis, "Give Us Your Poor Homeless Organizations"; Kosmin, *Class of 1979*.

[99]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Krautman, "Study of the Acculturation . . . Los Angeles"; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985; 1991 New York Jewish Population Study.

[100]Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985; Barber, "Jews of Washington Heights."

children's receiving Jewish education. In Los Angeles, 20 percent of the young people surveyed were getting some kind of Jewish education.[101]

The 1991 New York study found that 28 percent of post-1965 adult Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union had received some formal Jewish education as children, compared to 77 percent for all members of the larger New York Jewish community. While members of the larger community most often received their Jewish education in afternoon schools, the most common form of Jewish education for Soviets was day school. Twenty-four percent of émigrés in the New York study report having had "a bar or bat mitzvah or confirmation" when they were young, in contrast to 55 percent of all New York Jews. The Soviet figures seem high in light of what is known about the absence of Jewish education under Communism, and we may assume that some of this Jewish education was acquired after arrival in this country. Also, since the late 1980s, more Jewish educational activities have been available in the former USSR. Finally, the New York study does not specify the amount of Jewish education, so that even a one-time study session might qualify as "Jewish education" (in contrast to the Kosmin study, which specified one year).

By and large, émigré parents encourage their children to get a Jewish education and to engage in Jewish activities. For example, Simon found that 79 percent would encourage or strongly encourage children to get a Jewish education; the 1985 New York study found that 97 percent feel it is important or very important to be educated about Jewish history and culture, while 76 percent of those surveyed want their children to get a Jewish religious education.[102] (See table 19.)

Jewish Socialization

The Jewish agencies involved in the resettlement of Soviet Jews see one of their primary functions as enhancing ethnic ties and integrating émigrés into the life of the American Jewish community. Accordingly, resettlement policy has been directed at including Soviet émigrés in American Jewish activities rather than encouraging the creation of Russian or Russian-Jewish activities. Conflicts involving the religious and cultural socialization of Soviet émigrés were most intense during the early years of resettlement (prior to the mid-1980s), when media exposure to the image of the pious refusenik led most American Jews to assume that Soviet Jews would be both religious and anti-Soviet. The executive director of Jewish Family Service of Akron exemplified this position when he described the "assimilation

[101]Kosmin, *Class of 1979*, p. 39; Krautman, "Study of the Acculturation . . . Los Angeles," p. 25.

[102]Simon, *New Lives*, p. 38; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1985.

task" for Soviet exiles in a 1980 article: "If our program succeeds in its goal of awakening Jewish consciousness, then these new Americans, in the near future, should become vital, responsible, and contributing members of our Jewish community."[103]

The arrival in the United States of Russian Jews who did not fit the preconceived notion of either Yiddish-speaking shtetl characters or of knowledgeable, committed Jews and Zionists caused consternation in many Jewish circles. David Harris, then Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee, pointed out that "it has become somewhat misleading to assert that the Soviet Jew, among other reasons, 'emigrates for a new life as a Jew'—at least, that is, if he is going to the United States. On the contrary, he emigrates to the United States (or Canada, etc.) to seek a new life as a freer individual, and, often, to have, at least in the beginning, a brief respite from being a Jew."[104]

A Soviet Jewish activist in San Francisco put it this way:

> First of all, we are not like your grandparents, people from Shalom Aleichem. We are educated, professional people. If you talk about the community in general, it's a non-religious community and that's it. Because we don't have religious ground. You have to form this ground first, but I don't think this will be an overnight thing. Right now, I try really to impress to American community, for us, Jewishness is non-religious.[105]

With time, some Soviet émigrés respond positively to the Jewish socialization component of resettlement, joining synagogues, sending their children to Jewish day schools and camps, participating in Jewish community activities, and raising funds for Jewish philanthropic activities. In the 1991 New York study, for example, 57 percent of émigrés reported giving to Jewish charities in the year prior to the survey, while 66 percent of all New York Jews did so. Not surprisingly, émigrés were the most likely to give $100 or less and the least likely to give $1,000 or more. (See table 17.)

Just as émigrés sometimes resist efforts at religious training, most also retain a strong Russian identity. While most Soviet Jews generally dislike communism, many retain a feeling of attachment to the culture, language, cuisine, literature, landscape, and way of life of their homeland and are unwilling to abandon their traditions in favor of American ways. When Americans approach former Soviets with strident criticism of Russia and clear expectations that they should forsake their background, émigrés are alienated. In this they surely resemble the earlier generations of Russian

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[103]Larry R. Schwartz, "Soviet Jewish Resettlement: Operationalizing Jewish Consciousness Raising," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 57, no. 1, 1980, p. 55.

[104]David Harris, "A Note on the Problem of 'Noshrim,' " *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 6, no. 2, 1976, p. 108.

[105]Gold, *Refugee Communities*, p. 209.

Jews who resisted the Americanization programs of German Jews.[106]

While officially there has been a strong emphasis on the inculcation of religion in Soviet Jewish resettlement activities, in reality, many resettlement personnel distance themselves from this task. Social workers realize that émigrés' most immediate interests involve achieving economic stability and ensuring secure careers for their children, not studying Hebrew or going to temple.[107]

By the late 1980s, acknowledgment was finally given at the organizational level to the fact that most Soviet Jews were not religiously active. Initial hopes to "create a Jewish need" or "foster Jewish language skills" and make Soviet émigrés into "vital, responsible, and contributing members of our Jewish community" were replaced by a more realistic acknowledgment of Soviet émigrés' secular and ethnic rather than religious identification.[108] An American rabbi who works with Soviet Jews reflected this realization: "One of the disappointments that many rabbis felt was that most of the Soviet Jews did not find a need to express their Jewishness. We should have understood this, because they come from a secular, atheistic country, but it was difficult to accept."[109]

By the early 1990s, there were scattered reports of religious or communal involvement on the part of some former Soviets, suggesting that the picture was not entirely uniform. For example, the Reform Beth Shalom People's Temple in Bensonhurst (Brooklyn), New York, had attracted some 500 Soviet Jewish members with programs intended to welcome émigrés on their own terms. Similarly, in Los Angeles, Russian-born rabbis involved in the Chabad movement created a number of programs, including a synagogue, where some 1,400 émigrés attended services on Yom Kippur in 1993.[110]

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[106]Markowitz, "Jewish in the USSR"; Bernard Farber, Charles H. Mindel, and Bernard Lazerwitz, "The Jewish American Family," in *Ethnic Families in America*, 3rd ed., ed. Charles H. Mindel, Robert Habenstein, and Roosevelt Wright, Jr. (New York, 1988), pp. 400–37.

[107]Gayle Zahler, "Jewish Identity and the Soviet Emigre Newcomer," paper presented at the National Conference of Jewish Communal Workers, Boca Raton, Fla., 1989.

[108]Simcha R. Goldberg, "Jewish Acculturation and the Soviet Immigrant," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 57, no. 3, 1981, pp. 154–63; Schwartz, "Soviet Jewish Resettlement"; Alvin I. Schiff, "Language, Culture and the Jewish Acculturation of Soviet Jewish Emigres," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 57, no. 1, 1980, pp. 44–49. See also Kosmin, *Class of 1979*; Zahler, "Jewish Identity"; and Carp, "Absorbing Jews Jewishly."

[109]Barber, "Soviet Jews of Washington Heights."

[110]Walter Ruby, "Russian Jews in America," *Long Island Jewish World*, Apr. 2–8, 1993, pp. 16–19; Naftoli Estulin, "Chabad Russian Immigrant Program and Synagogue," leaflet, Sept. 1993.

CONCLUSION

The patterns of economic and social adjustment and the political outlook of Soviet Jewish émigrés appear to be fairly clear. Highly skilled and educated, learning English fairly quickly, and taking advantage of excellent services, émigrés generally do well in their economic adaptation, if not always in the same high-status jobs they held in the USSR. Socially, most prefer the company of fellow émigrés, in an informal context that emphasizes their Russian culture and politically conservative views. It can be said that their general adaptation to American life appears to be following a predictable course.

What remains to be seen is the degree to which these émigrés will become involved in Jewish life in the future, either on their own terms or in consort with the American Jewish community. While identifying as Jews, most are not religious, but they maintain an ethnic attachment to their community that is more intense than that of American Jews. The general consensus regarding former Soviet Jews' communal and religious lives suggests that they are not drawn to formal organizations and are not religiously motivated; however, that image is beginning to be challenged. We have noted recent reports showing small groups of émigrés in various communities throughout the country creating organizations and becoming involved in Jewish life.

As today's émigrés often point out, the recently arrived Jews from the former Soviet Union are drastically different from the cohort of their *landsleit* who came to these shores from Russia almost a century ago. They want to be accepted on their own terms, as individuals and as Jews, and to win respect for their culture and background. They care deeply about the traditions of their European way of life and, while grateful to America for the opportunities and freedom it offers, strongly guard their independence from established Jews whom they see as over-zealously planning their American and Jewish acculturation. Like previous waves of immigrants before them, they will shape an identity that is uniquely their own—in their own way and in their own time.

TABLE 1. SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES[a] (BY CALENDAR YEAR)

Year	Number	Year	Number
1965	12	1980	15,461
1966	36	1981	6,980
1967	72	1982	1,327
1968	92	1983	887
1969	156	1984	489
1970	135	1985	570
1971	214	1986	641
1972	453	1987	3,811
1973	1,449	1988	10,576
1974	3,490	1989	36,738
1975	5,250	1990	31,283
1976	5,512	1991	34,715
1977	6,842	1992	45,888
1978	12,265	1993	35,581
1979	28,794		
		Total	289,719

[a]HIAS-assisted émigrés, who account for most of the total Jewish immigration.
Source: HIAS.

TABLE 2. ORIGINS OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRES IN THE U.S. BY YEAR OF ARRIVAL

Republic	1980 to 1989		1980 through May 1993		1990 through May 1993	
Ukraine	43%	(32,850)	42%	(81,421)	41%	(48,571)
Russia	27	(20,237)	24	(46,391)	22	(26,154)
Belarus	14	(10,419)	13	(24,437)	12	(14,018)
Moldova	4	(3,376)	6	(11,113)	7	(7,737)
Latvia	3	(2,313)	2	(4,486)	2	(2,173)
Uzbekistan	4	(3,111)	6	(12,591)	8	(9,480)
Azerbaijan	2	(1,608)	2	(4,715)	3	(3,107)
Unknown		(10)	1	(2,856)	2	(2,846)
Other	3	(2,405)	3	(6,037)	3	(3,632)
Total	100%	(76,329)	100%[a]	(194,047)	100%	(117,718)

[a]Exceeds 100% due to rounding.
Sources: HIAS 1991; 1993.

TABLE 3. LOCATION OF PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE U.S., 1980 AND 1990

1980 (By Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas)		1990 (By State)[a]	
New York SMSA	36%	New York	30%
Los Angeles/Long Beach	16	California	23
Chicago	7	Illinois	6
San Francisco/Oakland	4	New Jersey	6
Boston	4	Massachusetts	5
Miami	3	Florida	5
		Pennsylvania	5
Six SMSAs total = 70%		Seven states total = 80%	

[a]As of writing, SMSA data are unavailable.
Sources: 1980 data from Barry R. Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States: An Analysis of Their Linguistic and Economic Adjustment," *International Migration Review* 27, no. 2, 1993; 1990 U.S. Census.

TABLE 4. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

Educational Level	New York City			Los Angeles County		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
8th grade or less	7%	8%	8%	5%	6%	6%
Some high school	11	8	9	7	9	8
Finished high school	23	26	25	15	14	15
Some college	20	23	22	14	28	21
College grad or more	38	35	36	59	43	51
(One or more years college)	(58)	(58)	(58)	(73)	(71)	(72)

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 5. AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL, PERSONS AGED 24–65, BORN IN THE USSR, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

Period of Arrival	New York City		Los Angeles County	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
1987–90	13.5	13.4	14.1	13.6
1980–81	13.4	12.9	14.3	13.6
1975–79	13.5	13.3	15.3	14.2

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 6. AVERAGE EARNINGS BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL, EMPLOYED PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

Period of Arrival	New York City			Los Angeles County		
	Men	Women	Ratio Women/Men	Men	Women	Ratio Women/Men
1987–90	$19,372	$ 8,187	42%	$19,672	$12,604	64%
1980–81	$31,748	$22,732	72	$44,619	$27,521	62
1975–79	$33,050	$22,495	68	$43,061	$25,031	58

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 7. LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL FOR PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

	New York City					
	Men			Women		
	1965–90	1965–86	1987–90	1965–90	1965–86	1987–90
In labor force	76%	89%	60%	57%	68%	41%
(Employed)	(65)	(86)	(35)	(48)	(63)	(25)
(Unemployed)	(12)	(3)	(24)	(9)	(4)	(16)
Not in labor force	24	11	41	43	32	59
	Los Angeles County					
	Men			Women		
	1965–90	1965–86	1987–90	1965–90	1965–86	1987–90
In labor force	79%	88%	53%	63%	71%	42%
(Employed)	(71)	(81)	(43)	(58)	(68)	(30)
(Unemployed)	(8)	(7)	(10)	(6)	(3)	(12)
Not in labor force	21	12	47	37	29	58

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 8. WELFARE USE[a] BY PERIOD OF ARRIVAL, PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[b]

Period of Arrival	New York City		Los Angeles County	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
1965–90	14%	13%	7%	11%
1965–86	5	10	5	9
1987–90	26	18	12	15

[a]AFDC, SSI, General Relief.
[b]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 9. LARGE-CITY REFUGEE TOTALS AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATES, 1989–1992[a]

City	Total Refugees at 4 Months[b]	No. Self-Sufficient	Self-Sufficiency Rate
Baltimore			
1989	239	191	0.0%
1990	893	721	30.7
1991	472	409	36.7
1992[c]	610	503	82.4
Boston			
1989	1,073	286	26.7%
1990	1,254	336	26.8
1991	572	47	8.2
1992	1,008	94	9.3
Chicago			
1989	1,381	169	12.2%
1990	3,000	403	13.4
1991	990	129	13.0
1992	2,333	293	12.5
Los Angeles			
1989	1,467	245	16.7%
1990	2,449	535	21.8
1991	1,370	198	14.4
1992	2,066	244	11.8
New York			
1989	10,162	1,220	12.0%
1990	19,973	969	4.9
1991	8,131	395	4.5
1992	16,760	905	5.4
Philadelphia			
1989	723	68	9.4%
1990	1,474	174	11.8
1991	558	103	18.5
1992[c]	745	162	21.7

TABLE 9.—*(Continued)*

City	Total Refugees at 4 Months[b]	No. Self-Sufficient	Self-Sufficiency Rate
San Francisco			
1989	726	129	17.7%
1990	1,665	566	34.0
1991	806	114	14.1
1992	1,572	109	6.9
Total for 7 cities			
1989	15,771	2,308	14.6%
1990	30,708	3,704	12.1
1991	12,899	1,395	10.8
1992	25,094	2,310	9.2
Total for whole CJF system			
1990	41,349	10,155	24.6%
1991	19,352	4,599	23.8
1992	33,620	6,151	18.3

[a]Years shown are Matching Grant Program Years: 1989 = 10/1/88–9/30/89; 1990 = 10/1/89–12/31/90; 1991 = 1/1/91–12/31/91; 1992 = 1/1/92–12/31/92.
[b]Total at 4 months is total number of Matching Grant refugees who completed 4 months of service during each year.
[c]Baltimore and Philadelphia's 1992 figures do not include data for final period of 1992.
Source: HIAS Matching Grant Department.

TABLE 10. OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

	New York City			Los Angeles County		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Manager/Administrator	12%	8%	10%	19%	15%	17%
Prof/Tech	22	29	25	28	26	27
Sales	11	6	9	11	16	13
Clerical	6	25	15	5	20	12
Craft	25	2	15	20	6	14
Operative	3	4	3	2	4	3
Transport	11	0.3	6	8	0	4
Laborer	2	1	2	1	0	1
Service	7	23	14	3	13	8
Farm				1	0	1

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 11. SOVIET REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS, 1992 (INDIVIDUALS)

Last Employment in USSR	First Employment in USA											
	Arch Engin	Math Science	Comput Progm	Soc Sci Educ	Medcl Health	Human Art/Mus	Manag Adm/Clr	Bkkp Acct	Sales Service	Barber Cosm	Skill Trds	Total
Arch/Engin	83	8	4	1	5	2	7	29	5	0	108	252
Math/Science	8	9	2	2	5	1	2	2	0	0	5	36
Computer Prog	4	0	75	2	1	0	2	5	0	0	1	90
Soc Sci/Educ	0	0	2	26	3	2	7	59	3	6	6	114
Medical/Health	0	0	0	1	18	1	0	4	3	4	5	36
Human/Art/Mus	0	0	0	1	0	25	2	2	5	1	21	57
Mng/Adm/Clerk	0	1	0	4	1	0	2	5	3	0	8	24
Bookkeep/Acct	0	0	1	2	0	1	1	57	3	3	3	71
Sales/Service	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	8	2	6	19
Barber/Cosmet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	21	0	22
Skilled Trades	6	1	2	3	1	2	8	10	6	0	240	279
TOTAL	102	19	86	42	35	34	31	175	36	37	403	1,000

Note: Analysis based on 1,000 most recent job placements recorded in NYANA computer system as of May 21, 1992.
Source: Operations Analysis Dept., New York Association for New Americans.

TABLE 12. ECONOMIC SECTOR OF EMPLOYED PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 24–65, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

Economic Sector	New York City			Los Angeles County		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Private	70%	78%	74%	62%	78%	69%
Public	10	14	11	6	5	5
Self-employed	21	8	15	33	17	25

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 13. FORMER SOVIET JEWISH PROFESSIONALS & ENGINEERS[a] IN THE U.S., 1979–1992[B]

Sex	Men	Women	Total
	Professionals		
N	15,425	27,111	42,536
% of total labor force	15	27	41
	Engineers[a]		
N	12;475	6,557	19,032
% of total labor force	12	6	19
	Professionals & Engineers Combined		
N	27,900	33,668	61,568
% of total labor force	28	33	61
	All Occupations		
N	50,641	50,492	101,133
% of total labor force	50	50	100

[a]These two occupational categories for former occupation are tabulated separately. Engineer category also includes architects.
[b]Data for 1979–1991 are for calendar year; data for 1992 are fiscal year. 1990 data are not available.
Source: HIAS 1979–1993.

TABLE 14. ETHNIC TIES OF NEW YORK JEWS, 1991

Speak Yiddish:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	38%	42%

Respondent or any member of household has been a dues-paying member of a YMHA or Jewish Community Center within the past 12 months:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	15%	17%

Regularly read any Jewish publications:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	41%	49%

Respondent or spouse has close friends or immediate family living in Israel:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	46%	83%

Of the people respondent considers closest friends:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Few or none are Jewish	6%	0.2%
Most, almost all or all are Jewish	66%	96%

When it comes to a crisis, Jews can only depend on other Jews.

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Disagree	47%	25%
Agree	50%	68%

Source: The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study.

TABLE 15. INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY EVENTS OF NEW YORK JEWS, 1991

Participate in activities that support Israel or Soviet Jewry:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	50%	56%

Attended a Purim carnival or celebration during the past year:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	34%	67%

Celebrated Yom Ha'atzma'ut (Israel Independence Day) in any way during the past year:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	19%	30%

Attended a Holocaust commemoration during the past year:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Yes	22%	34%

Source: The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study.

TABLE 16. LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME, PERSONS BORN IN THE USSR, AGED 5+, NEW YORK CITY AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990[a]

	New York City		Los Angeles County	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Russian	53,133	91.1	12,000	89.0
Yiddish	1,363	2.3	46	0.3
English	1,267	2.2	543	4.0
Hebrew	820	1.4	252	1.9
Hungarian			185	1.4
Syriac			144	1.3

[a]Persons migrating to the U.S. since 1965. Anyone with Armenian ancestry or who reported speaking Armenian at home was excluded.
Source: 1990 Census.

TABLE 17. COMPARATIVE JEWISH BEHAVIORS, SOVIET JEWS AND U.S. JEWS[a]

	Soviet Jews in U.S.		Soviet Jews in N.Y.		U.S. Jews[b]
Study and Year Data Collected	Simon 1981	Kosmin[c] 1989	N.Y. Fed. 1984	NYJPS[d] 1991	NJPS 1990
Fast on Yom Kippur	50%	84%	65%	78%	58%
Attend Passover seder	—	67	75	90[d]	89[e]
Light Hanukkah candles	58	68	70	94[d]	83[e]
Light Sabbath candles	22	27	41	64[d]	43[e]
Kosher meat	—	20	20	—	17[f]
Two sets of dishes	12	18	—	70[d]	—
Member of synagogue	—	41	—	42	41[f]
Give to Jewish charity	—	82	58	57	62[f]
UJA contribution	—	57	10	—	45[f]
Visited Israel	—	21	—	33	31
Avoid bread on Passover	53	—	41	—	—

[a]Questions are not always identical. These are approximations for comparative purposes. For actual questions, see original studies.
[b]Jewish by religion.
[c]Respondents in the U.S. at least 8 years.
[d]While many of these responses seem quite high, the rates for all Jewish New Yorkers in certain behaviors are the same or higher, e.g., seder attendance (93%), Hanukkah candles (93%), two sets of dishes (78%), and Jewish charity (66%).
[e]Sometimes, Usually, Always.
[f]Households, not individuals.
Sources: Rita J. Simon, ed., *New Lives: The Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel* (Lexington, Mass., 1985); Barry A. Kosmin, *The Class of 1979: The "Acculturation" of Jewish Immigrants from the Soviet Union,* North American Jewish Data Bank, CUNY Graduate School and University Center, 1990; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *Jewish Identification and Affiliation of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in New York City—A Needs Assessment and Planning Study,* 1985; Bethamie Horowitz, *The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study,* United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1993; Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," AJYB 1992 (fast, seder, candles); Barry A. Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey,* Council of Jewish Federations, 1991.

TABLE 18. SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP, DENOMINATION, AND ATTENDANCE OF NEW YORK JEWS, 1990

Respondent or any member of household currently a dues-paying member of a synagogue or temple:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
	42%	42%

Jewish denomination of respondent:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Conservative	34%	20%
Orthodox	15	11
Reform	35	29
Reconstructionist	2	5
Something else	12	19

Frequency of attendance at any type of organized Jewish religious service:

	All Jews	Post '65 Soviets
Not at all	16%	8%
Once or twice a year	11	9
Only on special occasions	8	2
Only on High Holy Days	16	39
3+ times a year	19	11
About once a month	7	7
Several times a month	5	6
About once a week	6	10
Several times a week	6	7

Source: The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study.

TABLE 19. IMPORTANCE OF JEWISH ACTIVITIES FOR CHILDREN AS RATED BY SOVIET JEWISH PARENTS[a]

Study and Year Data Collected	Simon (U.S.) 1981	N.Y. Fed. 1984	Krautman (L.A.) 1990
Marry another Jew	87%	84%	90%
Observe Sabbath	45	69	—
Give to Jewish charities	87	—	89
Belong to Jewish orgs.	76	74	75
Have mostly Jewish friends	74	70	—
Visit Israel	—	80	90
Get a Jewish education	79	97–76[b]	—

[a]Questions are not always identical. These are approximations for comparative purposes. For actual questions, see original studies.

[b]97% Jewish history and culture; 76% Jewish religion.

Sources: Rita J. Simon, ed., *New Lives: The Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel* (Lexington, Mass., 1985); Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *Jewish Identification and Affiliation of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in New York City—A Needs Assessment and Planning Study,* 1985; Jerry Allan Krautman, *A Study of the Acculturation and Jewish Identity of Soviet Jews Emigrating to Los Angeles Between 1972 and 1989,* MBA thesis, University of Judaism, 1990.

Ethiopian Jews in Israel

by STEVEN KAPLAN and CHAIM ROSEN

OF THE MANY DIASPORA JEWISH communities, none has undergone more dramatic change in recent years than the Beta Israel (Falashas).[1] Prior to 1977 all but a handful of Beta Israel lived in Ethiopia. During the 1980s, almost half the community emigrated to Israel, and the center of Beta Israel life shifted from Ethiopia to Israel. In 1991, "Operation Solomon" put an end to the Beta Israel as an active and living Diaspora community, and by the end of 1993 virtually all Beta Israel were in Israel.

This article describes and analyzes the process of their immigration (*aliyah*) to, and absorption *(klitah)* in, Israel. Although every attempt has been made to provide as much quantitative statistical data as possible, significant gaps remain. Most of the research undertaken on the Ethiopians in Israel has been qualitative in nature. Even in those cases where attempts have been made to carry out precise surveys of immigrants, the results have not always been satisfactory.[2] Since Ethiopian immigrants usually arrived in Israel with few official documents, basic "facts" such as age and family status were often unverifiable, and immigrants were registered on the basis of their own or family members' testimony. Once they were settled in the country, the multiplicity of agencies dealing with the immigrants further complicated the process of compiling comprehensive and authoritative information.[3]

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[1]In Ethiopia, the members of the group usually referred to themselves as Beta Israel (the House of Israel) or simply Israel. They were more widely known as "Falashas." Today, they prefer to be called Ethiopian Jews.

[2]The Israel Ministry of Absorption has, for example, released several sets of figures concerning the number of Ethiopian immigrants that have arrived in Israel. In some cases the number said to have arrived in a given year has varied by as much as 25 percent!

[3]The bibliographic references contained in this article have been prepared with a primarily English-reading audience in mind. Only the most essential sources in other languages have been cited. This has resulted in an unfortunate, but inevitable, neglect of the vast and growing Hebrew literature concerning Ethiopian Jews in Israel. Every attempt has been made to summarize the major findings of that literature in the appropriate sections. Two extremely useful bibliographies containing Hebrew material have been published in recent years. They can be obtained by contacting Betachin, R. Yafo 101, Jerusalem 94342, and the Henrietta Szold Institute, 9 Columbia St., Jerusalem 96583.

BACKGROUND

The history of the Beta Israel did not, of course, begin with their arrival in Israel. Long before their encounter with world Jewry, the Beta Israel worshiped and created, struggled and fought, all within the context of the wider stream of Ethiopian history. Although some aspects of this history, particularly the question of "Falasha origins," have provoked considerable controversy in recent years, events prior to the late 19th or early 20th century are of little relevance to our concerns in this article.[4]

More recent events form the starting point for our discussion. For almost a century and a half prior to their *aliyah*, the Beta Israel were exposed to outside influences that slowly altered their religious life, social norms, and self-image. While none of the changes from this period had as immediate and overwhelming an impact as emigration from Ethiopia and immigration to Israel, neither can they be ignored. It is only possible to report the effects of the move to Israel faithfully if we begin with an accurate picture of what existed before.[5]

The modern history of the Beta Israel began in 1859 with the establishment in their midst of a Protestant mission under the auspices of the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews. It was the mission's activities more than anything else in the period before the 20th century that made these isolated Jews aware of the existence of a more universal form of Jewish identity and brought them to the attention of world Jewry.[6]

In response to the missionary threat, a number of prominent Jewish leaders began to lobby for aid to be sent to the Beta Israel. In 1867, Joseph Halévy was sent to Ethiopia as the emissary of the Alliance Israélite Universelle.[7] Despite Halévy's unequivocal confirmation of the Beta Israel's Jewishness, and his enthusiastic support for the establishment of institutions to

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[4]One of the central ironies of recent years is that only during the period of their emigration from Ethiopia has their history in that country begun to be clearly understood. See in particular Kay Kaufman Shelemay, *Music, Ritual and Falasha History* (East Lansing, Mich., 1989); James Arthur Quirin, *The Evolution of the Ethiopian Jews* (Philadelphia, 1992); and Steven Kaplan, *The Beta Israel (Falasha) in Ethiopia: From Earliest Times to the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1992).

[5]Steven Kaplan and Chaim Rosen, "Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: Between Preservation of Culture and Invention of Tradition," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 35, no. 1, June 1993, pp. 35–48.

[6]On the activities of this mission, see Kaplan, *Beta Israel*, pp. 116–42, and Quirin, *Ethiopian Jews*, pp. 179–91.

[7]On Halévy's visit and its significance, see Kaplan, *Beta Israel*, pp. 138–42. For Halévy's account of his journey, see Joseph Halévy, "Travels in Abyssinia," tr. James Picciotto, in A. Levy, *Miscellany of Hebrew Literature* (London, 1877).

assist them, no action was taken for almost 40 years, when Halévy's pupil Jacques (Ya'acov) Faitlovitch journeyed to Ethiopia in 1904. Faitlovitch, who dedicated his life to the cause of Ethiopian Jewry, was responsible more than any other single person for their entry into Jewish history and consciousness. The common thread that ran through all aspects of his program on their behalf was the attempt to bring them closer to other Jewish communities. To this end, he sought to raise their standards of education and created a Western-educated elite capable of interacting with their foreign Jewish counterparts. He also attempted to reform Beta Israel religion to bring it closer to "normative" Judaism. Among the innovations he introduced were the lighting of Sabbath candles, the recitation of Hebrew prayers, the use of the Star of David, and the observance of holidays such as Simhat Torah. Faitlovitch worked on behalf of Ethiopian Jewry until his death in 1955.[8]

During the years immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel, no attempt was made to bring the Beta Israel on *aliyah*. Lingering questions concerning their Jewishness, as well as social, medical, and political considerations, all convinced successive Israeli governments to defer any decisive action. Efforts were made, however, by the Jewish Agency and other organizations to strengthen their ties to world Jewry and Israel. From 1953 to 1958, representatives of the Jewish Agency's Department for Torah Education in the Diaspora were active in Ethiopia. Two groups totaling 27 Ethiopian youngsters were also brought to the Kfar Batya Youth Aliyah village in Israel to be trained as teachers and future leaders of their fellow Ethiopians. Eventually a network of schools was established throughout the Gondar region, which at its peak served hundreds of students. The impact of their efforts was not felt evenly among all sectors of the population. Some communities, particularly those in peripheral regions, remained largely unaffected. Others, in or near villages in which schools were established, underwent a more dramatic transformation as they were exposed to rabbinic Judaism, Zionism, and modernization.[9] Israel and Jerusalem, which had existed mainly as symbols of a lost biblical period, began to be perceived as living realities and for some a goal to be struggled toward. Not surpris-

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[8]Unfortunately, we lack a detailed study of Faitlovitch's life and works. See, however, Simon D. Messing, *The Story of the Falashas: "Black Jews" of Ethiopia* (Brooklyn, 1982), pp. 62–79; Itzhak Grinfeld, "Jacques Faitlovitch—'Father' of the Falashas," in *The Jews of Ethiopia—A Community in Transition*, ed. Yossi Avner et al. (Tel Aviv, 1986), pp. 30–35; and especially Faitlovitch's article in AJYB 1920–21, vol. 22, pp. 80–100.

[9]The best discussion of these issues in English is G. Jan Abbink, "The Falashas in Ethiopia and Israel: The Problem of Ethnic Assimilation," in *Nijmegen Sociaal Anthropologische Cahiers*, vol. 15, 1984. This work also contains a useful, albeit dated, discussion of Ethiopian Jewish absorption in Israel.

ingly, youngsters tended to adopt new ideas more quickly than their elders, and in some cases generational tensions developed.[10]

Such intergenerational tensions were further exacerbated following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, which led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the institution of a military Marxist regime.[11] Young people exposed to secular education and political indoctrination rejected the ways of their elders as old-fashioned. Contacts with non-Beta Israel increased significantly as young people joined political organizations, were conscripted into the security forces, or simply sought the professional and educational opportunities available in urban areas.

A Tale of Three Aliyot

While the significance of such changes should not be minimized, they pale in comparison to what happened from 1977 onward. At the beginning of 1977, fewer than 100 Ethiopian Jews had been grudgingly allowed—by either Ethiopian or Israeli authorities—to settle in Israel. By the end of 1993 the number of immigrants had risen to nearly 45,000! This mass migration took place over a relatively short period, not as a single event but rather in a series of waves, each of which had its own special characteristics.

Although it was generally not realized at the time, 1973 was a crucial year in the history of the Beta Israel. Early that year, Ovadia Yosef, the Sephardi chief rabbi of Israel, issued a religious ruling recognizing the Falashas as Jews. Citing rabbinic opinions from more than 400 years earlier, he stated that they were descendants of the lost tribe of Dan.[12] Rabbi Yosef's pronouncement brought no immediate change in the fortunes of Ethiopian Jewry. Indeed, the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Israel in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 if anything increased their isolation. His decision did, however, remove most doubts concerning the Jewishness of the Beta Israel, and thus made it possible for Jews in Israel and the Diaspora to agitate on their behalf. Slowly, their

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[10]This was especially the case following the return of the Ethiopian youngsters who had studied at the Kfar Batya Youth Aliyah village.

[11]Galia Sabar Friedman, "Religion and the Marxist State of Ethiopia: The Case of the Ethiopian Jews," *Religion in Communist Lands* 17, no. 3, 1989, pp. 247–56.

[12]The best English discussion of the halakhic status of Ethiopian Jews is by (former Israeli Supreme Court justice) Menachem Elon, "The Ethiopian Jews: A Case Study in the Functioning of the Jewish Legal System," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 19, 1986–87, pp. 535–63. Hebrew volumes include: (Rabbi) Menachem Waldman, *Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia: The Jews of Ethiopia and the Jewish People* (Tel Aviv, 1989); idem, *From Ethiopia to Jerusalem: Ethiopian Jewry in the Modern Era* (Jerusalem, 1991); (Rabbi) David Chelouche, *The Exiles of Israel Will Be Gathered* (Jerusalem, 1988); and (Attorney) Michael Corinaldi, *Ethiopian Jewry: Identity and Tradition* (Jerusalem, 1989).

controversial and sometimes confrontational tactics bore fruit. The issue of Ethiopian Jewry began to appear on the agenda of more and more Jewish organizations, and pressure grew for Israel to act on their behalf.[13]

From 1977 onward, successive Israeli governments began to turn their attention to the issue of Ethiopian Jewry. In that year, 121 Ethiopian Jews were brought to Israel as part of an "arms for Jews" deal between the Israelis and the Ethiopians. Unfortunately, in February of 1978, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan revealed the military side of the agreement, and an embarrassed Ethiopian government terminated the arrangement.

Although promises of land reform and freedom of worship led many to hope that Ethiopia's Marxist rulers would ameliorate the situation of the Beta Israel, this did not prove to be the case. While seldom victims of organized persecution, they suffered all the tribulations inflicted on the general population as well as those reserved for a particularly weak and vulnerable minority group. As conditions in Ethiopia deteriorated, their religious devotion to Jerusalem began to be transformed into an active desire to emigrate.

Rather surprisingly, the first significant wave of Beta Israel to leave Ethiopia did not include those who had had the most contact with foreign Jews and Israelis.[14] Starting in 1980, Jews from the relatively isolated regions of Tigre and Walqayit began to journey to the Sudan and to settle in refugee camps. Some were to wait there for as long as two or three years before being taken to Israel. Although Sudan was officially opposed to the emigration of these Jews, several Sudanese government officials agreed to allow their removal in exchange for large bribes and on condition of confidentiality. By the end of 1983, over 4,000 Beta Israel, virtually the entire Jewish population of Tigre and Walqayit, had reached Israel.

The Sudanese camps, however, far from emptying out, became home to an ever increasing number of refugees. Most were fleeing yet another famine in war-torn Ethiopia. A small number, Beta Israel from the Gondar region, were driven not by the search for food, but by their desire to reach Israel.

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[13]Rabbi Yosef's decision also paved the way for the granting of citizenship to the handful of Ethiopian Jews already in the country. For a recent study focusing on the American efforts on behalf of Ethiopian Jewry, see Jeffery A. Kaye, "On the Wings of Eagles: A History and Analysis of the Movement to Rescue Ethiopian Jewry" (M.A. thesis, HUC-JIR, Cincinnati, 1993). Among the most significant groups active in these efforts were the American Association for Ethiopian Jews (AAEJ), the Canadian Association for Ethiopian Jews (CAEJ), the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry (NACOEJ), and in England the Falasha Welfare Association (FWA).

[14]This is not to say that these Tigrean Jews had been completely cut off from Jewish contacts. Cf. G.J. Abbink, "An Ethiopian Jewish 'Missionary' as Cultural Broker," in *Ethiopian Jews and Israel*, ed. Michael Ashkenazi and Alex Weingrod (New Brunswick, N.J., 1988), pp. 21–32.

Despite many obstacles, what had hitherto been a trickle of Jewish emigrants from Gondar became a flood in 1984, and by the middle of the year, close to 10,000 additional Ethiopian Jews had crossed the border into the Sudan. As the situation in the refugee camps deteriorated and the mortality rate rose, the Israeli government decided to abandon its policy of gradual immigration in favor of a more ambitious policy. During a period of less than two months, starting in mid-November 1984, more than 6,700 Ethiopian Jews were airlifted to Israel in what became known as Operation Moses.[15]

Almost from the start, Operation Moses was an open secret, as hundreds of Israelis struggled to accommodate the new arrivals. Although strict censorship was imposed in Israel, this did not prevent several foreign papers from carrying reports on the airlift accredited to reporters outside Israel. Despite the fears of Israeli authorities, the Sudanese government ignored these stories and allowed the operation to continue. On January 3, 1985, representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, in an apparent attempt to divert media attention from the airlift and toward those Ethiopians already in Israel, gave a detailed briefing to the local and foreign press. On January 5, the Sudanese government suspended the airlift.

The untimely disruption of Operation Moses left several hundred Jews stranded in the Sudan. The U.S. and Israeli governments immediately formulated plans to rescue them. A few months later, a further 648 Beta Israel were removed from the Sudan in a CIA-sponsored airlift variously labeled Operation Sheba or Operation Joshua.

The trek to the Sudan and the ensuing sojourn in Sudanese refugee camps had a devastating effect on Ethiopian family life. Almost every Ethiopian who reached Israel during this period had both lost family members and left others behind in Ethiopia.[16] Scarcely a single family survived intact. For

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[15]Although a number of books were published on Operation Moses, they were intended as popular, not scholarly, works. They include: Tudor Parfitt, *Operation Moses* (London, 1985); Louis Rapoport, *Redemption Song: The Story of Operation Moses* (New York, 1986); Claire Safran, *Secret Exodus* (New York, 1987); Ruth Gruber, *Rescue: The Exodus of the Ethiopian Jews* (New York, 1987). Vastly different in tone and more scholarly in intent are two recent articles: Ahmed Karadawi, "The Smuggling of the Ethiopian Falasha to Israel Through Sudan," *African Affairs* 90, no. 358, Jan. 1991, pp. 23–50; and Teshome Wagaw, "The International Political Ramifications of Falasha Emigration," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 29, no. 4, 1991, pp. 557–81. Only one book has been published to date about Operation Solomon: Ya'acov Friedmann, *Operation Solomon: One Year and Thirty-One Hours* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1992). Books are also being prepared by former Israeli ambassador to Ethiopia Asher Naim and by journalist Charles Hoffmann.

[16]Although no exact figures exist for the number of Ethiopian Jews who perished, community members often speak of 4,000. For some sample figures and the psychological impact of these difficulties, see our discussion of mental health below, especially note 90.

many, moreover, loss and separation were accompanied by uncertainty, as the fate of at least one family member remained unclear. Family reunification became the watchword of the Ethiopian community in Israel.

During the period from August 1985 until the end of 1989, about 2,500 additional immigrants managed to reach Israel—either directly from Addis Ababa or in small groups from the Sudan. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Israel in the fall of 1989 opened the possibility of a renewal of the *aliyah* movement, this time openly and in a manner agreed upon by both sides. Although immigration from Ethiopia was limited at first, the Ethiopian government allowed small numbers of Beta Israel to leave on a regular basis. This fueled the expectations of others, who were encouraged by representatives of the American Association for Ethiopian Jews to migrate to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. By the summer of 1990, over 20,000 Ethiopian Jews had traveled to Addis Ababa in the hope of receiving exit visas. Jewish Agency and Israeli government officials, who had had no hand in the migration, were caught unprepared. Thus, the conditions initially encountered by the migrants were extremely difficult. Malnutrition, inadequate housing, and disease all threatened the Beta Israel.

Responding to the crisis, the combined efforts of the Israeli embassy, Jewish Agency, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and other organizations, most notably the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry, ensured that the basic needs of the refugees were met, thus avoiding the catastrophic mortality rates associated with Operation Moses.[17] The city, however, held dangers of a new and different kind. Traditional patterns of communal village life deteriorated as Jews settled in shantytowns throughout the urban sprawl of the Ethiopian capital. Families, customarily the ultimate refuge and source of security in times of crises, found themselves completely incapable of providing for their members' most basic needs. Removed from their traditional occupational setting, many settled into a pattern of lethargy and dependence, living off the stipends and other assistance provided by the Jewish organizations working in Addis.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia's Marxist regime continued its struggle against regionally based opposition groups. In the northern province of Eritrea, rebels seeking independence from Ethiopia had fought a bloody civil war for several decades. A little further south, in Tigre province, forces opposed to the regime hoped to defeat president Mengistu Haile Mariam and gain control of the entire country. In the early 1990s, rebels from both provinces joined forces and began marching south in the hope of conquering Addis Ababa and toppling the Mengistu regime.

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[17]On the medical aspects of these efforts, see note 81 below.

Throughout the first months of 1991, as the internal political situation in Ethiopia continued to decline, Israeli negotiators laid the groundwork for a rescue operation; at the same time, American officials attempted to put together a deal that would both secure the safety of the Beta Israel and limit bloodshed. In the middle of May, as rebel forces closed in on Addis Ababa, President Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe. Fears grew that the Beta Israel would be trapped in what threatened to be a bitter struggle.

During a period of 36 hours spanning May 24 and 25, over 14,000 Beta Israel were airlifted to Israel in a mission code-named Operation Solomon. On the most basic level, this massive undertaking was vastly successful in ending the problem of family disintegration. With the *aliyah* of over 90 percent of all Beta Israel—almost 45,000 immigrants—only a relatively small number of family members remained in Ethiopia.

Still, the total number of immigrants must be considered incomplete. Small groups of Jews as well as individuals interested in making *aliyah* continue to be discovered in remote areas, or areas previously thought to be without Jews, such as Gojjam province. There is also the as yet unresolved issue of the Christianized Jewish population, specifically the group referred to as the Falas Mura. An estimated 4,000–5,000 are in Addis Ababa (including 2,800 who have been there since before Operation Solomon), expecting to emigrate. In addition, estimates have been made of anywhere from 25,000 to 250,000 more who are waiting to see the fate of their kinfolk before they, too, demand to emigrate in accordance with the Law of Return, as former Jews, or to achieve unification with family members who have already reached Israel during previous operations.

The Falas Mura Controversy

Supporters of Ethiopian *aliyah* both in Israel and abroad had always stressed the steadfastness with which the Beta Israel clung to their Judaism. At the time of the Ethiopians' initial confrontation with the rabbinate, moreover, it had been argued that anyone who had even passing contact with non-Jews risked exclusion from the Jewish community in Ethiopia. It came as something of a shock, therefore, when several thousand Falashas who had lived as Christians joined in the migration to Addis Ababa in 1991 and demanded to be taken to Israel. Known by a number of names, including *Maryam Wodet* (Lovers of Mary) or *Falas/Faras Mura*,[11] these Falasha Christians posed an unprecedented challenge to Israeli and Jewish organizations in Ethiopia.

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[11]This name has been popularly interpreted as *falas* (Falasha), *Mura* (converts, from the Hebrew term: *hamarat dat*, conversion). There is no basis for this interpretation. Other no less problematic interpretations rely on the word *faras* (horse) and translate the term as a lone horse or part of the horse's digestive system.

So long as immigration from Ethiopia continued at a rate of several hundred or even a thousand a month, a final decision on the Falas Mura could be delayed. After consultation with members of the community, Israeli authorities decided that the Falas Mura would be taken to Israel only after those judged to be bona fide Jews had been removed. The events leading up to Operation Solomon upset this thinking, and it was decided to leave the known Falas Mura behind, while the airlift took place.

The government's decision to leave converts of Jewish descent in Ethiopia focused unprecedented public and media attention on these "Falasha Christians." As in most matters relating to the Beta Israel, strong positions have been taken on both sides of the issue. Those advocating *aliyah* for the Falas Mura claim that the converts constitute a clearly defined community, limited to 25,000 individuals, who have never married non-Falas Mura and who basically have never ceased to be Jewish. They also put forth various, sometimes contradictory, explanations of the group's origins, claiming that they are "Marranos" forced to convert during times of persecution, secularized Jews who had never converted to Christianity, or disappointed Zionists dismayed by Israel's refusal to rescue the Falashas for more than 30 years. The decision not to bring them to Israel, some charge, was based on racism and counter to all legal and humanitarian norms.

Many experts on Ethiopian history and society see the picture as far more complex.[19] On the subject of numbers, they claim that the Falas Mura now found in the vicinity of the Israeli embassy in Addis Ababa represent only a fraction of the possible descendants of Beta Israel, whose total number could reach tens of thousands of potential emigrants, and even, as some Ethiopian government officials have claimed, reach into the hundreds of thousands.[20]

Contrary to what is often suggested, this school of thought claims that neither coercion nor direct financial inducements appears to have played a major role in enticing Beta Israel to join the mission. Rather, the offer of educational opportunities, social advancement, and the possibility of gaining rights to own land were the crucial factors drawing Ethiopian Jews away from their villages and their ancestral religion. Over time there arose a broad spectrum of converted Falashas, ranging from active disciples of the missionaries, who sought to convert others as well, to ostensible Christians for whom a formal Christian identity was just another of the trappings of high office and elite status. While some identified with Protestant sects, the

[19]Steven Kaplan, "Falasha Christians: A Brief History," *Midstream*, Jan. 1993, pp. 20–21.

[20]In the summer of 1993, an Ethiopian political activist living in Switzerland requested that "the Semitic Tribes of the Gihon," who, he claimed, numbered several million, be recognized as Jews. This previously unheard-of group does not appear to have any chance of being recognized by Israeli authorities.

vast majority followed the Hebraic-biblical norms of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

However, the Falas Mura did not simply disappear into the larger society. For one thing, despite their willingness to be practicing Christians, many of these converts were only partially successful in changing their affiliation and achieving the goals they had set for themselves. In many cases, they retained their involvement in the low-status crafts, such as potting and smithing, that marked the Beta Israel as a despised semicaste within the broader Ethiopian society and often continued to be labeled as "Falasha" on an ethnic basis.[11] Perhaps most importantly, despite communal norms dictating that such converts be excluded from the "*Oritawi Falasha*" (Old Testament Falasha) community, many of them continued to retain contacts with family members and even to attend Jewish religious celebrations. Whatever their outward appearance or the attitude of the community at large, their relatives often remained convinced that "inside" they were still Jews.

So long as *aliyah* to Israel remained only a dream for the Jews of Ethiopia, the benefits in assuming and maintaining a Christian identity were usually quite obvious. Events from 1977 onward, however, dramatically changed this situation. Already today, the 45,000 figure for Ethiopian immigrants in Israel greatly exceeds the 28,000 identified as "practicing" in 1976. High birthrates and previously overlooked villages notwithstanding, this number undoubtedly reflects the presence of an estimated 5,000 Falas Mura or genuine Christians (spouses of Jews) already in the country.

An interministerial committee convened in the fall of 1992 by Absorption Minister Yair Tsaban heard testimony and recommendations from scholars, rabbis, jurists, diplomats, Ethiopian religious and political leaders, Falas Mura activists, and Falas Mura already in Israel. Early in 1993 the committee presented its recommendation that only a limited number of Falas Mura be allowed to come to Israel, as part of a family reunification program based on humanitarian considerations, rather than as immigrants under the Law of Return. Although the recommendations of the Tsaban committee were adopted by the Israeli cabinet, Falas Mura activists—among them a number of prominent figures from across the Israeli political and religious spectrum—have continued to oppose them.

Ethiopian immigrants in Israel are themselves divided as to the best way to handle the problem of the Falas Mura. While those with relatives still in Ethiopia obviously wish for them to be brought to Israel, and many are sympathetic to their plight, others are less enthusiastic and in some cases

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[11] While their adherence to such biblically sanctioned observances as circumcision and abstinence from pork might lead those not familiar with Ethiopian culture to label them as Marranos, these customs are, in fact, an intrinsic part of Ethiopian Christianity.

even opposed to their *aliyah*. Only a handful of the 60–70 *qessotch* (religious leaders) in Israel, for example, agreed to sign a letter calling for the *aliyah* of the Falas Mura or have appeared in public on their behalf.

By the time the Tsaban committee concluded its hearings, more than 20 months had passed since Operation Solomon. Another half year was to pass before the first Falas Mura were brought to Israel under the family reunification plan. By the fall of 1993, many of those in Addis Ababa had been there, waiting to be taken to Israel, for more than two years. During this period, the approximately 3,000 under the direct care of the JDC and the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry (NACOEJ) were receiving instruction in Jewish and Israeli culture. This activity, too, sparked considerable controversy, with some charging that it was a calculated attempt to "Judaize" the Falas Mura and thus make it harder for the Israeli government to refuse to bring them to Israel. Ethiopian government officials, who had always viewed the Falas Mura campaign as an unwanted intervention in their internal matters, viewed such Jewish "missionary" activity with particular concern. In July of 1993, they expelled eight Jewish teachers brought to Ethiopia by NACOEJ, along with the organization's resident director.

As of this writing, no speedy end to the Falas Mura controversy appears in sight. Although the Ethiopian government will probably continue to allow small numbers of Falas Mura who meet the criteria set by the Israeli government to emigrate,[22] this will neither satisfy nor silence those who wish to see all Falas Mura brought to Israel.

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE ETHIOPIAN COMMUNITY

As noted above, nearly 45,000 Beta Israel came to Israel between 1972 and 1993 (table 1). During the period from 1977 to 1992, 8,200 Ethiopian children were born in Israel. Thus, even if the exact number born in 1993 is not known, it is clear that well over 50,000 Ethiopians were living in Israel by the end of 1993.[23]

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[22] As of November 1993, 260 individuals from 50 families had been granted the right to emigrate.

[23] These figures are a composite of statistics compiled from monthly and yearly internal reports issued by the Ministry of Absorption and the Central Bureau of Statistics. The figure on births in Israel was contributed by Danny Budowski, who obtained them from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

TABLE 1. ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL, 1972–1993

1972–1976	91
1977	125
1978	3
1979	30
1980	258
1981	601
1982	528
1983	2,192
1984	8,240
1985	1,763
1986	209
1987	252
1988	603
1989	1,334
1990	4,121
1991	20,026
1992	3,538
1993	700
Total	44,614

Gender and Age

It is notoriously difficult to compile accurate demographic data on Ethiopian immigrants, as virtually every category except gender is subject to cultural confusion and situational redefinition. According to figures from the Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, from 1977 to 1993, 22,541 Ethiopian males and 22,996 females arrived in the country.[24] With regard to age (table 2), the Ethiopian immigrant population appears highly weighted toward youth, with almost 46 percent of the population aged 0–18, 36 percent aged 19–44, 11 percent aged 45–64, and 7 percent aged 65 and older.[25]

These figures must, however, be viewed with a certain degree of caution.

[24]No breakdown of immigrants who arrived before 1977 is available. They were, however, in the main, young men in their late teens or early twenties.

[25]These figures are based on data from the Ministry of Absorption. Among those who arrived (mainly through the Sudan) until mid-1985, 52.2 percent were 0–18 years of age, and only 5.9 percent were over age 60.

TABLE 2. AGE DISTRIBUTION

Age	Male	Female
0–2	338	316
3–5	1,628	2,490
6–9	2,490	2,254
10–14	3,734	3,338
15–18	2,505	2,389
19–24	2,789	2,767
25–34	3,010	3,244
35–44	1,968	2,237
45–49	804	784
50–59	1,122	1,135
60–64	421	641
65–74	1,189	1,006
75–84	439	306
85+	104	89

Since most immigrants had no independent documentation regarding their date of birth, officials have been forced to rely on oral testimony. The ages (and marital status) claimed have often been dependent on the immigrants' perceptions as to what ages or status will confer the most benefits in Israel. Requests to "correct" such information are common. For example, a young man in his twenties may claim to be only 15 in order to be assigned to a boarding school, rather than a job training program, while older immigrants may seek to add to their age in order to qualify as pensioners.

Family Structure

Similarly, differences between Ethiopian and Israeli concepts of "family" have created problems for demographers and absorption workers alike.

For the Beta Israel, social life was traditionally organized around the flexible and often overlapping concepts of the extended family (*zamad*) and the household (*beta sa'ab*). *Zamad* is a term whose precise meaning varies according to the circumstances and context. Thus, *zamad* is most frequently used to refer to an extended family (as opposed to strangers), but it may also be used to distinguish blood relations from in-laws.[26] In Ethiopia, within the borders of the *zamad*, little attention was paid to the "real"

[26]When searching for a spouse for a son or daughter, parents would automatically exclude anyone in their *zamad*, counting back seven generations.

relationships between members. Thus, according to the circumstances, grandparents, uncles, or older siblings might function like a child's "parents." A person's "children" might easily include nieces, nephews, stepchildren, and younger siblings.

In contrast to the geographically dispersed *zamad*, the *beta sa'ab* (household) was a residential unit whose membership changed over time. Although often composed around a core nuclear family, widowed parents, divorced siblings, elderly relatives, various children, and even servants were often vital parts of a single *beta sa'ab*. At any given moment, the precise configuration of the *beta sa'ab* was determined by an assortment of personal preferences and economic needs, and it would change as these changed.

In light of the above, it is often difficult to determine the precise biological relationships that exist among a group of Ethiopians sharing a residence.

TABLE 3. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

One-Parent	2,667
Single (Nonelderly)	3,945
Single (Elderly)	960
Couples (Nonelderly)	858
Couples (Elderly)	296
Couples with 1–3 children	2,845
Couples with 4 children or more	2,655
Other	162
Total households:	14,388

TABLE 4. HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Single	4,905
2 persons	2,369
3 persons	1,665
4 persons	1,449
5 persons	1,161
6 persons	1,012
7 persons	784
8 persons	536
9 or more	544

These household units are, moreover, fluid and subject to frequent restructuring. The figures given in tables 3 and 4 are, therefore, a useful guide rather than a definitive picture.

No aspect of Ethiopian family life in Israel has aroused more comment among absorption workers and other professionals than the large number of one-parent families. Approximately a third of all Ethiopian children live in one-parent households. This compares with less than 9 percent among the rest of the Israeli population.

This relatively high figure can be attributed to several factors. Such families were created, for example, when couples made *aliyah* at different times, or when one of the partners died on the way to Israel. In Israel itself, the redefinition of gender roles, conflicts over personal goals, and sharp differences between husbands and wives in their rates of adjustment to new conditions contribute to the breakup of two-parent units. To this must be added such "universal" factors as disagreements over child rearing and tensions created by crowded housing and economic difficulties.

Although no precise statistics exist, many children in Ethiopia apparently lived with only one of their parents. However, the safety net provided by an extended family as well as the fluid character of household units meant that few children lived in one-*adult* households.[27]

THE ABSORPTION PROCESS: RELIGION AND COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION

The Ethiopians and the Rabbis

As noted above, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's decision to recognize the Jewishness of the "Falashas" was a turning point in their history.[28] His pronouncement, however, not only opened the doors to a more active policy in favor of Ethiopian immigration, it also placed those Ethiopian Jews who did arrive—together with all other Jews in Israel—under the religious jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate. Although the chief rabbis had affirmed the *communal* status of the Ethiopians as Jews, they continued to express reservations concerning the *personal* status of individuals. In particular, they voiced their concern that the Ethiopians' ignorance of rabbinic law (Halakhah) had rendered divorces and conversions, performed by *qessotch*

[27]Shalva Weil, *Ethiopian One-Parent Families in Israel* (Hebrew with English abstract) (Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1991); Ruth Westheimer and Steven Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation: The Ethiopian Jewish Family in Transition* (New York, 1992), pp. 105–09.

[28]See note 12 for a bibliography on the halakhic status of the Ethiopians.

("priests," the religious leaders of the Beta Israel in Ethiopia) for centuries in Ethiopia, invalid. According to the Chief Rabbinate, as a result of nonhalakhic conversions, hundreds of individuals whose status as Jews was questionable had immigrated from Ethiopia. And nonhalakhic divorces, they claimed, had raised considerable questions about the danger of *mamzerut* (illegitimacy) among the Ethiopians.[29] In either case, grave difficulties existed with regard to a simple and immediate integration of the Ethiopians into the general Jewish population. Ethiopian immigrants strongly rejected both claims.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Chief Rabbinate required Ethiopian immigrants to undergo a modified conversion ceremony consisting of ritual immersion, a declaration accepting rabbinic law, and, in the case of men, a symbolic recircumcision. Although initially applied to all Ethiopians, the requirement was eventually limited to those wishing to marry. Toward the end of 1984, the demand for recircumcision was dropped.[30]

During the period from 1972 to 1984, several thousand Ethiopian immigrants, from Tigre, Walqayit, and Gondar submitted to the demands of the rabbinate. From 1985 onward, however, organized resistance to what was labeled "forced conversion" became increasingly apparent. One particular group of young men, members of a newly formed organization called Beta Israel, organized a systematic campaign in all the absorption centers against any cooperation with rabbis. Recently arrived immigrants, acting on the advice of these more experienced Ethiopians, refused to cooperate with the rabbinate. Their resistance culminated in a month-long protest opposite the Chief Rabbinate headquarters in the fall of 1985.[31]

In April 1986, in an attempt to circumvent the rabbinate's marriage requirements, 15 Ethiopian couples were brought together in a Tel Aviv wedding hall to be married in a "traditional ceremony" conducted by four of the *qessotch* who had participated in the strike. Such marriages, which would have been completely valid in Ethiopia, had no legal status in Israel and were not accepted by Interior Ministry authorities. Couples married by

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[29]According to Jewish law, the child of an adulterous sexual relationship is a *mamzer*. In the case of the Ethiopians, the rabbinate argued that if their divorces were indeed invalid according to Jewish law, subsequent remarriages were adulterous, producing offspring who were illegitimate, who in turn passed this status down to their offspring for centuries.

[30]Changes in rabbinic policies were the result of a number of factors, including a significant rise in the rate at which immigrants were arriving, pressure exerted by those already in the country, and an improved understanding on the part of the rabbinate of circumcision as practiced by the Ethiopians.

[31]Steven Kaplan, "The Beta Israel and the Rabbinate: Law, Politics and Ritual," *Social Science Information* 27, no. 3 (Sept. 1988), pp. 357–70.

qessotch could, however, by visiting a notary, gain recognition of their union as a common-law marriage. This assured them of being treated as a couple for certain civil purposes, such as public housing. From a religious point of view, such marriages created enormous halakhic problems. If, for instance, a woman had not been officially certified as divorced or widowed—which would be the case if she had been divorced in Ethiopia or if her husband had died in the Sudan, but she had no proof of his death—then all of her children born in Israel would automatically be considered *mamzerim* (illegitimate).

The number of "*qes* marriages" dropped significantly following the appointment of Rabbi David Chelouche of Netanya, a prominent supporter of the Ethiopians, as the sole official marriage registrar for the entire community. Under this compromise, sanctioned by the Israeli Supreme Court in June 1989, any Ethiopian in the country could travel to Rabbi Chelouche to register to be married.

While the appointment of Rabbi Chelouche provided a solution that preserved both the Ethiopians' dignity and the rabbinate's sovereignty, bitterness over the dispute lingered. Active protests concerning the issue seemed on the wane until, in early 1991, several months prior to Operation Solomon, a well-known elderly *qes*, *Qes* Menashe, was brought to Israel. He immediately aligned himself with the opponents of the Supreme Court decision, against Rabbi Chelouche and against any compromise with the Chief Rabbinate. These *qessotch* demanded full recognition of themselves as "rabbis," qualified without any additional training to perform all ceremonies for their community, just as they had done in Ethiopia.

Their pleas went largely unheeded until early in 1992. Then a newly formed group of activists seized upon the issue of the lack of respect given their *qessotch*. These young, mainly secular, men organized strikes and incited violent demonstrations (something that had not previously been part of Ethiopian protests), demanding that the *qessotch*, or rather those associated with *Qes* Menashe, be certified by the Chief Rabbinate to be the sole arbiters of religious ceremonies for their community. The *qessotch*'s case received widespread media coverage, especially when their ranks were swelled by almost 80 elderly men (most of whom had arrived in Operation Solomon), all clad in white turbans and black capes, the external signs of *qes* status.

Once again the chief rabbis reiterated their position that without training in those aspects of Jewish law required to perform a marriage ceremony or write a divorce writ, it would be impossible to permit the *qessotch* to do these things. They pointed out that, if they were to grant them the right to conduct marriage ceremonies, the result would be a Karaite-like status, in

effect separating the Ethiopians from the rest of Jewry and prejudicing their full acceptance as equals among all other Jews.

In November 1992, a special interministerial committee recommended that all the *qessotch* be given paid positions on the religious councils that exist in every municipality. They urged the *qessotch* to attend special courses, so that they could serve, ultimately, as official rabbis (presumably for anyone who approached them, not just Ethiopians). Even though *qessotch* who had been among the demonstrators were members of the committee, and signed their names to the list of recommendations, their young activist supporters threatened to organize renewed demonstrations unless all of the original demands were met in full.

In the meantime, an attempt has been made by those *qessotch* who have been attending classes and learning the basics of Jewish law to bring about a reconciliation, first of all between the group supporting the Chief Rabbinate and that opposing it (both of whose members are from the Gondar region, the Tigrean *qessotch* having remained aloof from all such "political" frays), and then between all the *qessotch* and the Chief Rabbinate. Attempts have been made to include *qessotch* on religious councils in areas that have a sizable Ethiopian population. In some cases, the local councils have objected that the *qessotch* appointed lack sufficient knowledge; in others, Ethiopian activists have objected to the specific *qessotch* named to the council. Nevertheless, the number of *qessotch* on such councils continues to grow. As these Ethiopian religious leaders come into more regular contact with local rabbis and begin (albeit on a limited basis) to once again meet their community's religious needs, the tensions between them and the Israeli religious establishment may diminish.

During the past decade a number of *qessotch* have been studying at Makhon Meir, a yeshivah in Jerusalem. The same institution also runs a special program that prepares young Ethiopians for rabbinic ordination. The first graduates of this program, about a dozen in number, were expected to be ordained in 1994.[32] It is hoped that their presence will increase the awareness and understanding of rabbinic Judaism in the Ethiopian community and pave the way for a rapprochement between community elders and the Chief Rabbinate.

Other Religious Matters

The Ethiopians have been confronted with a number of other issues relating to Jewish observance. In Ethiopia, the Beta Israel had survived by

[32]There is, to date, only one Ethiopian rabbi in Israel, Rabbi Yosef Hadane. He, however, was trained and ordained prior to the start of large-scale immigration from Ethiopia.

clinging tenaciously to their Jewish identity and to distinctive practices including purity rituals and the isolation of women when menstruating and after giving birth.

The transition to Israeli observances and customs since *aliyah* has not been easy. For the Beta Israel, who had no fires on the Sabbath and hence no hot food, the custom of eating *cholent* and other dishes kept warm throughout the day appears to be a violation of strict observance. Although both Ethiopians and Israeli Orthodox Jews share a concern for ritual purity, the former believe that immersion must take place in a river or stream and have been reluctant to accept the *mikveh*, ritual bath, as a substitute.

In the past, immigrants to Israel have tended to establish their own synagogues, which preserve distinctive ethnic practices and forms. Thus far, however, the Ethiopians have only partially conformed to this pattern. Beersheba, for example, has long had an Ethiopian *minyan*, and there is soon to be an Ethiopian synagogue. There are thriving Ethiopian congregations in both Ashdod and Lod. In other cases, however, it has not proven easy to make the transition from one religious system to another. Prayers in Ge'ez recited by the *qes* in Ethiopia are not easily replaced by a Hebrew liturgy led by a rabbi. Indeed, many Ethiopians find little familiar in the worship of their local synagogues beside the use of "amen."

Efforts have been made to adapt some Beta Israel traditional practices to fit in with the conditions of their new homeland. They have, for instance, transformed one of their primary festivals, known as Sigd—a commemoration of the return from exile described in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah—into a holiday which they can celebrate in Jerusalem. They have even sought to interest other Israelis in their unique holiday, so that the Sigd can, like well-known Moroccan and Kurdish festivals, be of more than just parochial interest.[33]

Communal Organization and Leadership

As indicated by the discussion of relations with the rabbinate, Ethiopian immigrants in Israel have shown considerable political initiative since their arrival in the country. No community in Israel has demonstrated as pronounced a proclivity to take to the streets in protest or to form organizations ostensibly intended to promote the interests of their members.

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[33]G.J. Abbink, "*Seged* Celebration in Ethiopia and Israel: Continuity and Change of a Falasha Religious Holiday," *Anthropos* 78, 1983, pp. 789–810; S. Ben-Dor, "The Sigd of Beta-Israel: Testimony to a Community in Transition," in Ashkenazi and Weingrod, *Ethiopian Jews*, pp. 140–59; Emmanuel Grupper and Anita Nudelman, "Cross-Cultural Pluralism in Action: The Case of 'Seged' Celebration of Ethiopian Jews in Youth Aliyah Institutions," in *Between Africa and Zion: Proceedings of the First International Congress of the Society for the Study of Ethiopian Jewry* (Ben Zvi Institute, Jerusalem, forthcoming).

In part, at least, this decentralized form of organization can be seen as a continuation of patterns of communal organization found in Ethiopia. The Beta Israel "community" was actually a loosely connected network of villages and local communities linked by religious, cultural, and marital ties, but lacking any centralized political authority. Even on the local level, political authority was exercised by a variety of figures who acted through consensus building rather than the use of coercive power or through reliance on state institutions.[14]

This tendency to decentralization has been exacerbated by the increasing interaction with world Jewry, which has introduced a variety of external patrons to the community, enabling each faction to draw support from the wide range of Jewish and Israeli interest groups. Thus, the Reform and Conservative movements and secularist groups are prepared to support almost all demonstrations against the Chief Rabbinate, while several prominent members of Gush Emunim have taken up the cause of the Falas Mura.

The move to Israel has also disrupted traditional patterns of leadership. The deterioration in the position of the *qessotch* has been discussed above. Similarly, the community elders (*shmagilotch*), who were the main representatives of their people in nonreligious, official matters in Ethiopia, have not been able to function effectively as leaders in Israel. Their "wisdom" no longer captures anyone's attention and seems to be of no practical value, particularly when it relates to making one's way in Israel. By contrast, the youngsters, primarily due to their quicker grasp of Hebrew and of the Israeli mentality, have forged ahead of their parents and are less willing to ask for, let alone abide by, their parents' advice than they had been in the past.

This role diminution is to some extent inevitable, but it is felt particularly acutely by the Ethiopians. In contrast to the avowedly child- and youth-centered norms of Israeli society, the Beta Israel of Ethiopia respected and honored the elderly and aged. As a man grew older, his personal status grew. If he was well thought of and behaved honorably, he would be considered a *shmagile* (elder) by the time he reached his late thirties or early forties. People came to him with their problems and asked for his advice. Although the *shmagilotch* (elders) were exclusively men, older women also had an important role to play. A senior woman, known as a *baaltet*, would be consulted on issues relating to women, including childbirth, illness, and disputes between younger women.

Although the status of parents and elders in Ethiopia had begun to decline even before the revolution of 1974, they were able to retain a

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[14]Steven Kaplan, "Leadership and Communal Organization Among the Beta Israel: An Historical Study," *Encyclopaedia Judaica Year Book 1986/1987* (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. 154–63; Shalva Weil, "Leadership Among Ethiopian Jews in Israel," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming).

modicum of authority so long as the Beta Israel remained in Ethiopia. Their experience in handling the day-to-day problems of village life remained a valuable commodity. Once they reached Israel, however, their situation deteriorated rapidly. Faced with unprecedented challenges in a strange new society, their years of accumulated wisdom suddenly seemed irrelevant. Settled haphazardly around the country, the reputation for sound judgment they had earned through years of shrewd arbitration on a village level appeared to evaporate. Immigration agencies, moreover, saw the elderly as neither a source of wisdom nor an object of veneration, but a problematic "generation of the wilderness" that could never be successfully integrated into their new society.

The peripheralization of the *shmagilotch* was significant, not only for its impact on the elders themselves but also for its effect on the community as a whole. At precisely the time when the Ethiopian community was experiencing some of its greatest difficulties, one of its most important institutions for dealing with crises was in ruins. Fortunately, attempts have been made by some organizations in recent years to consult and mobilize the *shmagilotch*.[35]

Successive waves of *aliyah* have produced divisions within the immigrant community between newcomers and oldtimers, veterans with establishment positions and young Turks. Since the early 1980s, the community has been rife with factions. The first serious conflict to emerge erupted between Tigreans and Gondaris in 1981. Although the site of this conflict was the absorption center in Beersheba,[36] its ramifications spread, so that even today relations between members of these two groups are often far from cordial.[37] Disagreements on how best to further the cause of immigration and the reunification of families have also led to altercations between individuals and within families. In the absence of any procedures for electing representatives, there has been a tendency for talented individuals to assert that they are leaders, whether or not they have any significant backing from anyone outside of their immediate families.

For a time, two secular groups composed predominantly of young people competed with each other as to which could best claim to be the legitimate

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[35]In the most ambitious such project, *Betachin* (Amharic: Our House), an organization sponsored by the JDC, employs a number of Ethiopian staffers, including laymen and *qessotch* as mediators and counselors to help Ethiopian families resolve problems. They have also published a number of Hebrew pamphlets on issues of family life, mediation, and conflict.

[36]Abbink, "Falashas . . . Ethnic Assimilation," pp. 174–88, 293–314.

[37]Ibid., pp. 277–78. See also Michael Ashkenazi, "Political Organization and Resources Among Ethiopian Immigrants," *Social Science Information* 17, no. 3, 1988, pp. 371–89. On Tigrean and Gondari contrasts, see Chaim Rosen, "The Many Ways of Ethiopian Jews: Similarities and Differences Between Beta Israel from Gondar and Tigre" (in Hebrew), *Pe'amim* 33, 1988, pp. 93–108.

voice of the people. Both were composed exclusively of Gondaris and had little connection with the Tigrean and Walqayit segments of the community. The organizers of both groups acquired their basic political experience through involvement in opposition political groups in Ethiopia prior to their flight to Israel.

In 1987 an attempt was made to bring these two groups together around the issue of family reunification. When this proved impossible, a third group, known as the Rescue Committee, was formed. It captured public attention by organizing a six-week sit-in outside the Knesset to highlight the reunification issue. This was followed by a large rally in Jerusalem's Binyanei Ha-umah (Convention Center), which was attended by prominent Israeli politicians and international human-rights activists.

The unity displayed in the calls for family reunification was, however, only superficial, and new organizations sprang up in rapid succession. Several leaders of the Rescue Committee created yet another organization, which they named after the "father of Ethiopian Jewry," Jacques Faitlovitch. A short time later the Ethiopian Students' Organization, composed of students in institutions of higher education, was formed. The National Committee for Ethiopian Jewry, which had been dormant for some years, was also resuscitated.

In 1990, following a year or so of bickering and mutual recrimination, the leaders of seven organizations agreed to set their differences aside and unite in the Umbrella Organization of Ethiopian Jewish Organizations. This move was warmly applauded by top Jewish Agency figures, who promptly rewarded the leaders of the group with large sums of money to support their new venture. Despite the Israeli media's tendency to portray the Umbrella Organization as *the* representative of Ethiopian Jewry, one large Ethiopian organization refused to operate under its auspices, and various additional factions continued to emerge. The former, in particular, made constant attacks on the small group of individuals who, in addition to dominating the Umbrella Organization, controlled the Amharic radio program and published the only regular Ethiopian-language magazine in the country.[38]

In the aftermath of Operation Solomon, two additional groups emerged. The Zionist Movement for the Cause of Ethiopian Jewry has taken over the battle for the recognition of the *qessotch*; the South Wing to Zion lobbies for the immediate immigration to Israel of the Falas Mura.

As of this writing, the community is badly divided. *Qessotch* are at odds with one another. The group that is critical of the rabbinate refuses to eat meat slaughtered by the *qessotch* who have studied ritual slaughtering at Makhon Meir, a Jerusalem yeshivah. Young activists denounce each other,

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[38] See "*Kesef Shahor*" (Black Money), *Ha'olam Ha'zeh*, Aug. 3, 1992, pp. 18–21.

passing out flyers at every public gathering, depicting their rivals as corrupt and incompetent.

Such divisions have a clearly deleterious effect on the Ethiopians' overall integration. The political influence that they would normally have acquired as a rapidly growing ethnic group is being severely dissipated. Each group's leadership insists that it speaks for the majority of the community, yet the reality of mutual recriminations and accusations weakens all of them. It may well be that only the next generation will see the emergence of young leaders capable of forging a truly unified, community-oriented leadership, one that can become a significant factor in the Israeli political arena.[39]

THE ABSORPTION PROCESS: HOUSING, EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH

Housing and Residential Distribution

Of all the challenges facing the Israeli immigration authorities, none has proven more complex and fraught with difficulties than settling the Ethiopians in permanent housing. Unlike language courses, job-training programs, health facilities, and many other services offered to new *olim* (immigrants), apartments cannot be easily produced in response to a sudden rise in demand. If vacancies exist, they are usually in less desirable areas, which are the least equipped to deal with a large influx of newcomers. Settling too many immigrants in a single location can lead to their being ghettoized; settling too few can leave them isolated and make it difficult for helping agencies to reach them. Housing decisions are among those with the broadest impact, for they affect educational opportunities, employment prospects, and social integration. Housing mistakes are also among the hardest to correct, for rebuilding is usually impractical, and repeated moves are almost always disruptive.

Throughout most of 1984 all Ethiopian immigrants were temporarily housed in absorption centers before being moved into permanent housing.[40] Such centers did not have sufficient space, however, to handle the large

[39] A discussion of problems facing the present activist leaders, plus a survey of the large number of major and minor organizations within the community, can be found in *Ha'aretz*, July 27, 1992, where an unpublished report written by Dr. Shalva Weil is extensively quoted.

[40] Absorption centers are designed to house immigrants temporarily and to ease their initial adjustment to their new surroundings. By concentrating immigrants in separate buildings or housing projects, absorption authorities are able to exercise better control over their access to government services, Hebrew instruction, job information, etc. Initially established in 1969 to assist Western immigrants during their first six months in Israel, they have since been used in the absorption of other immigrants. For a critical view of this process, see Michael Ashkenazi and Alex Weingrod, *Ethiopian Immigrants in Beersheba* (Highland Park, Ill., 1984).

influx of immigrants from Operation Moses. Accordingly, about one-third of the 6,700 immigrants who arrived at the end of 1984 were placed in ten hotels rented by the Jewish Agency. They lived for over a year in these hotels in what can best be described as a hothouse atmosphere; they were fed in dining halls and had almost all their needs met by outsiders. Hotel residents were, not surprisingly, relatively slow to develop even the minimum skills required for leading an independent life in Israel.

Only in 1986, after much wrangling between absorption agencies, were all Ethiopian immigrants removed from hotels. Since only a few were judged to be ready to live on their own in apartments, the majority were transferred to regular absorption centers, where they joined hundreds of other immigrants from various countries.

In general, the longer the Ethiopians were in the country, the more specific their housing preferences became, and the harder it was to move them out of the centers. Most wished to live close to family members already settled in permanent housing. Others were guided by their perceptions of employment opportunities in different regions. As a result, too, of interministerial squabbling over how to deal with them, the Ethiopians' temporary sojourn in absorption centers stretched on for years. At the end of 1987, almost 40 percent of those who arrived in Operation Moses had still not been resettled. In some cases, absorption officials, rather than moving the Ethiopians into permanent housing, left the immigrants in place and simply changed the status of absorption centers by removing the services they had provided. Nine absorption centers—former apartment complexes designed to accommodate people on a short-term basis—were decreed overnight to be permanent homes, whose residents had to pay rent, utilities, taxes, and so on. Ethiopian residents of these converted centers complained bitterly, feeling that they had been deprived of the opportunity to choose where to live.

On a larger scale, this decision resulted in the instant "ghettoization" of many immigrants. Despite explicit recommendations that no apartment building house more than 3–4 Ethiopian families, some blocks suddenly had over 50 and many others more than 15. Moreover, despite vague promises to the contrary, these families had almost no chance of moving into other apartments, since all available public housing was required for those still living in more cramped absorption centers.

Another housing problem developed when several hundred families were placed in previously abandoned mobile homes (*caravanim*) located at the edge of small towns and cities. In a short time, newspaper reports and even documentary films appeared showing the crumbling walls, unsanitary facili-

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see also Esther Hertzog, "The Israeli Absorption Bureaucracy and the Ethiopian Immigrants," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming).

ties, and hazardous living conditions in these *caravanim*. Nevertheless, it took almost four years to find better housing for these immigrants. Even after Operation Solomon, at least 200 families from the time of Operation Moses were still living in absorption facilities of one type or another.

The lessons learned from the experience of housing the Operation Moses immigrants were quite clear and were reflected in the Ministry of Absorption's *Master Plan, Second Stage*, which was published in April 1991. Based on the assumption that Ethiopian immigrants would continue to arrive in Israel at a rate of 500–800 a month throughout 1991 and 1992, it focused on "direct absorption" in apartments made available when they immigrated. The arrival of more than 14,000 immigrants during Operation Solomon completely undermined these assumptions. In seeking an instant emergency solution for this large group, the Jewish Agency was forced to fill every available hotel, residence house, rest home, and established mobile-home site.[41]

Immediately after Operation Solomon, Minister of Housing Ariel Sharon promised that all Ethiopian immigrants would be in permanent apartments within one year. Despite his promises, not only did few families find permanent housing, new ones kept arriving to join those already in the various absorption facilities. By June 1992, a total of almost 24,000 Ethiopians were living in absorption facilities. Sharon's major response, which was immediately implemented by the Jewish Agency (which had to pay $13,500 a year for each Ethiopian living in a hotel), was to revive the previously failed policy of placing the Ethiopians "temporarily" in mobile homes.

Between June and September 1992, thousands of Ethiopians were transferred out of their hotels and other residential facilities into caravan sites scattered throughout the country. Despite the drawbacks of life in a tiny mobile home, this arrangement at least gave the Ethiopians more control over their lives than they had in the hotels. At a number of absorption centers and hotels the Ethiopians mounted protests demanding permanent apartments in public housing, rather than being transferred to yet another form of temporary residence. Sharon met with the Ethiopian protesters and once again promised that all Ethiopians would be in permanent housing within a year, by July 1993. A few weeks later, however, national elections were held, and Sharon was no longer in office. His successor, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, immediately abrogated all commitments that had been made to the Ethiopians.

In November 1992, the government announced that it would take three to four years before all of the caravan sites could be evacuated. In order to achieve this target date, 6,000 apartments would have to be acquired for

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[41]During 1991–92, only 150 families, as an experiment, were offered direct absorption, being placed in apartments in Ofakim, Arad, and Dimona.

Ethiopian immigrants. Starting in April 1993, Ethiopian immigrants were offered special conditions for purchasing an apartment; these include a direct grant of $80,000 as well as interest-free loans. Thus, a family with four or more children receives as much as $110,000 toward the purchase of an apartment in any of 52 authorized locations in the center of the country. These unprecedented terms, which may cover as much as 99 percent of the total cost of an apartment, are far better than those available to any other group of either immigrants or veteran Israelis.

Despite their initial skepticism, some 1,750 families out of 5,961 took advantage of this offer during the first six months of the campaign. Most Ethiopian immigrants, however, view the entire idea of home-purchase with suspicion. They fear that such large grants will carry hidden payments, or that the government will one day come to reclaim apartments. In order to alleviate such fears and to relieve the crush of the caravan camps, a carefully designed information campaign for the Ethiopians has been undertaken.

As noted above, the primary problem with the mobile homes at the time of Operation Moses was their physical deterioration. The problem today is their uncanny resemblance to the segregated tent camps (*ma'abarot*) that were used to house immigrants in the 1950s. Huge mobile-home towns have been erected, usually in isolated open areas where Ethiopians are segregated from the general Israeli population.[42]

As of December 1993, 21 caravan sites (in which some 16,000 Ethiopians were living) were operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Absorption. In addition, 6,200 Ethiopians were still living in 27 absorption centers and 3 hotels. Thus, by the end of 1993, about half of the entire Ethiopian immigrant population was still in temporary housing, receiving either government or Jewish Agency subsidies. As a result of the mortgage campaign, it was projected that, by the end of 1994, the majority of families would either have purchased apartments or be eligible for public housing.

PERMANENT HOUSING

At least in part, the Ethiopians' housing preferences are based on pragmatic considerations they share with most groups in the population: the availability of work, the suitability of the climate, and the centrality of the location. Thus, despite their age-old dream of living in Jerusalem, few Ethiopians have decided to do so, because the work opportunities are limited and the climate is too cold. Their aversion to living on the West Bank has stemmed not from political considerations but from its relative isolation.

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[42]As of Sept. 1993, 70 percent of those living in mobile homes were Ethiopian immigrants. Most immigrants from the former Soviet Union refused to live in mobile homes, unless faced with homelessness.

TABLE 5. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ETHIOPIAN HOUSEHOLDS AND INDIVIDUALS

Region	Households	Individuals
North	5,103	15,704
Tel Aviv	1,741	5,028
Negev	2,234	7,962
Jerusalem	2,522	7,733
Center	2,787	8,002

TABLE 6. MAJOR CENTERS OF ETHIOPIAN IMMIGRANT RESIDENCE, OCTOBER 1993

Afikim	893
Afula	1,113
Ashdod	1,266
Ashkelon	2,531
Barutayim	786*
Beersheba	3,249
Beit Hatzor	1,012*
Gedera	763
Hadera	1,286
Haifa	1,723
Hatzrot Yesef	1,763*
Hulda	1,023*
Jerusalem	1,156
Kadourie	825*
Kiryat Gat	1,548
Kiryat Yam	1,203
Ma'agalim	765*
Mevo'im	839*
Nazareth	1,154
Netanya	2,259
Ramle	770
Safed	1,066
Tiberias	974

*Caravan sites; other settlements include both permanent and temporary housing.

In general, however, the primary factor influencing Ethiopians' choice of housing has been their desire to live near close relatives. Although most prefer not to live in a building occupied only by Ethiopians, they do favor neighborhoods that have many related families within easy walking distance. Since many of the first Ethiopians to find permanent housing were sent to towns around Tel Aviv such as Bat Yam, Holon, and Netanya, or neighborhoods in Beersheba, many subsequent immigrants expressed a preference for these locales. Thus, despite plans calling for a dispersion of the Ethiopians in order to avoid ghettoization, their own inclination was to live together in extended family groups.[43]

Another important factor shaping preferences in a manner not anticipated by absorption planners is the Ethiopians' perspective on the job market. Here, too, the greater Tel Aviv area enjoys a good reputation among Ethiopian immigrants. Not only did they find ready employment in the factories of the region, they also discovered that the salaries they received were better than those for comparable jobs in, for example, Jerusalem. The more the Ethiopians received apartments in towns like Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZion, and Petah Tikvah, the greater the demand for apartments in these places among those remaining in absorption centers. As the supply of public apartments available for Ethiopian immigrants in these cities dwindled, a slow process began of redefining "close to Tel Aviv." From 1988 on, there was a growing interest in a second tier of towns, including Rehovot, Nes Ziona, Ramle, and, more recently, Yavneh, Lod, Ashdod, and Ashkelon.[44] (See tables 5 and 6.)

Education

Since approximately 60 percent of the Ethiopian immigrants were under age 24 at the time of their arrival in Israel, providing appropriate educational programs has been one of the greatest challenges facing absorption authorities.[45]

When Ethiopian immigrants first began arriving in Israel, it was decided

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[43]This conflict between the Ethiopians' preferences and the government's desire to avoid concentrating too many in one place has led to some towns being "closed" to Ethiopians. An appeal challenging this policy was filed with the Supreme Court, but it was dismissed.

[44]For the distribution of Ethiopians in Israel in permanent housing in August 1985 and August 1988, see S. Kaplan, *Les Beta Israel (Falashas)* (Turnhout, Belgium, 1990), pp. 170–73.

[45]See V. Netzer, R. Elazar, and S. Ben-Dor, eds., *Saga of Aliyah: The Jews of Ethiopia: Aspects of Their Linguistic and Educational Absorption* (Jerusalem, 1990), for background on the approaches to education followed in Israel, and G. Ben-Ezer, *K'mo ohr be'kad* (Like Light in a Jug) (Jerusalem, 1992), for an account of the psychological aspects of Youth Aliyah's educational programs.

that all Ethiopian children would be sent to state religious schools during their first year in Israel.[46] This policy, based on the assumption that it would ease the transition for immigrants from a traditional religious background, was applied not only in elementary schools but in Youth Aliyah secondary-level boarding schools as well. Thus, all Ethiopian youngsters absorbed by Youth Aliyah were registered in religious schools. Although parents were permitted to transfer a child to any school after the first year, in practice this seldom occurred. A 1988 study revealed that of the 3,500 Ethiopian students then learning in elementary schools, only about 280, or 8 percent, were in secular schools.[47]

Whatever the political and social considerations behind the decision to send Ethiopians to religious schools, it significantly limited the options available to ministry officials. On the one hand, a large portion of the educational system was deprived of any contact with the Ethiopian students; on the other, certain schools and areas were called upon to assume a considerable burden. Schools of the right size, serving the right age groups, and with the necessary facilities were not always available in proximity to immigrant housing or absorption centers. In some cases, classes suddenly had a large percentage of Ethiopian students, and some schools found themselves with a student body that was 60–70 percent Ethiopian.[48]

Immediately after Operation Solomon, a major effort was made to find suitable schools for the Ethiopian children who had arrived. When arrangements were finally made for them, they were often placed in "special" classes with only Ethiopian children. In some cases they were taught by young women doing national service or other nonprofessional teachers who were unprepared for the challenge of handling so many newcomers who could not read or write their native Amharic, let alone Hebrew.

At the start of the 1993–94 school year, more than two years after Operation Solomon, some 4,000 Ethiopian children were registered in elementary schools. Although most Ethiopian children had been in school for over a year, and were thus no longer required to attend a religious school,

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[46]According to the State Education Law of 1953, Israeli schools are divided into two trends: state (secular) education and state religious education. This law also allows for "recognized" schools, such as those run by the ultra-Orthodox, which are not state schools. Approximately 60 percent of Jewish children attend secular schools, 30 percent religious schools, and 10 percent independent recognized schools. Youth Aliyah is a department of the Jewish Agency that operates a network of secondary boarding schools as well as urban day centers. The boarding schools are also either religious or secular.

[47]Shalva Weil, *Emunot veminhagim dati'im shel yehudei etiyopia be-yisrael* (Beliefs and Religious Customs of Ethiopian Jews in Israel; Hebrew with English abstract) (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 124–41.

[48]For a critique of the decision to send Ethiopian immigrants to religious schools, as well as a general discussion of their education in the mid-1980s, see Teshome G. Wagaw, *For Our Soul: Ethiopian Jews in Israel* (Detroit, 1993).

the community was not, as a whole, interested in placing its children in other schools. In fact, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Absorption, Ethiopian organizations, and other activists to promote secular schools, the percentage of students in nonreligious schools actually declined, from 8 percent in 1988 to 5 percent (approximately 200) in 1993.[49] In effect, most Ethiopian parents seem to be more concerned that their children receive a religious education than with the academic standards of the institutions in question.

Thus, there was still a great need to find religious schools capable of handling so large an influx of students. Since few religious schools were situated near caravan sites, young children were often being bused up to one or one-and-a-half hours in order to attend an appropriate elementary school. Needless to say, in such cases, even the most concerned parents could have little if any contact with their children's school or teachers. Although one early study found that about 20 percent of the Ethiopian children in the elementary schools were having learning problems, which was approximately the same percentage as for the general population,[50] more recent reports indicate that the situation has deteriorated.

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

The decision to send Ethiopian students to religious schools was actually one of the few educational policy decisions made during the period prior to and through Operation Moses. Indeed, as the Israel State Comptroller noted in his report of 1986, thousands of Ethiopian students had already entered the school system by the time planning began on appropriate educational programs. "[The Ministry of Education] began to prepare itself—with regard to preparing cadres of teachers, curricula, and syllabi, and drawing up an overall policy—very late, after the [Ethiopian] children were attending school. Even then, the pace was very slow."[51]

One direct consequence of this lapse was that most Ethiopian parents sent their children off to school with little sense of the norms or expectations of the school system. For their part, the teachers and school staff had little sense of what needed to be explained. Tardiness, inadequate dress, unkempt appearance, a lack of supplies (pencils, notebooks), and insufficient lunches were only a few of the problems that developed at the outset. Ultimately,

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[49]This decline is evident even if one counts an additional 70 Ethiopian students placed in special programs for gifted students in secular schools.

[50]Penina Golan-Kook, Tamar Horowitz, and Leah Shaftiah, *Histaglut Hatalmidim Ha'olim Me'etiyopia Lemisgeret Beit-Hasefer* (The Adaptation of Ethiopian Immigrant Children to the School Framework) (Jerusalem, 1987).

[51]*Israel State Comptroller's Report* 36, 1986, pp. 693–94, quoted in Steven Kaplan, "Beta Israel," *Encyclopaedia Judaica Year Book 1986–87* (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 214–16.

however, the "mechanical" aspects of school attendance were no harder to learn than the use of unfamiliar objects like refrigerators, flush toilets, and toasters. Such problems rarely persisted for long. Once in the classroom, Ethiopian students tended to be well behaved and highly motivated.

Other difficulties have been harder to resolve. Even when Ethiopian parents understand the purpose and organization of school work, few are capable of helping their children study or prepare assignments. Indeed, from the Ethiopian parents' perspective, formal education is noteworthy for the manner in which it reduces the child's link to his or her family. For the first time in living memory, children's daily lives no longer revolve around their household and kin. Much of their time is spent in school, in a world both physically and culturally distant from that of their parents.[52] Here they are exposed to models of behavior greatly at odds with those of Ethiopia and their parents. Frequently, this places them in a terrible bind: the more successfully they pursue their natural desire to integrate and become like their non-Ethiopian friends and classmates, the greater the distance between them and their parents. While some strive and even manage to achieve a precarious balance, acting Israeli in the street and Ethiopian at home, others find themselves torn between two sets of seemingly irreconcilable cultural norms.

Among Ethiopians in Israel, as among most immigrant groups, children tend to adapt more quickly and completely than their parents.[53] Accordingly, while young Ethiopians have generally learned Hebrew with alacrity and have quickly grasped the workings of Israeli society, their elders have often gained only the most minimal skills in the new language and remain mystified by the world around them.[54] In some cases, traditional roles are almost completely reversed as children assume the primary responsibility for representing the family to the outside world and serve as translators and mediators.

YOUTH ALIYAH

Youth Aliyah (*Aliyat Hanoar*), founded in 1932 by Henrietta Szold, accepted its first group of parentless children from Germany in 1933. Many others were to follow, and the organization established a network of boarding secondary schools (youth villages) that sought to provide a standard

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[52]While this is the case for all school students, it is particularly true for those who live in Youth Aliyah villages (see below) and see their parents on an irregular basis.

[53]Tsili Doleve-Gandelman, *Ethiopian Jews in Israel, Family Portraits: A Multi-Faceted Approach* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1989). See also Westheimer and Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation*, pp. 59–78.

[54]Tsili Doleve-Gandelman, "'Ulpan Is Not Berlitz': Adult Education and the Ethiopian Jews in Israel," *Social Science Information* 28, no. 1, 1989, pp. 4–24.

education, as well as to offer emotional support and inculcate Jewish and Israeli culture. During the period of the massive *aliyah* from the Middle East and North Africa in the 1950s, most of the the immigrant children placed in Youth Aliyah institutions had parents in the country but were removed from their homes to speed their acculturation.

Although misgivings developed during the 1980s over policies that separated immigrant youths from their parents, over 96 percent of Ethiopian immigrants aged 13–18 were placed in youth villages.[55] What began as an effort to care for the many youngsters who had arrived without their parents in the early 1980s became the standard track for nearly every Ethiopian teenager. As a result, Ethiopians came to be a disproportionately large part of the villages' population. In 1993 Ethiopian students accounted for 37 percent of those learning throughout the entire system,[56] but they were 65 percent of the students in religious villages. The fact that some of the system's weakest schools are in religious institutions severely limits chances for widespread scholastic achievement and social integration. At the same time, Ethiopians' achievements at some of the system's stronger schools, such as Yemin Orde and Kfar Batya (both religious), have been quite impressive.

Recent studies of the educational record of Youth Aliyah graduates show that Ethiopian immigrants have overwhelmingly been sent to vocational, rather than academic, programs. Thus, in 1992–93 only 27 percent of those Ethiopians completing the 12th grade were prepared to take *bagrut* (university matriculation) exams; and only a small percentage of these achieved results that would have permitted them to pursue university or college studies.[57] For their part, according to press accounts, those in the vocational track often expressed dissatisfaction with the limited occupational choices available in most schools.

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[55]See the special issues of *Alim*, a Youth Aliyah publication in Hebrew devoted to this subject: Summer 1983; Spring 1985; Tamar Dothan, "Diagnosing Ethiopian Immigrant Youth," in *The Integration of Immigrant Adolescents* (Youth Aliyah, Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 69–81; Nisan Kouri, "Vocational-Technological Training in Youth Aliyah," *Youth Aliyah Bulletin*, Summer 1987, pp. 65–72; Rivka Hanegbi and Sara Itziksohn Menuchin, "Problems of Cultural and Development Passages for Ethiopian-Jewish Adolescents in an Israeli Environment," in *Cultural Transition: The Case of Immigrant Youth* (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 140–49; Anita Nudelman, "Understanding Immigrant Adolescents," *Practicing Anthropology* 15, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 13–15.

[56]The percentage of Ethiopian youngsters in Youth Aliyah rose from 24 percent in 1991, to 35 percent in 1992, to 37 percent in 1993.

[57]Rachel Gindin, "Aliyat Hanoar Graduates of Ethiopian Origin 1992–93" (in Hebrew), Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Oct. 1993. A total of 125 students (72 boys and 53 girls) completed the program designed to prepare them for matriculation exams. Even these students had particular problems with English and mathematics, and many of them did not take the matriculation exams in these subjects.

Even under the best of circumstances, the Youth Aliyah option remains problematic. While no one questions the short-term benefits for many children, the long-term implications of a policy that removes children from their families during their teens remains the subject of much controversy. In the light of past experiences with earlier immigrants from Asia and Africa, it seems likely that the widespread use of boarding schools may once again produce a generation of immigrant youth with few links to the local population and no family roots.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

For those young people who managed to go to secondary school in Ethiopia, or even to college, the Student Administration, funded by both the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Absorption, assisted in setting up special preparatory courses in which those who seem qualified for higher education can have a chance to prove their competence. Although this type of program, or *mekhinah*, is normally one year for Israelis and other immigrants, it has at times been extended to two years for Ethiopians, so that some of the difficulties they encounter can be better handled through special courses. For example, since almost every Ethiopian student had trouble passing the national psychometric tests, special instruction was provided.[58] Although not all passed, this did not bar them from further study, since certain programs, as well as certain universities, place less importance on the test scores than others. Also, it has been found that, with help, many Ethiopian students succeed in university, even if their psychometric results remain below standard.[59]

In order to assist those Ethiopians who seek to study beyond high school, special "affirmative" conditions have been created that are unavailable to any other immigrant group. Beside the right to a second year of *mekhinah*, the Ethiopian student has the formal right to free higher education for as long as it takes him or her to complete a bachelor's degree. In contrast, a Russian immigrant student has the right to free education for only a two-year period.[60]

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[58]Psychometric exams are standardized tests designed to measure general academic ability and aptitude. Until recently, they were required of all Israeli high-school and *mekhinah* students who applied to a university. As in similar tests given in other countries, many of the questions are culturally bound. For Ethiopian students, moreover, the structure and form of the exam are also unfamiliar.

[59]Cf. the articles by Phyllis A. Rothman, "The Mathematics Program for Ethiopian Students," *Nitzanim*, Spring 1987, and Moshe Fasi and Debi Kohn, "Absorption of Students from Ethiopia in the Rothberg School," ibid.

[60]This was reported on in the newspaper *Ha'aretz* (July 27, 1992), under the heading "Positive Discrimination," in which it was also pointed out that from two-and-a-half to five

Despite these advantages, only 148 Ethiopian students attended university, college, or pre-academic *mekhinah* during the 1992–93 school year, a relatively modest figure. Included in this figure were 30 degree students at the Hebrew University, 3 of them working at the master's degree level; 18 at Bar-Ilan University, the majority in an ongoing special social-work program; 9 at Ben-Gurion University; 14 at Tel Aviv University; and 4 at the Haifa Technion. Thirty-five students were enrolled in the Technological College in Beersheba.

During the 1993–94 academic year, over 300 Ethiopians were studying in institutions of higher education. Of this number, 110 were registered in universities, colleges, and technical schools. In addition, over 200—including both those who had arrived in Operation Solomon and veterans who had attended Youth Aliyah schools without completing the necessary matriculation—were enrolled in a number of *mekhinot* and experimental programs. At the Hebrew University *mekhinah*, 20 students were registered; at Tel Aviv University, 31. A search that was made for newly arrived individuals who had had more than ten years of schooling in Ethiopia but were still not qualified for university or college-level programs produced 90 individuals. They were registered in technological and vocational training programs at the Western Galilee College, School of Technology, near Acre. Special courses have also been introduced to train Ethiopians to be teachers, dental technicians, and rabbis. A pretechnicians' course was established at the Hadassah Community College in Jerusalem for another 40. An experimental first-year program was set up at Haifa University for 60 Ethiopians who had arrived in Operation Solomon with 11–12 years of academic background. At the end of a year all but one had passed the course, and the majority were able to enter directly into academic or professional training programs. These and similar results in the *mekhinah* programs seem to indicate that policies that exclude Ethiopians from academic programs may be seriously underestimating their potential.

YOUTH PROJECT

Ethiopian immigrants between the ages of 18 and 28 who had either very limited prior schooling or none at all posed a special challenge for the educational system. Rather than ignore the needs of this age group, or simply push nearly 1,000 young people into unskilled work, the Ministry of Absorption, through its Student Administration, devised a special two-

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times more money is invested in the absorption of each Ethiopian immigrant than in a comparable immigrant from the former Soviet Union.

year intensive education program known as the Youth Project, which was inaugurated in July 1985.[61]

Working in cooperation with the Ministries of Education, Labor, and Religious Affairs, with help from the Jewish Agency and the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the Student Administration contracted with some 20 institutions, including yeshivahs, vocational schools, and various comprehensive high schools. The Ethiopian students were taught half a day of academic subjects (primarily Hebrew, mathematics, civics, and Bible) and half a day of vocational courses (mainly welding, auto mechanics, carpentry, electricity, and printing for men; sewing, home economics, child care, and secretarial skills for women).

Thanks to generous funding, the Youth Project was able to mobilize the talents of highly qualified teachers and to bring young Ethiopians into some of the country's finest vocational schools. Unfortunately, the vocations offered were often of limited demand in the open job market. Nonetheless, it was evident after two years that the socialization experience alone, quite apart from actual skills learned, contributed to a marked improvement in most participants' ability to organize their time, plan their futures, and deal with the demands of Israeli society. Four years after the original Youth Project participants ended their study, a survey conducted by the JDC found that around 70 percent of project graduates were employed, although not necessarily in the area of their training.

In the meantime, the Youth Project was continued. All the young people between ages 18 and 28 who arrived in Operation Solomon with 0–9 years of previous education were placed in vocational training schools. As of October 1993, a thousand students were enrolled in this two-year program.

ARMY TRAINING

In the early years of the two-year Youth Project, all able-bodied men who completed it were placed in a specially designed pre-induction military training program. This intensive six-week course, called *Magen Tsion*, aimed at bridging the gap between the life experience of the Ethiopians and that of the Israeli youths with whom they were expected to serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Before this course was set up, the tendency was to excuse Ethiopians from any serious participation in military service and to direct them to courses in driving, mechanics, and cooking—something many youths did not want. The *Magen Tsion* program was subse-

[61] See Chaim Rosen's evaluation of this project: "*Proyekt Ha-Tse'irim: Olei Etiyopia Mineku-dat Mabat Tarbutit*" (The Youth Project: Ethiopian Immigrants from a Cultural Perspective), (Ministry of Absorption, Jerusalem, 1987).

quently discontinued in favor of more individual approaches. As many youths as possible are inducted and immediately integrated with other recruits. When deemed necessary, special preparatory courses that draw on the lessons learned in *Magen Tsion* are made available.

Often showing a flair for military endeavors and possessed of superb stamina, many young Ethiopians have deliberately chosen to serve in the ranks of the infantry, tank corps, paratroopers, and, when possible, in the elite combat units of the regular army. There is already a small but definitely growing cadre of Ethiopian officers, which is a clear indicator of their determination, as well as their ability to compete on an equal basis with other Israelis. As of 1993, more than 2,000 Ethiopian males had completed army training. In June 1993, 850 were in active service, including 17 officers and 16 career soldiers.[62]

Based on the numbers of graduates bound to come from Youth Aliyah in the years ahead, the contribution of Ethiopian Jews to the Israeli armed forces is likely to increase. Those who arrived in Operation Solomon have yet to be inducted (including 3,000 in Youth Aliyah and 1,000 in the Youth Project). Once they are eligible, they will swell the ranks of the Ethiopians doing military service.

Ethiopian women have been far slower than their male counterparts to enter the army. By 1992 only about two dozen women had entered the IDF. During the next year, however, their number doubled to about 50. In part, at least, this low figure is a natural result of the decision to send Ethiopians to religious boarding schools. Female students at such schools are often discouraged from entering the army, and in some cases are even asked to sign a document indicating that they will request a deferment on religious grounds. In addition, it must be said that most Ethiopian parents do not want their daughters to go into the army, where women are exposed to nontraditional behaviors and mores.

Employment

THE PROBLEM OF DEPENDENCE

For many Ethiopians, their sojourn in Israeli absorption centers and hotels continued a pattern of dependence that had begun either in the Sudan or Addis Ababa. For months or even years, they had lived as refugees and relied on the generosity of others for their survival. Although attempts were

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[62]Malka Shabtay, "The Re-formation of Cultural Identity Among Ethiopian Immigrants to Israel," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming); idem, "Absorption of Ethiopians Through the Israeli Defense Forces," *Practicing Anthropology* 15, no. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 16–17.

made during the period prior to Operation Solomon to find meaningful work for as many Ethiopians as possible in Addis Ababa, both their numbers and the external conditions made this extremely difficult. In any event, such efforts came to an end as soon as they arrived in Israel and became involved in an absorption process designed to familiarize them as quickly as possible with the language, customs, and norms of their new homeland.

Many Ethiopians were, for a number of reasons, all too ready to accept the cocoon-like protection they were offered. In part, at least, their response to the assistance they were offered may have been modeled on common behavior patterns in Ethiopia, where the poor often fare better from charity than from striking out on their own.[63] In addition, not unlike refugees elsewhere in the world, Ethiopian immigrants arrived in Israel with a strong belief that, having found sanctuary, they would now be compensated for their suffering. As refugee expert Barry N. Stein has noted, refugees have a "strong belief that they are owed something by someone. Since their persecutors are unavailable, the refugees shift their demands to the government and helping agencies."[64] Moreover, as immigrants warmly welcomed and cared for by the Jewish state, they carried high expectations that all their needs would be met.

At first, this was indeed the case. Not only did the various absorption agencies provide the immigrants with housing, clothing, and food, but hundreds of Israelis came forward with gifts of clothing, toys, blankets, and anything else they could think of. This tremendous beneficence was, however, not without its darker side. In some instances, dramatic gestures of giving seemed designed more to satisfy the donor than to assist the recipient. While giving presents such as school supplies and toys directly to smiling Ethiopian children was immensely gratifying to both sides and provided excellent photo opportunities, it also reinforced the children's perception that, in their new home, outsiders, not parents, were the people to turn to for both satisfying needs and obtaining luxuries.

More generally, the longer the Ethiopians were helped because they were helpless, the more adept many of them became at displaying their need for charity.[65] Some grew quite accustomed to the role of indigent ward and came to view it as natural. Thus, they felt deeply wronged when immigrant benefits such as free housing and medical care were terminated after the end of the mandated period. They had been loyal and obedient, why were their

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[63]John Iliffe, *The African Poor: A History* (Cambridge, Eng., 1987), pp. 16–17.

[64]Barry N. Stein, "The Refugee Experience," *International Migration Review* 15, nos. 1–2, 1981, p. 327.

[65]Michael Ashkenazi, "Studying the Students: Information Exchange, Ethiopian Immigrants, Social Workers, and Visitors," in *Ethiopian Jews and Israel*, ed. Ashkenazi and Weingrod, pp. 85–96.

benefactors "punishing" them? Even programs that called for only a symbolic financial contribution from the *olim* were often resisted. In some cases, immigrant parents went on strike when it was suggested that they contribute toward the cost of their children's clothing, rather than simply taking clothes from a box of donated items. Others seemed to view individual initiative as something to be hidden. Students often attempted to conceal the fact that they had paying jobs, assuming that scholarships were given only to the truly needy and that they might be penalized for their enterprise. Thus, while most Ethiopians in Israel struggle for independence, eking out a living any way possible, some devote their energies to winning the favors of the absorption agencies and seemingly endless flow of charitable bodies, measuring their success by how much they can get from outsiders.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

Unlike almost all other immigrants to Israel, who seek jobs in their fields or register for retraining courses, the majority of the Ethiopian men, and practically all of the women, arrived with neither a vocation nor any readily marketable skills. The majority lived in rural villages, where their work experience included ox-plow farming, simple metalworking, weaving, and, for women, pottery making.

In order to facilitate their integration into a technological society, the Ministry of Absorption, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and experts from the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), has endeavored to create meaningful vocational training programs. These have included specially adapted courses to prepare Ethiopians for such occupations as the building trades for men and jewelry making for women.

A survey of 2,800 Operation Moses immigrants, conducted by the Brookdale Institute in the summer of 1992, found that 85 percent of the men and 39 percent of the women had participated in at least one training program.[56] Among the most popular courses for men were auto mechanics (343), metalworking (202), building trades (100), carpentry (97), and auto electronics (92). Significant numbers of women had studied sewing (129), geriatric care (96), practical nursing (91),[57] and infant care (69).

During the period prior to Operation Solomon, finding employment did not seem to have been a problem for the Ethiopians. It is generally estimated—official figures were never made available—that about 80 percent of those eligible for work did find jobs.[58] Although at first there were fears

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[56]Gila Noam and Chen Lipschitz, "A Survey of Young Ethiopians from Ethiopia" (in Hebrew), unpublished manuscript (Brookdale Institute, Jerusalem, Aug. 1993).

[57]Forty-nine men also attended practical nursing courses. Once Russian immigrants began to arrive, among them an abundance of already trained people willing to work in this field, funds for training Ethiopians as nurses diminished.

[58]The Brookdale survey cited above found that 83 percent of the men and 43 percent of the

of the Ethiopian Jew being exploited to serve as unskilled "black labor," replacing Arab workers, this has not been common. The Ethiopians themselves have consistently refused menial work.[69] Once they left the protection of the absorption centers, most were quick to see the need to work hard in order to obtain an adequate income to cover all of the expenses of their new urban life. In Ethiopia, the Jews more than any other group had worked at a variety of occupations, usually simultaneously. A man would divide his day among two or three different activities, including farming, weaving, and blacksmithing. This model of multiple tasks has been translated by some industrious individuals into a willingness to work in factories that offer double shifts and the opportunity for overtime pay. This enables the Ethiopians to upgrade their salaries significantly and removes the stigma of having to apply every month to the National Insurance for supplementary salary payments.[70]

The employment situation for the latest arrivals has not been particularly impressive. In part the problem lies in where they are living: most of the caravan sites are far from the major employment centers. Then, too, the unemployment benefits they are eligible to receive are usually larger than whatever salaries they can earn. In addition, as noted above, their absorption situation has contributed to the feeling that there is no need to work hard, since the government will take care of them. A variety of new training programs have been established in which several thousand people have been involved. Job placement, so far, has been sporadic, and ongoing efforts are being made to integrate training with access to jobs.

WOMEN AT WORK

Ethiopian women in Israel are encouraged to assume a more important role in family life and to have greater autonomy in their dealings with the surrounding society. In Ethiopia, women traditionally deferred to men, who held all positions of authority. In Ethiopia, a woman's responsibilities were

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women sampled were either employed, serving in the army, or studying. More specifically, 68 percent of the men and 41 percent of the women were working. The State Comptroller's Report, 38, 1988, p. 499, noted that in July 1987, 73.5 percent of eligible Ethiopians were not permanently employed. The difference in these figures reflects the fact that the survey was limited to those under age 40, and that the comptroller did not count either seasonal workers or those in vocational courses as employed. A large number of Ethiopians are in both these categories. For a still useful earlier study of employment in Ethiopia and Israel, see R. Best, "Wirtschaftsweisen der Beta Israel in Athiopien (Geschichte und Darstellung) und Aspekte ihrer okonomischen Integration in Israel" (M.A. Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat, February 1988).

[69] The Brookdale survey found that 55 percent of women, but only 23 percent of men, were employed as unskilled labor.

[70] This applies chiefly to those residing in the Tel Aviv area, where most such factories are located.

generally limited to the domestic realm, as part of a rigid, gender-based division of labor. Women's activities included cleaning, cooking, embroidery, caring for young children, bringing water, washing clothes, making clay vessels for eating and cooking, and weaving straw baskets for storage. Men were responsible for building the family house, farming, smithing, weaving cloth, and any endeavor associated with the outside world.[71] The division was usually strictly observed, and it would be unthinkable for a woman to perform most male tasks or for a man to perform "woman's work."

Although the feminist movement has had far less influence in Israel than in the United States or Western Europe, the average Israeli's expectations of a woman's role differ enormously from those of Beta Israel society. Ethiopians first encounter Western-style women in the absorption bureaucracy; Hebrew teachers, social workers, and house mothers are particularly prominent.[72] These Israeli women are significant not only because they represent the unprecedented phenomenon of female authority figures, but also for the simple reason that they are working outside the home.

Initially, Ethiopian women brought to Israel were relieved of some of their domestic responsibilities. Hotels, in particular, assumed most of the work associated with the preparation of food. Even when they moved to mobile homes or permanent housing, many of their former chores—including making dishes and pots, fetching water, and weaving baskets—were suddenly obsolete. Nevertheless, the basic ethos remained the same: whatever was done in the house was considered the responsibility of the woman.

But while the domestic realm remained restricted to women, women were no longer restricted to the domestic realm. Indeed, both ideological and practical pressures were brought to bear on Ethiopian women to explore the options for work outside the house. Although it has often been suggested that the woman's decision to work outside the house is itself the cause of considerable tension and strife, this may be a case of the chicken and the egg. In some instances at least, women who view themselves as trapped in unsatisfactory marriages may seek outside work and the income it brings in order to gain independence. In such cases, the woman's work is not the problem, but (at least in her eyes) the solution. What is undeniable is the fact that, in Israel, a woman's options are far broader than they were in

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[71]Although the distinctions drawn by the Beta Israel were essentially the same as those observed by their neighbors, there were some slight differences. In contrast to their Christian counterparts, Beta Israel women were known for making clay pots that were sold to outsiders. Symbolically, however, this form of work was associated with the domestic realm and the home.

[72]On these female authority figures and on women in general, see Westheimer and Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation*, pp. 79–102. See also Eva Leitman, "The Cultural Adaptation of Three Generations of Ethiopian Women," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming).

Ethiopia, and that many take advantage of this either within the framework of marriage or outside it.

The tensions between women's traditional roles and the opportunities offered in Israel are most clearly seen when the wife goes out to work while the husband remains unemployed. Although the overall unemployment rate among Ethiopian women appears to be higher than among men (see above), the phenomenon of unemployed husband–employed wife is common, largely because of disparity in ages. In Ethiopia, the husband was generally several years older than his wife. However, in some circumstances, such as second marriages, he might be 10, 20, even 25 years her senior. A 35-year-old woman will be offered more training programs and probably adapt more quickly than her 50-year-old husband. Indeed, at that age, unless he is part of the tiny minority of educated immigrants, he is unlikely to be seriously considered as a candidate for the workforce. Once the wife is working, not only does her income make her more independent, but her exposure to the world around her greatly accelerates her adaptation. While she confronts the daily challenges of working life—Hebrew conversation, bus routes and schedules, work relations, pay slips, etc.—the husband remains behind: isolated, confused, frustrated.

PENSIONERS

The one age group that has been the least productive in Israel is that of people over age 50.[73] Whereas in Ethiopia a man of this age and older would be very active in his fields and at his hearth, in Israel he suddenly finds himself a "pensioner." At the time of their initial adjustment to life in Israel, many distinguished elders found themselves with nothing to do and often with no one to talk to except other "old people," as everyone else was either learning or working.[74] For a while the oldsters simply enjoyed the miraculous "gift" of money they received each month for doing nothing. Gradually, at least some of these people—who, given the vagueness of age reckoning in Ethiopia, could well be younger than the "65 or over" they were registered as—began to suffer from constantly being at home.

For some, the solution has been to draw on a typical Ethiopian inclination to wander. They leave their homes and families and set out to visit relatives or to attend weddings and funerals, whenever they have the chance to do so. Others have realized that they need to be productive, and so have become "working pensioners," doing weaving in their homes, working as guards or checkers at supermarkets, or finding work in greenhouses or even factories. Those who do this have no trouble continuing to receive their

[73]On the general decline in the position and authority of "elders," see the discussion above.
[74]About 7 percent of the Ethiopian population receive pensions.

pensions along with their salaries.[75] The existence of working pensioners contradicts the oft-repeated claim that every Ethiopian over 45 is "over the hill" and will have great difficulty in finding a place for himself, or in learning Hebrew to any great extent. They usually gain remarkable fluency in Hebrew and continue to be influential in their community's affairs. In contrast, the "wanderers" seldom if ever progress with Hebrew or adjust to their new environment.

Health Issues

The arrival of the Ethiopian Jews in Israel has confronted the Israeli medical establishment with a variety of unprecedented challenges. Not only did many immigrants arrive with medical problems that were unfamiliar to Israeli authorities, but each successive wave of *olim* presented a slightly different health profile. Almost without exception, moreover, Ethiopian immigrants were unfamiliar with the vocabulary, technology, and underlying principles of Western medical practice.[76]

As noted above, the vast majority of Ethiopian immigrants who arrived prior to 1986 were illegal migrants who journeyed to the Sudan and spent extended periods in refugee camps before being airlifted to Israel. Although no exact figures exist, somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 Ethiopian Jews died in or on their way to the Sudan.[77] Those who survived and reached Israel were generally in poor physical condition.[78] Between 32 and 52 per-

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[75]Since such working pensioners do not report that they are employed, they do not figure in government statistics, and it is impossible to determine their number.

[76]Two issues of the *Israel Journal of Medical Sciences* (*IJMS*), comprising a total of over 40 articles, have been devoted to health issues concerning Ethiopian immigrants: vol. 27, no. 5, May 1991, and vol. 29, nos. 6–7, June-July 1993. See below for references to specific articles.

[77]Tudor Parfitt, *Operation Moses*, p. 87. The Ethiopian community and Israeli officials consistently cite the higher figure in discussions of mortality during this period and at the annual memorial service held in Jerusalem.

[78]C. Hershko, G. Nesher, A.M. Yinnon, et al., "Medical Problems in Ethiopian Refugees Airlifted to Israel: Experiences of 131 Patients Admitted to a General Hospital," *Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 89, 1986, pp. 107–11. This should not be confused, however, with certain positive elements in their health profile prior to their departure for the Sudan. Upon arrival in Israel, Ethiopian immigrants have low cholesterol levels and few dental caries. In Israel their diet tends to change and includes increased consumption of foods associated with higher blood pressure and heart disease. There is also evidence for an increase in dental cavities as a result of the consumption of sweets. Judith T. Shuval, *Social Dimensions of Health in Israel* (Westport, Conn., 1992), p. 127; U. Goldbourt, T. Rosenthal, and A. Rubinstein, "Trends in Weight and Blood Pressure in Ethiopian Immigrants During Their First Years in Israel . . . ," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 260–63; U. Goldbourt, M. Khoury, E. Landau, L.H. Reisin, and A. Rubinstein, "Blood Pressure in Ethiopian Immigrants . . . ," ibid., pp. 264–67; idem, "Blood Pressure and Body Mass Index in Ethiopian Immigrants: Comparisons of Operation Solomon and Moses," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 360–63; S. Cohen, H. Sarnat, Z. Rakocs, and

cent of those who arrived during Operation Moses suffered from malnutrition, and over 80 percent tested positive for intestinal parasites.[79] A quarter of those who arrived between 1980 and 1988 were diagnosed as having malaria, while during the same period about 2 percent were identified as having tuberculosis.[80]

In contrast to this group, those who arrived in the 1990s, and particularly those who came after a clinic was established in Addis Ababa in July 1990 by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, were far healthier on their arrival in Israel.[81] The average weight of males who arrived prior to Operation Solomon was, for example, only 47.5 kilograms (about 105 pounds), while for those who arrived in Operation Solomon it was 58 kilograms (about 128 pounds).[82] Few required immediate hospitalization. Having avoided the rigors of the Sudan and/or received treatment for existing conditions, only a small number tested positive for malaria.[83] These improvements notwithstanding, parasitic infections and evidence of exposure to hepatitis B virus continued to be common among the new arrivals, and the incidence of tuberculosis remained disturbingly high.[84]

E. Amir, "Increased Caries Prevalence in Adolescents Who Immigrated from Ethiopia to Israel," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 297–99.

[79]Jacov Nahmias, Zalman Greenberg, Leo Djerras, and Leumit Giladi, "Mass Treatment of Intestinal Parasites Among Ethiopian Immigrants," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 278–83; Jacov Nahmias, Zalman Greenberg, et al., "Health Profile of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel: An Overview," ibid., p. 339.

[80]P.E. Slater, C. Costin, and Z. Greenberg, "Malaria in Israel: The Ethiopian Connection," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 284–87; S.A. Wartski, "Tuberculosis in Ethiopian Immigrants," ibid., pp. 288–92. The prevalence rate of 1.9/100 compares to 4.5/100,000 in the general Israeli public. During the period immediately after Operation Moses (1985), Ethiopian immigrants accounted for slightly more than half of all cases of tuberculosis in Israel. This trend continued and even increased following Operation Solomon.

[81]J. Lachter, "Medicine and the Ethiopian Jews: Report and Analysis from Addis Ababa," *IJMS* 28, no. 1, 1992, pp. 43–46; Theodore M. Myers, "A Medical Care Program for Ethiopian Jewish Migrants in Addis Ababa," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 334–37. When this clinic was established in July 1990, Ethiopian Jews in Addis Ababa were dying at a rate of almost 40 a month (a figure still slightly lower than comparable rates among the local population). During the period March–May 1991, only 12 deaths were reported.

[82]Nahmias, "Profile," p. 339.

[83]Paul Slater, Zalman Greenberg, and Corina Costin, "Imported Malaria from Ethiopia—End of an Era?" *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 383–84. Between May 1990 and May 1991, only 33 cases were found among the 19,614 immigrants who arrived.

[84]E. Ben-Porath, L. Hornstein, J. Zeldis, J. Nahmias, "Hepatitis B Virus Infection and Liver Disease in Ethiopian Immigrants to Israel," *Hepatology* 6, 1986, pp. 662–66; L. Hornstein, E. Ben-Porath, A. Cuzin, Z. Baharir, N. Rimon, J. Nahmias, "Hepatitis B Virus Infection in Ethiopian Immigrants," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 268–72; E. Flateau, O. Segol, A. Shneour, H. Tabenkin, R. Ras, "Prevalence of Markers of Infection with Hepatitis B and C Viruses in Immigrants of Operation Solomon," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 387–89; R. Edman and Z. Greenberg, "Intestinal Parasitic Infection in Operation Solomon Immigrants," ibid., pp. 374–76. During the period 1989–1991, the rate of tuberculosis among Ethiopian immigrants

In one respect, at least, immigrants who arrived via Addis Ababa were at greater risk than those who had come through the Sudan. While the latter were not exposed to HIV/AIDS, which had yet to become widespread in Ethiopia, the former were. By the early 1990s, Addis Ababa was one of the mostly highly infected cities in the world.[85] Beta Israel males, dislocated from their traditional residences and occupations, with time on their hands and money (from Jewish welfare organizations) in their pockets, were able to visit local prostitutes, 60 percent of whom were infected with the HIV virus. Unprotected blood supplies and nonsterile needles (used medically) put others at risk. Since no testing was done for HIV in Ethiopia prior to immigration, those carrying the virus simply brought it to Israel. Thus, while none of a group of 1,439 Operation Moses immigrants tested HIV positive, 226 of approximately 10,000 immigrants (over 10 years old) who arrived in 1991 were found to be carriers.[86]

HEALTH EDUCATION

The challenge posed by cases of HIV/AIDS is perhaps the most vivid example of the problems relating to the medical status of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. Although rare or unfamiliar diseases brought by the immigrants may have initially baffled Israeli medical personnel, in most cases these have yielded to treatment. A more complex challenge is the interaction with a population that has little or no familiarity with the Western biomedical model of healing: its terminology, technology, or assumptions. Most Ethiopian immigrants continue to hold, in whole or in part, to their traditional system of medical explanation, healing, and healers. Both secular healers (midwives, herbalists, uvula cutters, and "surgeons") and more religiously oriented specialists (*dabtara*, *tonkway*, *balazar*) continue to operate in Israel.[87] Immigrants turn to such healers both when they are dissat-

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declined from 1.9 percent to a still relatively high 1.3 percent. S.A. Wartski, "Tuberculosis Case Finding and Treatment in Ethiopian Immigrants to Israel, 1989–1991," ibid., pp. 376–80.

[85]Ethiopian Ministry of Health, "Report to W.H.O.: AIDS Control and Prevention Activities," Annual Report 1989.

[86]Shlomo Maayan, Nurit Vardinon, Rivka Yazkan, Erica Cohen, Flora Ben-Yshai, and Israeli Yust, "Lack of Exposure to HTLV1 Among Ethiopian Immigrants of Operation Solomon (1991) Arriving to the Jerusalem Area," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 393–95. Among Ethiopian immigrants, the HIV virus appears to be most commonly transmitted by heterosexual contact, tattooing, bloodletting, and other traditional medical practices.

[87]On the traditional Ethiopian medical system in general, see Simon Messing, *The Target of Health in Ethiopia* (Information Corporation, New York, 1972). On Ethiopian immigrants in Israel, see Nudelman, "Immigrant Adolescents"; idem, "Health Behavior and Traditional Healing Among Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming); and Richard M. Hodes and Befekade Teferedegne, "Traditional Ideas of Health and Disease Among Ethiopian Jews," in *Social Science and Medicine* (forthcoming). The term *tonkway* is often used as a generic term for all sorts of "sorcerers" or mystical healers. The *dabtara*

isfied with the treatment they have received from Western practitioners and as a supplement to ongoing treatment, which addresses social and spiritual aspects of illness usually ignored in the West.

Thus, medical interventions and health education inevitably involve a process of cultural translation for both health professionals and patients. How are apparently healthy individuals to be convinced that they need to refrain from certain behavior, subject themselves to a regimen of treatments, or regularly take specified medicine because "tests" reveal them to be infected with malaria, hepatitis, tuberculosis, or HIV? How are Israeli health professionals to interpret immigrants' descriptions of medical symptoms and to distinguish between different types of physical and psychological distress?

In response to these challenges, health educators, doctors, and anthropologists have trained Ethiopian immigrants to serve as cultural mediators between immigrant patients and Israeli medical personnel.[88] Innovative health education programs have been developed to bridge the gap between the different medical systems. These have included such subjects as nutrition, personal hygiene, the use of the health system, preventive medicine, sex education and birth control, sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, and first aid.[89]

MENTAL HEALTH

No aspect of medical care for Ethiopian immigrants has proven more complex than that of mental health care. No "wonder drug" exists to treat the many cases of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, culture shock, somatization, and suicide that have emerged in Israel in recent years. In no area, moreover, is the contrast between the Ethiopian and Western medical systems more striking.

One does not have to look far to understand the etiology of many of these

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is a learned man who makes use of books and writing to heal. The *balazar* heals through a cult associated with spirit (*zar*) possession. This cult will be discussed in greater detail below.

[88]Shabtay, "Defense Forces," p. 17; Nudelman, "Immigrant Adolescents," p. 14.

[89]Nudelman, "Immigrant Adolescents," p. 14; Diane Levin-Zamir, Dina Lipsky, Ellen Goldberg, and Zipora Melamed, "Health Education for Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel, 1991–2," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 422–28; Tsipora Bental, Rina Gersten and Michael Alkan, "Health Education for the Ethiopian Community in the Negev," ibid., pp. 429–37; Michael Alkan, Tsipora Bental, and Rina Gersten, "Health Education in the Ethiopian Community in the Negev Region," *Family Physician* 18, 1990, pp. 159–62; Daniel Chemtov, Haim (Chaim) Rosen, Ronny Shtarkshall, and Varda Soskolne, "A Culturally Specific Educational Program to Reduce the Risk of HIV and HBV Transmission Among Ethiopian Immigrants to Israel: A Preliminary Report on Training Veteran Immigrants as Health Educators," ibid., pp. 437–42; Daniel Chemtov and Haim (Chaim) Rosen, *Be "Gobez" for the Sake of Your Health* (Jerusalem, Multiagency Committee for Education and Information on HIV Infection and Related Diseases, 1992).

problems. Almost every area discussed above carries with it immense psychological stress and the seeds of potential disorders. For some Ethiopians it is the trauma of the *aliyah* process itself, during which they were threatened by arrest, robbery, rape, illness, and starvation.[90] Those who survived often suffered the loss of loved ones and were usually separated from close family members still in Ethiopia.[91] Almost all experienced a sudden and dramatic change in lifestyle as they entered a highly urbanized Western country and confronted a strange language, new foods and clothing, a foreign economic system, and a sometimes hostile religious establishment. Changing gender roles and the removal of children from the home for educational purposes put additional strain on the family unit and added to the sense of extreme disorientation felt by many.

Many of the symptoms displayed by Ethiopian psychiatric patients, including anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances, and somatization are all too familiar to Israeli mental health officials. Trancelike states and dissociative disorders pose a more unusual challenge. Although such phenomena were not considered "normal" in Ethiopia, they were a familiar and widely understood part of life. They were understood, however, not as the result of internal conflicts and disturbances, but as the product of a type of spirit known as *zar*.[92] A woman, or much more rarely a man, who was possessed

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[90]Gadi Ben-Ezer is currently completing a dissertation that examines psychosocial aspects of Ethiopian immigrants' accounts of their emigration and *aliyah*. Recent research has found a clear correlation between the seriousness of traumas suffered on the way to Israel and extent of psychological difficulties in Israel. See Ariel Arieli, "Persecutory Experience and Post-traumatic Stress Disorders Among Ethiopian Immigrants," in *Grief and Bereavement in Contemporary Society* III, ed. Emanuel Chigier (London, 1988), pp. 70–76; and Ariel Arieli and Seffefe Ayche, "Psychopathological Aspects of the Ethiopian Immigration," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 411–18. For a study of children in Addis Ababa, see Gadi Ben-Ezer and Haim Peri, *Displaced Children: A Report of the Condition of Displaced Jewish Children in Addis Ababa* (Israel Section of Defence for Children International, Jerusalem, 1991).

[91]Ben-Ezer and Peri, *Displaced Children*, p. 415. Among 87 Ethiopian immigrants treated by a mental health center in Netanya, 35 percent had lost one family member, 30 percent had lost more than one member; 40 percent were forced to bury their dead without conducting religious ceremonies, and 56 percent had arrived in Israel without any other family member. See also Sara Minuchen Itziksohn and Rivka Hanegbi, "Loss and Mourning in the Ethiopian Community: An Anthropological-Psychological Approach," in *Grief and Bereavement in Contemporary Society* III, ed. Emanuel Chigier.

[92]On the *zar* in Ethiopia and Israel, see Yael Kahana, "The Zar Spirits: A Category of Magic in the System of Mental Health in Ethiopia," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 31, 1985, pp. 125–43; Alan Young, "Why Amhara Get *kurenya*: Sickness and Possession in an Ethiopian Zar Cult," *American Ethnologist* 14, 1975, pp. 245–65; G. Ratzoni, R. Blumensohn, A. Apter, and S. Tyano, "Psychopathology and Management of Hospitalized Suicidal Ethiopian Adolescents in Israel," *IJMS* 27, no. 5, pp. 293–96; G. Ratzoni, A. Apter, R. Blumensohn, and S. Tyano, "Psychopathology and Management of Hospitalized Ethiopian Immigrant Adolescents in Israel," *Journal of Adolescence* 11, no. 3, 1988, pp. 231–36; G. Ratzoni, Isabel Ben Amo, Tal Weizman, Ronit Weizman, Ilan Modai, and Alan Apter, "Psychiatric Diag-

by a *zar* would behave in a bizarre fashion until put under the care of a *balazar* (literally, the owner of a *zar*), a healer who had him/herself been possessed. Thereafter, she would belong to a cult group and would meet with others who had themselves been possessed by *zar* spirits.

Israeli health practitioners quickly discovered that diagnosis and treatment of patients in a dissociative state often required them to become familiar with the context of traditional healing. Often their patients had visited or were continuing to visit a *balazar* at the same time as they received Western treatment. In some cases, "second opinions" from and "referrals" to traditional healers were even initiated by the Israeli doctors.

By far the most troubling feature of the Ethiopians' psychological adjustment to Israel has been the comparatively large number of suicides. In 1985, the suicide rate among Ethiopian immigrants was six times that found among veteran Israelis.[93] Although the rate has declined somewhat over the years, it still remains significantly higher than that found among the bulk of the population.

Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to state unequivocally why a particular person commits suicide and another in similar circumstances does not. In the case of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel the problem is complicated by recurrent attempts to politicize the phenomenon. Thus, painful personal and family tragedies are exploited to score points in ongoing political debates. During the conflict with the rabbinate, for example, suicides were said to have resulted from the inability of Ethiopians to marry legally, but in discussions concerning university studies, the same cases were attributed to having been refused admission. While the suicides following Operation Moses were often attributed to the trauma of *aliyah*, the guilt of "survivors' syndrome," and concern for relatives in Ethiopia, the massive family reunification of Operation Solomon, far from putting an end to such tragedies, produced a new wave of deaths.[94] An editorial published on December 20, 1991, in the *Jerusalem Post* argued (apparently on the basis of a single case) that Ethiopian suicides in Israel were not connected to difficulties in the absorption process, but were directly attributable to the failure to bring the Falas Mura, Beta Israel who had converted to Christianity, to Israel.

The attempts of the *Post* and others notwithstanding, any attempt to find a single cause and a simple solution to the problem of Ethiopian suicides in Israel appears doomed to failure. Suicide does not appear to have been

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noses in Hospitalized Adolescent and Adult Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel," *IJMS* 29, nos. 6–7, pp. 419–21.

[93]Arieli and Ayche, "Psychopathological Aspects," p. 412; Ratzoni et al., "Psychopathology and Management . . . Suicidal"; Westheimer and Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation*, pp. 113–17.

[94]Arieli and Ayche, "Psychopathological Aspects," pp. 417–18.

common among the Beta Israel in Ethiopia. This does not mean, however, that it is the result of any one feature of their experience in Israel. Reports concerning Ethiopian refugees in the United States, Germany, Canada, and resettlement camps in Ethiopia itself all mention a disturbingly high rate of suicide. Given the vast differences that separate these countries and their refugee programs, it seems unlikely that a common denominator will be found on this level.

Analysis of a few of the suicides that have occurred since Operation Moses seems to support the link between at least some of these incidents and the kinds of absorption difficulties discussed above. On December 14, 1991, for example, a Christian Ethiopian who feared he would be returned to Ethiopia if his Beta Israel wife carried out her threat to divorce him, murdered her and then committed suicide. Later the same month, an Ethiopian Jew engaged in a violent quarrel with his wife struck her, knocking her unconscious. Fearing that he had killed her, the man himself committed suicide.[95] Other cases earlier the same year included a father of eight who killed himself following an extended period of unemployment, and another whose suicide appears to have been connected to having tested positive for HIV.

One theme that emerges in many cases is the feeling the victims had of being trapped and powerless. Unable to live in an honorable fashion in a country whose rules and customs remain unfamiliar, the Ethiopian seeks to exert at least a measure of control by dying with honor. In contrast to the usual norm by which attempted suicides outnumber deaths by nearly ten to one, among Ethiopians the proportion narrows to two or three to one. The teen suicides found in many Western countries are also comparatively rare among the Ethiopians. It is the older generation, and for reasons we have discussed above, particularly the men, who are most vulnerable to the loss of hope and honor.

Finally, it must be remembered that suicides are both a symptom of difficulties and a cause of difficulties. Viewed from the perspective of the family, suicide is like a stone thrown into a pond, leaving in its wake orphans, widows and widowers, one-parent families, and bereaved elders. It produces yet one more chink in the fragile structure of Ethiopian family life.

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[95]On violence within Ethiopian families, see Westheimer and Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation*, pp. 109–13.

CONCLUSIONS

Major efforts have been made to facilitate the speedy integration of the Ethiopians into Israeli society. In some matters their adjustments have come easily, while in others, traditional preferences remain strong. So, for example, women are not averse to relinquishing their familiar leather baby carriers, worn on their backs, for strollers, but they generally insist on preparing *enjera*, the Ethiopian pancake bread, rather than go over to pitas, as have so many of the other ethnic groups in Israel.[96] In religious matters they have generally been ambivalent. Youngsters have been eager to learn about Jewish customs and observances—*tefillin*, *mezuzot*, Hanukkah—with which they were previously unfamiliar, but have been reluctant to incorporate them into their daily lives. Their fathers have assiduously avoided taking on many new practices.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of Ethiopian children study in the national religious school system, a notable process of secularization seems to be taking place among the younger generation of Ethiopians. Even as many resist the acceptance of new practices as taught in school, they simultaneously reject the ways of their fathers, which may seem outdated. This tendency toward secularization is often accelerated when they serve in the army, and many young men remove their *kippot* for good at this stage.

The dilemmas faced by Ethiopian Jews in the religious realm are further complicated by the challenges to their traditional social structure and patterns of family life. Almost everyone who has met or worked with Beta Israel immigrants has commented on the upheavals they have weathered in their domestic lives.[97] The changes undergone by Ethiopian families in Israel—as couples divorce and remarry, children assert an unprecedented degree of independence, and women redefine their roles—lie at the heart of the Ethiopian experience in Israel. Moreover, the Ethiopians' move to Israel has not only redefined roles within the family but has also radically altered the family's relationship with the surrounding society. In Ethiopia, the Beta Israel were united by a shared faith and a broad network of kinship ties. Families and households were the foundation of rural communal society and played a far greater role in the life of the individual than they do in most industrial societies. Families served as schools, workshops, clinics, reformatories, and credit organizations. In Israel most of these functions have

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[96]Cf. Tsili Doleve-Gandelman, "The Role of Ethiopian Women in the Production of the Ethnic Identity of Their Immigrant Group in Israel," in *Other Perspectives in Gender and Culture: Rewriting Women and the Symbolic*, ed. J.F. MacCannell (New York and Oxford, 1990), pp. 242–57.

[97]For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Westheimer and Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation*.

become the primary responsibility of other institutions. Families that have been forced to give up many functions must adjust themselves to a new position in the wider community.

At this point in their absorption process, a tension continues to exist between the deep-rooted sentiments that still tie the newcomers to their former way of life in Ethiopia and their frequently stated desire to be like other Israelis. At one extreme of the tension is the specter of their becoming a totally separate group, isolated and ostracized.[98] At the other end is the fear that the Ethiopians will renounce all of their traditions and become—except, of course, for color—indistinguishable as a group from the majority of other Israelis.[99] While there is little consensus in Israel as to what the precise outlines of a successful absorption would be, there can be little disagreement that either of these extremes would represent a dangerous and costly failure.

Looking back at the decade since Operation Moses, it can be seen that many of the immigrants who arrived with or prior to that airlift have made significant progress. Their success was to some extent overshadowed in the immediate aftermath of Operation Solomon, when the issues of crowded housing, inadequate educational facilities, and high unemployment once again made headlines. Amid a spate of hunger strikes, protest marches, and violent demonstrations, past achievements were quickly forgotten. Dire predictions were made that the caravan sites would become explosive slums, racial powder kegs with no precedent in the history of the State of Israel.[100]

On the whole, these pessimistic forecasts have not been borne out. Many of the problems that surfaced immediately after Operation Solomon were the almost inevitable result of so large an influx and the short-term problems it produced. While hardly conforming to a utopian vision of the ingathering of the exiles, the absorption of Ethiopian immigrants has had its successes. Ethiopian immigrants are today no longer viewed as a curiosity, but as a familiar part of Israel's ethnic mosaic. They have been accepted in cities and towns throughout the country and contribute in growing numbers to the Israel Defense Forces. Government policies designed to move immigrants from caravan sites to permanent housing have succeeded in part.

As of January 1994, most Ethiopian immigrants had been in Israel less

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[98]On the "marginalization" of the Beta Israel, see Alex Weingrod, "The Context of Ethiopian Jews in Israel: Immigrants, Israelis, Ethiopian Jews," in *Between Africa and Zion* (forthcoming).

[99]In Ethiopia the Beta Israel were highly acculturated but had not socially assimilated. The challenge facing them in Israel is to assimilate without completely acculturating.

[100]See, for example an interview (in Hebrew) in *Yediot Aharonot*, June 3, 1992, with Uri Gordon, head of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency and former head of Youth Aliyah, entitled "Are We Setting Up for the Ethiopians the *Ma'abarot* [camps] of the Year 2,000?"

than three years. Thus, it is still too early to predict the outcome of their integration into their new homeland (a process that will continue for years if not decades). The questions of whether the Ethiopians will achieve their goals by dint of their long-standing, characteristic patience or their newly emergent violence, or whether they will be left adrift regardless of what kinds of actions they take, stand as a concluding reminder that much is yet to be accomplished before one can speak with satisfaction about the ingathering of the Jews of Ethiopia in the land of Israel.

Jewish Population in the United States, 1993

BASED ON LOCAL COMMUNITY counts—the method for identifying and enumerating Jewish population that serves as the basis of this report—the estimated size of the American Jewish community in 1993 was 5.8 million. This is about 5 percent more than the 5.5 million "core" Jewish population estimated in the Council of Jewish Federations' 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS).[1]

The difference, small though it is, between the national and aggregated local figures is partly explained by the lag in data gathering and reporting on the local level. As more local communities conduct studies over the next few years, declines and increases that have already occurred will be documented, and the updated statistics will most likely show national and regional patterns more in line with NJPS findings. However, since there are definitional issues as well as a lack of uniformity in local research, the aggregate counts may never exactly match the NJPS national totals.

The demographic results of the NJPS suggested that the population was growing slightly due to an excess of Jewish births over Jewish deaths during the late 1980s. However, extrapolation from the age structure suggests that for the mid-1990s, zero population growth in numbers has been realized, with a balance between the annual numbers of births and deaths. At the same time, some growth in numbers is occurring through Jewish immigration into the United States. The most obvious example is that of refugees from the former Soviet Union, for whom the annual quota is currently set at 40,000 Jews each year.

The NJPS used a scientifically selected sample to project a total number for the United States, but could not provide accurate information on the state and local levels. Therefore, as in past years, in this article we have based local, state, and regional population figures on the usual estimating procedures.

While the Jewish federations are the chief reporting bodies, their service areas vary in size and may represent several towns, one county, or an aggregate of several counties. In some cases we have subdivided federation areas to reflect the more natural geographic boundaries. Some estimates, from areas without federations, have been provided by local rabbis and other informed Jewish community leaders. In still other cases, the figures that have been updated are from past estimates provided by United Jewish Appeal field representatives. Finally, for smaller communities where no recent estimates are available, figures are based on extrapolation from older data. The estimates are for the resident Jewish population, including those in private households and in institutional settings. Non-Jewish family members have been excluded from the total.

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[1]See Barry A. Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991).

The state and regional totals shown in Appendix tables 1 and 2 are derived by summing the individual estimates shown in table 3 and then making three adjustments. First, communities of less than 100 are added. Second, duplicated counts within states are eliminated. Third, communities whose population resides in two or more states (e.g., Kansas City and Greater Washington, D.C.) are distributed accordingly.

Because population estimating is not an exact science, the reader should be aware that in cases where a figure differs from last year's, the increase or decrease did not come about suddenly but occurred over a period of time and has just now been substantiated. Similarly, the results of a completed local demographic study often change the previously reported Jewish population figure. This should be understood as either an updated calculation of gradual demographic change or a correction of a faulty older estimate.

In determining Jewish population, communities count both affiliated and nonaffiliated residents who are "core" Jews as defined in NJPS.[2] In most cases, counts are made by households, with that number multiplied by the average number of self-defined Jewish persons per household. Similarly to NJPS, most communities also include those born and raised as Jews but who at present consider themselves as having no religion. As stated above, non-Jews living in Jewish households, primarily the non-Jewish spouses and non-Jewish children, are not included in the 1993 estimates presented in the appendix below.

Local Population Changes

Six communities reported increases of more than 1,000 this year. The community reporting the largest numeric increase was that of the Boca Raton-Delray Beach area at the southern end of Florida's Palm Beach County, which raised its population count from 60,000 to 70,500. The remaining portion of Palm Beach County and the Gulf Coast community of Tampa also show significant growth. The new estimate for each of these Florida communities reflects actual Jewish population growth, documented by a substantial increase in the number of Jewish households on the respective federation lists.

The new larger figures for Raleigh, North Carolina, and Somerset County, New Jersey, were also substantiated through expanded communal lists. The large increase for Sacramento, California, was documented in that community's recently completed Jewish population study. The communities with the largest percentage increases are all on the West Coast. Along with Sacramento, these include Corvallis, Oregon, and Napa County and the Vallejo areas of California.

The other communities showing significant but less dramatic Jewish population increases are primarily in the South and West. These include Naples-Collier County, Brevard County, and Orlando, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; New Orleans, Louisiana;

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[2]Born Jews who report adherence to Judaism, Jews by choice, and born Jews without a current religion ("secular Jews").

Las Vegas, Nevada; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Columbia, South Carolina. Several communities outside these regions also had increases: Kalamazoo, Michigan; Manchester, New Hampshire; and Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

No community reported a significant loss in Jewish population. The biggest decline was in the Los Angeles metropolitan region, where, based on several independent measures, the Jewish population count was reduced by about 2 percent, a drop of 11,000. This decline may be the result of migration out of Los Angeles and other parts of southern California to the northern part of the state as well as to the Pacific Northwest.

The drop of over 5,000 in Middlesex County, New Jersey, represents a correction of the previous estimate, which was found to be based on questionable methodology.

Continuing the trend of recent years, most of the communities reporting declines were in the Northeast and Midwest. These include Bridgeport, Connecticut; Kankakee, Illinois; Evansville and Lafayette, Indiana; Leominster, the Lynn-North Shore area, and North Berkshire County, Massachusetts; Bayonne, New Jersey; Poughkeepsie-Dutchess County, Niagara Falls, and Rome, New York; Akron and Canton, Ohio; and Butler, Pennsylvania. Declines outside of these regions occurred in Santa Barbara, California, and Beaumont, Texas.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
Alabama	9,000	4,138,000	0.2
Alaska	2,400	587,000	0.4
Arizona	72,000	3,882,000	1.8
Arkansas	1,800	2,399,000	0.1
California	919,000	30,677,000	3.0
Colorado	51,000	3,470,000	1.5
Connecticut	97,500	3,281,000	3.0
Delaware	9,500	689,000	1.4
District of Columbia	25,500	589,000	4.3
Florida	622,000	13,488,000	4.6
Georgia	75,000	6,751,000	1.1
Hawaii	7,000	1,160,000	0.6
Idaho	500	1,067,000	(z)
Illinois	268,000	11,631,000	2.3
Indiana	17,500	5,662,000	0.3
Iowa	6,000	2,812,000	0.2
Kansas	14,000	2,523,000	0.6
Kentucky	11,500	3,766,000	0.3
Louisiana	16,500	4,287,000	0.4
Maine	8,000	1,235,000	0.6
Maryland	212,000	4,909,000	4.3
Massachusetts	270,000	5,998,000	4.5
Michigan	107,000	9,437,000	1.1
Minnesota	32,500	4,480,000	0.7
Mississippi	1,400	2,614,000	0.1
Missouri	61,500	5,193,000	1.2
Montana	500	824,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,000	1,606,000	0.4
Nevada	21,000	1,327,000	1.6
New Hampshire	8,000	1,111,000	0.7
New Jersey	437,000	7,789,000	5.6
New Mexico	7,000	1,581,000	0.4
New York	1,640,000	18,119,000	9.1

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
North Carolina	20,000	6,843,000	0.3
North Dakota	600	636,000	0.1
Ohio	129,000	10,941,000	1.2
Oklahoma	5,500	3,212,000	0.2
Oregon	17,500	2,977,000	0.6
Pennsylvania	330,000	12,009,000	2.8
Rhode Island	16,000	1,005,000	1.6
South Carolina	9,000	3,603,000	0.3
South Dakota	350	711,000	(z)
Tennessee	17,500	5,024,000	0.4
Texas	109,000	17,658,000	0.6
Utah	3,500	1,813,000	0.2
Vermont	5,500	570,000	0.9
Virginia	68,500	6,377,000	1.1
Washington	33,000	5,136,000	0.6
West Virginia	2,500	1,812,000	0.1
Wisconsin	35,000	5,007,000	0.7
Wyoming	500	466,000	(z)
U.S. TOTAL	**5,840,000	255,082,000	2.3

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
*Resident population, April 1, 1992. (*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* series P-25, no. 1044.)
**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which previously reported Jewish populations of 1,500 and 350, respectively.
(z) Figure is less than 0.1 and rounds to 0.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1993

Region	Total Population	Percent Distribution	Jewish Population	Percent Distribution
Northeast	51,118,000	20.0	2,813,000	48.2
New England	13,200,000	5.2	405,000	6.9
Middle Atlantic	37,918,000	14.9	2,408,000	41.2
Midwest	60,713,000	23.8	678,000	11.6
East North Central	42,753,000	16.8	556,000	9.5
West North Central	17,960,000	7.0	122,000	2.1
South	88,143,000	34.6	1,215,000	20.8
South Atlantic	45,061,000	17.7	1,043,000	17.9
East South Central	15,529,000	6.1	39,000	0.7
West South Central	27,554,000	10.8	133,000	2.3
West	55,108,000	21.6	1,134,000	19.4
Mountain	14,381,000	5.6	155,000	2.7
Pacific	40,726,000	16.0	979,000	16.8
TOTALS	255,082,000	100.0	5,840,000	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1993 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	Jewish Population
ALABAMA	
*Birmingham	5,200
Decatur (incl. in Florence total)	
Dothan	150
Florence	150
Huntsville	750
**Mobile	1,100
**Montgomery	1,000
Sheffield (incl. in Florence total)	
Tuscaloosa	300
Tuscumbia (incl. in Florence total)	
ALASKA	
**Anchorage	2,000
*Fairbanks	180
Juneau	100
Ketchikan (incl. in Juneau total)	
ARIZONA	
Cochise County	260
*Flagstaff	250
Lake Havasu City	100
*Phoenix	50,000
Prescott	250
Sierra Vista (incl. in Cochise County)	
*Tucson	20,000
***Yuma	100
ARKANSAS	
Fayetteville	150
Hot Springs	130
**Little Rock	1,350
CALIFORNIA	
Antelope Valley	700
Bakersfield-Kern County	1,400
Berkeley (incl. in Contra Costa County, under S.F. Bay Area)	
Carmel (incl. in Monterey Peninsula)	
*Chico	500
Corona (incl. in Riverside total)	
***El Centro	125
*Eureka	500
Fairfield	800
Fontana (incl. in San Bernardino total)	
*Fresno	2,500
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Long Beach (also incl. in Los Angeles total)[N]	13,500
Los Angeles Metro Area	490,000
*Merced County	190
*Modesto	500
Monterey Peninsula	2,300
Moreno Valley (incl. in Riverside total)	
Murietta Hot Springs	400
*Napa County	950
Oakland (incl. in Alameda County, under S.F. Bay Area)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
Orange County	75,000
Palmdale (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Palm Springs[N]	9,850
Palo Alto (incl. in South Peninsula, under S.F. Bay Area)	
Pasadena (incl. in L.A. Metro Area total)	
Petaluma (incl. in Sonoma County, under S.F. Bay Area)	
Pomona Valley[N]	6,750
*Redding area	150
Redwood Valley	200
Riverside	2,000
Sacramento[N]	21,300
Salinas	750
San Bernardino area	3,000
*San Diego	70,000
San Francisco Bay Area[N]	210,000
Alameda County	32,500
Contra Costa County	22,000
Marin County	18,500
N. Peninsula	24,500

[N]See Notes below. *Includes entire county. **Includes all of 2 counties. ***Figure not updated.

State and City	Jewish Population
San Francisco	49,500
San Jose	33,000
Sonoma County	9,000
S. Peninsula	21,000
*San Jose (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
*San Luis Obispo	1,450
*Santa Barbara	4,500
***Santa Cruz	1,200
***Santa Maria	300
Santa Monica (also incl. in Los Angeles total)	8,000
Santa Rosa (incl. in Sonoma County, under S.F. Bay Area)	
Sonoma County (listed under S.F. Bay Area)	
South Lake Tahoe	150
*Stockton	1,200
Sun City	200
Tulare & Kings counties	300
Ukiah (incl. in Redwood Valley total)	
Valley area	900
*Ventura County	9,000
COLORADO	
Aspen	250
Boulder (incl. in Denver total)	
Colorado Springs	1,500
Denver[N]	46,000
Evergreen	100
*Ft. Collins	1,000
*Grand Junction	250
Greeley (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Loveland (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Pueblo	250
Telluride	100
Vail	100
CONNECTICUT	
Bridgeport[N]	10,250
Bristol (incl. in Hartford total)	
Cheshire (incl. in Meriden total)	
Colchester	300
Danbury[N]	3,500
Danielson	100
Darien (incl. in Stamford total)	
Greenwich	3,900
Hartford[N]	26,000
Hebron (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lebanon (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lower Middlesex County[N]	1,650
Manchester (incl. in Hartford total)	
Meriden[N]	3,000
Middletown	1,300
New Britain (incl. in Hartford total)	
New Haven[N]	24,000
New London[N]	4,000
New Milford area	600
Newtown (incl. in Danbury total)	
Norwalk[N]	9,500
Norwich (also incl. in New London total)	1,750
Rockville (incl. in Hartford total)	
Shelton (incl. in Valley area)	
Southington (incl. in Meriden total)	
Stamford/New Canaan	9,600
Storrs (incl. in Willimantic total)	
Torrington area	580
Valley area[N]	550
Wallingford (also incl. in Meriden total)	500
Waterbury[N]	3,000
Westport (incl. in Norwalk total)	
Willimantic area	700
DELAWARE	
Dover[N]	650
Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	9,500
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
Greater Washington	165,000
FLORIDA	
Boca Raton-Delray Beach (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Brevard County	4,140
*Crystal River	100
**Daytona Beach	2,500
Ft. Lauderdale (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Ft. Myers-Lee County	5,000
Ft. Pierce	500
Gainesville	1,600
Hollywood (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Jacksonville	7,300
Key West	500
*Lakeland	800
*Miami-Dade County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	

State and City	Jewish Population
Naples-Collier County	3,500
Ocala-Marion County	200
Orlando[N]	18,850
Palm Beach County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Pasco County	1,000
**Pensacola	775
*Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda	400
*St. Petersburg-Clearwater	9,500
**Sarasota	12,000
Southeast Florida	533,000
Boca Raton-Delray Beach	70,500
Ft. Lauderdale[N]	140,000
Hollywood[N]	66,000
Miami-Dade County	189,000
Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton-Delray Beach)	67,800
Stuart-Port St. Lucie	3,000
Tallahassee	1,640
*Tampa	15,000
Venice (incl. in Sarasota total)	
*Vero Beach	300
Winter Haven (incl. in Lakeland total)	
GEORGIA	
Albany	190
Athens	300
Atlanta Metro Area	67,500
Augusta[N]	1,400
Brunswick	100
**Columbus	1,000
**Dalton	180
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
Macon	900
*Savannah	3,000
**Valdosta	100
HAWAII	
Hilo	280
Honolulu (includes all of Oahu)	6,400
Kauai	100
Maui	210
IDAHO	
**Boise	220
Lewiston (incl. in Moscow total)	
Moscow	100
ILLINOIS	
Aurora area	500
Bloomington-Normal	230
Carbondale (incl. in S. Ill. total)	
*Champaign-Urbana	1,300
Chicago Metro Area[N]	261,000
**Danville	100
*Decatur	200
***DeKalb	200
East St. Louis (incl. in S. Ill.)	
Elgin[N]	600
Freeport (incl. in Rockford total)	
*Joliet	500
Kankakee	100
*Peoria	900
Quad Cities[N]	1,250
**Quincy	105
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
Rockford[N]	1,000
Southern Illinois[N]	750
*Springfield	1,000
Waukegan	400
INDIANA	
Bloomington	1,000
Elkart (incl. in South Bend total)	
Evansville	450
**Ft. Wayne	900
**Gary-Northwest Indiana	2,200
**Indianapolis	10,000
**Lafayette	400
*Michigan City	280
Muncie	160
South Bend[N]	2,000
*Terre Haute	250
IOWA	
Ames (also incl. in Des Moines total)	200
Cedar Rapids	420
Council Bluffs (also incl. in Omaha, Nebr. total)	150
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	2,800
*Iowa City	1,200
**Sioux City	570
*Waterloo	170
KANSAS	
Kansas City (incl. in Kansas City, Mo.)	
Lawrence	175
Manhattan	100
*Topeka	500
Wichita[N]	1,300

State and City	Jewish Population
KENTUCKY	
Covington/Newport (incl. in Cincinnati, Ohio total)	
Lexington[N]	2,000
*Louisville	8,700
Paducah (incl. in S. Ill.)	
LOUISIANA	
Alexandria	150
Baton Rouge[N]	1,200
Lafayette (incl. in S. Central La.)	
Lake Charles area	200
Monroe	525
**New Orleans	13,000
*Shreveport	905
South Central La.[N]	250
MAINE	
Augusta	200
Bangor	1,000
Biddeford-Saco (incl. in S. Maine)	
Brunswick-Bath (incl. in S. Maine)	
Lewiston-Auburn	500
Portland	3,900
Rockland	110
Southern Maine (incl. Portland)[N]	5,500
***Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
*Annapolis	2,000
**Baltimore	94,500
Cumberland	265
*Frederick	900
*Hagerstown	325
*Harford County	1,200
Howard County	7,200
Montgomery and Prince Georges counties	104,500
Ocean City	100
**Salisbury	400
Silver Spring (incl. in Montgomery County)	
Upper Eastern Shore[N]	130
MASSACHUSETTS	
Amherst	750
Andover[N]	3,000
Athol area (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Attleboro area	200
Beverly (incl. in Lynn total)	
Boston Metro Region[N]	228,000
Brockton[N]	8,000
Brookline (also incl. in Boston total)	26,000
Cape Cod-Barnstable County	3,000
Clinton (incl. in Worcester County)	
Fall River area	1,780
Falmouth (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Fitchburg (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Framingham (incl. in Boston total)	
Gardner (incl. in Athol total)	
Gloucester (also incl. in Lynn total)	450
Great Barrington (incl. in Pittsfield total)	
*Greenfield	1,100
Haverhill	1,500
Holyoke	600
*Hyannis (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Lawrence (incl. in Andover total)	
Leominster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Lowell area	2,000
Lynn-North Shore area[N]	20,000
*Martha's Vineyard	260
New Bedford[N]	3,300
Newburyport	280
Newton (also incl. in Boston total)	34,000
North Adams (incl. in N. Berkshire County)	
North Berkshire County	400
Northampton	700
Peabody (incl. in Lynn total)	
Pittsfield-Berkshire County	3,300
Plymouth area	500
Provincetown (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Salem (incl. in Lynn total)	
Southbridge (also incl. in Worcester County total)	105
Springfield[N]	11,000
Taunton area	1,300
Webster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	125
Worcester area[N]	10,100
*Worcester County	13,700
MICHIGAN	
*Ann Arbor	5,000
Bay City	200
Benton Harbor area	450

State and City	Jewish Population
**Detroit Metro Area	94,000
*Flint	1,710
*Grand Rapids	1,500
**Jackson	200
*Kalamazoo	1,100
Lansing area	2,100
*Marquette County	150
Midland	100
Mt. Clemens (incl. in Detroit total)	
Mt. Pleasant[N]	100
*Muskegon	220
*Saginaw	150
MINNESOTA	
**Duluth	500
*Minneapolis	22,000
Rochester	550
**St. Paul	9,200
Winona (incl. in LaCrosse, Wis. total)	
MISSISSIPPI	
Biloxi-Gulfport	150
**Greenville	160
**Hattiesburg	130
**Jackson	550
MISSOURI	
Columbia	400
Hannibal (incl. in Quincy, Ill. total)	
Kansas City Metro Area	19,100
*St. Joseph	265
**St. Louis	53,500
Springfield	300
MONTANA	
*Billings	240
Butte	110
Helena (incl. in Butte total)	
NEBRASKA	
Grand Island-Hastings (incl. in Lincoln total)	
Lincoln	800
Omaha[N]	6,500
NEVADA	
Carson City (incl. in Reno total)	
*Las Vegas	20,000
**Reno	1,400
Sparks (incl. in Reno total)	
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
Bethlehem	100
Claremont	150
Concord	450
Dover area	600
Exeter (incl. in Portsmouth total)	
Franconia (incl. in Bethlehem total)	
Hanover-Lebanon	360
*Keene	150
**Laconia	270
Littleton (incl. in Bethlehem total)	
Manchester area	3,500
Nashua area	1,000
Portsmouth area	950
Rochester (incl. in Dover total)	
Salem (also incl. in Andover, Mass. total)	150
NEW JERSEY	
Asbury Park (incl. in Monmouth County)	
*Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	15,800
Bayonne (listed under Hudson County)	
Bergen County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	83,700
Bridgeton	200
Bridgewater (incl. in Somerset County)	
Camden (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Cherry Hill-Southern N.J.[N]	49,000
Edison (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
Englewood (incl. in Bergen County)	
Essex County[N] (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	76,200
East Essex	10,800
Livingston	12,600
North Essex	15,600
South Essex	20,300
West Orange-Orange	16,900
Flemington	900
Freehold (incl. in Monmouth County)	
Gloucester (incl. in Cherry Hill-Southern N.J. total)	
Hoboken (listed under Hudson County)	
Hudson County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	12,040
Bayonne	1,740
Hoboken	1,100
Jersey City	5,700
North Hudson County[N]	3,500

State and City	Jewish Population
Jersey City (listed under Hudson County)	
Lakewood (incl. in Ocean County)	
Livingston (incl. in Essex County)	
Middlesex County[N] (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	51,000
Monmouth County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,600
Morris County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,500
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
Mt. Holly (incl. in Cherry Hill-Southern N.J. total)	
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Northeastern N.J.[N]	359,000
Ocean County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	9,500
Passaic County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	17,000
Passaic-Clifton (also incl. in Passaic County total)	8,000
Paterson (incl. in Passaic County)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Phillipsburg (incl. in Easton, Pa. total)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
Princeton area	3,000
Somerset County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	10,500
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Sussex County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	4,100
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
Trenton[N]	6,000
Union County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	30,000
Vineland[N]	2,150
Warren County	400
Wayne (incl. in Passaic County)	
Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Cherry Hill-Southern N.J. total)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	5,000
Las Cruces	525
Los Alamos	250
Santa Fe	900
NEW YORK	
*Albany	12,000
Amenia (incl. in Poughkeepsie-Dutchess County)	
Amsterdam	170
*Auburn	115
Beacon (incl. in Poughkeepsie-Dutchess County)	
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	2,600
Brewster (incl. in Putnam County)	
*Buffalo	17,000
Canandaigua (incl. in Geneva total)	
Catskill	200
Corning (incl. in Elmira total)	
*Cortland	200
Dunkirk	100
Ellenville	1,600
Elmira[N]	1,100
Fleischmanns	120
Fredonia (incl. in Dunkirk total)	
Geneva area	310
Glens Falls[N]	800
*Gloversville	380
*Herkimer	180
Highland Falls (incl. in Orange County)	
*Hudson	500
*Ithaca area	1,700
Jamestown	100
Kingston[N]	4,400
Lake George (incl. in Glens Falls total)	
Liberty (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,100
Middletown (incl. in Orange County)	
Monroe (incl. in Orange County)	
Monticello (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,400
Newark (incl. in Geneva total)	
Newburgh (incl. in Orange County)	

State and City	Jewish Population
New Paltz (incl. in Kingston total)	
New York Metro Area[N]	1,450,000
Bronx	83,700
Brooklyn	379,000
Manhattan	314,500
Queens	238,000
Staten Island	33,700
Nassau County	207,000
Suffolk County	100,000
Westchester County	94,000
Niagara Falls	200
Olean	120
**Oneonta	250
Orange County	10,000
Pawling	105
Plattsburg	260
Port Jervis (also incl. in Orange County total)	560
Potsdam	200
*Poughkeepsie-Dutchess County	4,000
Putnam County	1,000
**Rochester	22,500
Rockland County	83,100
Rome	150
Saratoga Springs	600
Seneca Falls (incl. in Geneva total)	
**Schenectady	5,200
South Fallsburg (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	1,100
Sullivan County	7,425
Syracuse[N]	9,000
Troy area	800
Utica[N]	1,900
Walden (incl. in Orange County)	
Watertown	120
Woodstock (incl. in Kingston total)	

NORTH CAROLINA

Asheville[N]	1,300
**Chapel Hill-Durham	3,000
Charlotte[N]	5,000
Elizabethtown (incl. in Wilmington total)	
*Fayetteville	320
Gastonia	190
Goldsboro	120
*Greensboro	2,500
Greenville	240
*Hendersonville	200
**Hickory	100
High Point (incl. in Greensboro total)	
Jacksonville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Raleigh-Wake County	5,750
Whiteville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Wilmington area	500
Winston-Salem	440

NORTH DAKOTA

Fargo	500
Grand Forks	130

OHIO

**Akron	5,500
Athens	100
Bowling Green (also incl. in Toledo total)	120
Butler County	900
**Canton	1,650
Cincinnati[N]	23,000
**Cleveland[N]	65,000
*Columbus	15,600
**Dayton	6,000
Elyria	200
Fremont (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Hamilton (incl. in Butler County)	
*Lima	210
Lorain	600
Mansfield	180
Marietta (incl. in Parkersburg, W.Va. total)	
Marion	125
Middletown (incl. in Butler County)	
New Philadelphia (incl. in Canton total)	
Norwalk (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Oberlin (incl. in Elyria total)	
Oxford (incl. in Butler County)	
**Sandusky	130
Springfield	200
*Steubenville	150
Toledo[N]	5,500
Warren (also incl. in Youngstown total)	400
Wooster	135
Youngstown[N]	4,000
*Zanesville	100

OKLAHOMA

Norman (also incl. in Oklahoma City total)	350
**Oklahoma City	2,500
*Tulsa	2,750

State and City	Jewish Population
OREGON	
Ashland (incl. in Medford total)	
Corvallis	700
Eugene	3,000
Grants Pass (incl. in Medford total)	
**Medford	1,000
Portland	12,000
**Salem	530
PENNSYLVANIA	
Allentown (incl. in Lehigh Valley total)	
*Altoona	400
Ambridge[N]	350
Beaver Falls (incl. in Upper Beaver County)	
Bethlehem (incl. in Lehigh Valley total)	
Bucks County (lower portion)[N]	14,500
*Butler	180
**Chambersburg	125
Chester (incl. in Phila. total)	
Chester County (also incl. in Phila. total)	4,000
Coatesville (incl. in Chester County)	
Easton (incl. in Lehigh Valley total)	
*Erie	850
Farrell (incl. in Sharon total)	
Greensburg (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	425
**Harrisburg	6,500
Hazleton area	300
Honesdale (incl. in Wayne County)	
Jeanette (incl. in Greensburg total)	
**Johnstown	415
Lancaster area	3,000
*Lebanon	350
Lehigh Valley	8,500
Lewisburg (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Lock Haven (incl. in Williamsport total)	
McKeesport (incl. in Pittsburgh total)	
New Castle	200
Norristown (incl. in Phila. total)	
**Oil City	100
Oxford-Kennett Square (incl. in Chester County)	
Philadelphia Area[N]	250,000
Phoenixville (incl. in Chester County)	
Pike County	300
Pittsburgh[N]	45,000
Pottstown	650
Pottsville	225
*Reading	2,800
*Scranton	3,200
Shamokin (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Sharon (also incl. in Youngstown, Ohio total)	260
State College	550
*Stroudsburg	400
Sunbury[N]	200
Tamaqua (incl. in Hazleton total)	
Uniontown area	250
Upper Beaver County	200
**Washington (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	175
Wayne County	500
Waynesburg (incl. in Washington total)	
West Chester (also incl. in Chester County)	300
Wilkes-Barre[N]	3,200
**Williamsport	350
York	1,500
RHODE ISLAND	
Cranston (incl. in Providence total)	
Kingston (incl. in Washington County)	
Newport-Middletown	700
Providence area	14,200
Washington County	1,200
Westerly (incl. in Washington County)	
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	3,500
**Columbia	2,500
Florence area	220
Georgetown (incl. in Myrtle Beach total)	
Greenville	1,200
Kingstree (incl. in Sumter total)	
**Myrtle Beach	425
Rock Hill (incl. in Charlotte, N.C. total)	
*Spartanburg	330
Sumter[N]	160
SOUTH DAKOTA	
Sioux Falls	150

State and City	Jewish Population
TENNESSEE	
Bristol (incl. in Johnson City total)	
Chattanooga	1,350
***Johnson City	210
Kingsport (incl. in Johnson city total)	
Knoxville	1,630
Memphis	8,500
Nashville	5,600
Oak Ridge	200
TEXAS	
Amarillo[N]	150
*Austin	5,000
Bay City (incl. in Wharton total)	
***Baytown	300
Beaumont	500
*Brownsville	325
College Station-Bryan	400
*Corpus Christi	1,400
**Dallas	35,000
El Paso	4,900
*Ft. Worth	5,000
Galveston	800
Harlingen (incl. in Brownsville total)	
**Houston[N]	42,000
Kilgore (incl. in Longview total)	
Laredo	160
Longview	150
*Lubbock	480
Lufkin (incl. in Longview total)	
Marshall (incl. in Longview total)	
*McAllen	475
Midland-Odessa	150
Port Arthur	100
*San Antonio	10,000
Tyler	400
Waco[N]	300
**Wharton	100
Wichita Falls	260
UTAH	
Ogden	150
*Salt Lake City	3,300
VERMONT	
Bennington	300
*Brattleboro	350
**Burlington	3,000
Manchester area	250
Montpelier-Barre	550
Newport (incl. in St. Johnsbury total)	
Rutland	550
**St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington, and Fairfax counties)	35,100
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria total)	
Blacksburg	300
Charlottesville	1,000
Chesapeake (incl. in Portsmouth total)	
Colonial Heights (incl. in Petersburg total)	
Fredericksburg[N]	500
Hampton (incl. in Newport News total)	
Harrisonburg (incl. in Staunton total)	
Lexington (incl. in Staunton total)	
Lynchburg area	275
**Martinsville	100
Newport News-Hampton[N]	2,000
Norfolk-Virginia Beach	19,000
Petersburg area	550
Portsmouth-Suffolk (also incl. in Norfolk total)	1,900
Radford (incl. in Blacksburg total)	
Richmond[N]	8,000
Roanoke	1,050
Staunton[N]	370
Williamsburg (incl. in Newport News total)	
Winchester[N]	200
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	400
Ellensburg (incl. in Yakima total)	
Longview-Kelso (incl. in Portland, Oreg. total)	
*Olympia	450
Port Angeles	100
Pullman (incl. in Moscow, Idaho total)	
*Seattle[N]	29,300
***Spokane	750
*Tacoma	1,100
Tri Cities[N]	300
Vancouver (incl. in Portland, Oreg. total)	
**Yakima	100
WEST VIRGINIA	
Bluefield-Princeton	200
*Charleston	950
Clarksburg	110
Fairmont (incl. in Clarksburg total)	
Huntington[N]	300
Morgantown	175
Parkersburg	130
**Wheeling	275

State and City	Jewish Population
WISCONSIN	
Appleton area	400
Beloit	150
Fond du Lac (incl. in Oshkosh total)	
Green Bay	320
Janesville (incl. in Beloit total)	
*Kenosha	180
La Crosse	120
*Madison	4,500
Milwaukee[N]	28,000
Oshkosh area	170
*Racine	375
Sheboygan	140
Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee total)	
Wausau[N]	240
WYOMING	
Casper	100
Cheyenne	230
Laramie (incl. in Cheyenne total)	

Notes

CALIFORNIA

Long Beach—includes in L.A. County: Long Beach, Signal Hill, Cerritos, Lakewood, Rosmoor, and Hawaiian Gardens. Also includes in Orange County: Los Alamitos, Cypress, Seal Beach, and Huntington Harbor.

Palm Springs—includes Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Cathedral City, Palm Desert, and Rancho Mirage.

Pomona Valley—includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, and Upland. Portion also included in Los Angeles total.

Sacramento—includes Yolo, Placer, El Dorado, and Sacramento counties.

San Francisco Bay Area—North Peninsula includes northern San Mateo County. South Peninsula includes southern San Mateo County and towns of Palo Alto and Los Altos in Santa Clara County. San Jose includes remainder of Santa Clara County.

COLORADO

Denver—includes Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, and Jefferson counties.

CONNECTICUT

Bridgeport—includes Monroe, Easton, Trumbull, Fairfield, Bridgeport, Shelton, Stratford, and part of Milford.

Danbury—includes Danbury, Bethel, New Fairfield, Brookfield, Sherman, Newtown, Redding, Ridgefield, and part of Wilton; also includes some towns in neighboring Putnam County, N.Y.

Hartford—includes most of Hartford County and Vernon, Rockville, Ellington, and Tolland in Tolland County, and Meriden area of New Haven County.

Lower Middlesex County—includes Branford, Guilford, Madison, Clinton, Westbrook, Old Saybrook, Old Lyme, Durham, and Killingworth. Portion of this area also included in New London and New Haven totals.

Meriden—includes Meriden, Southington, Cheshire, and Wallingford. Most included in Hartford total and a portion also included in New Haven and Waterbury totals.

New Haven—includes New Haven, East Haven, Guilford, Branford, Madison, North Haven, Hamden, West Haven, Milford, Orange, Woodbridge, Bethany, Derby, Ansonia, and Cheshire.

New London—includes central and southern New London County. Also includes part of Lower Middlesex County and part of Windham County.

Norwalk—includes Norwalk, Weston, Westport, East Norwalk, Darien, Wilton, part of Georgetown, and part of New Canaan.

Valley Area—includes Ansonia, Derby, Shelton, Oxford, Seymour, and Beacon Falls. Portion also included in Bridgeport and New Haven totals.

Waterbury—includes Bethlehem, Cheshire, Litchfield, Morris, Middlebury, Southbury, Naugatuck, Prospect, Plymouth, Roxbury, Southbury, Southington, Thomaston, Torrington, Washington, Watertown, Waterbury, Oakville, Woodbury, and Wolcott.

DELAWARE

Dover—includes most of central and southern Delaware.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Greater Washington—includes Montgomery and Prince Georges counties in Maryland, Arlington County, Fairfax County, Falls Church, and Alexandria in Virginia.

FLORIDA

Ft. Lauderdale—includes Ft. Lauderdale, Pompano Beach, Deerfield Beach, Tamarac, Margate, and other towns in northern Broward County.

Hollywood—includes Hollywood, Hallandale, Cooper City, Dania, Davie, Pembroke, and other towns in southern Broward County.

Orlando—includes all of Orange and Seminole counties and part of Lake County.

GEORGIA

Augusta—includes Burke, Columbia, and Richmond counties and part of Aiken County, South Carolina.

ILLINOIS

Chicago—includes all of Cook and DuPage counties and a portion of Lake County.

Elgin—includes northern Kane County, southern McHenry County, and western edge of Cook County.

Quad Cities—includes Rock Island and Moline (Ill.), Davenport and Bettendorf (Iowa).

Rockford—includes Winnebago, Boone, and Stephenson counties.

Southern Illinois—includes lower portion of Illinois below Carlinville, adjacent western portion of Kentucky, and adjacent portion of southeastern Missouri.

INDIANA

South Bend—includes St. Joseph and Elkhart counties and part of Berrien County, Mich.

KANSAS

Wichita—includes Sedgwick County and towns of Salina, Dodge City, Great Bend, Liberal, Russell, and Hays.

KENTUCKY

Lexington—includes Fayette, Bourbon, Scott, Clark, Woodford, Madison, Pulaski, and Jessamine counties.

LOUISIANA

Baton Rouge—includes E. Baton Rouge, Ascension, Livingston, St. Landry, Iberville, Pt. Coupee, and W. Baton Rouge parishes.

South Central—includes Abbeville, Lafayette, New Iberia, Crowley, Opelousus, Houma, Morgan City, Thibodaux, and Franklin.

MAINE

Southern Maine—includes York, Cumberland, and Sagadahoc counties.

MARYLAND

Upper Eastern Shore—includes towns in Caroline, Dorchester, Kent, Queen Annes, and Talbot counties.

MASSACHUSETTS

Andover—includes Andover, N. Andover, Boxford, Lawrence, Methuen, Tewksbury, Dracut, and town of Salem, New Hampshire.

Boston Metropolitan Region—includes all towns south and west of Boston within approximately 30 miles, and all towns north of Boston within approximately 20 miles. All towns formerly part of Framingham area are now included in Boston total.

Brockton—includes Avon, Brockton, Easton, Bridgewater, Whitman, and West Bridgewater. Also included in Boston total.

Lynn—includes Lynn, Saugus, Nahant, Swampscott, Lynnfield, Peabody, Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, Danvers, Middleton, Wenham, Topsfield, Hamilton, Manchester, Ipswich, Essex, Gloucester, and Rockport. Also included in Boston total.

New Bedford—includes New Bedford, Dartmouth, Fairhaven, and Mattapoisett.

Springfield—includes Springfield, Longmeadow, E. Longmeadow, Hampden, Wilbraham, Agawam, and W. Springfield.

Worcester—includes Worcester, Northborough, Westborough, Shrewsbury, Boylston, W. Boylston, Holden, Paxton, Leicester, Auburn, Millbury, and Grafton. Also included in the Worcester County total.

MICHIGAN

Mt. Pleasant—includes towns in Isabella, Mecosta, Gladwin, and Gratiot counties.

NEBRASKA

Omaha—includes Douglas and Sarpy counties. Also includes Pottawatamie County, Iowa.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Laconia—includes Laconia, Plymouth, Meredith, Conway, and Franklin.

NEW JERSEY

Cherry Hill—includes Camden, Burlington, and Gloucester counties.

Essex County—East Essex includes Belleville, Bloomfield, East Orange, Irvington, Newark, and Nutley in Essex County, and Kearney in Hudson County. North Essex includes Caldwell, Cedar Grove, Essex Fells, Fairfield, Glen Ridge, Montclair, North Caldwell, Roseland, Verona, and West Caldwell. South Essex includes Maplewood, Millburn, Short Hills, and South Orange in Essex County, and Springfield in Union County.

Middlesex County—includes in Somerset County: Kendall Park, Somerset, and Franklin; in Mercer County: Hightstown; and all of Middlesex County.

Northeastern N.J.—includes Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, Somerset, Union, Hunterdon, Sussex, Monmouth, and Ocean counties.

North Hudson County—includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, and Woodcliff.

Somerset County—includes most of Somerset County and a portion of Hunterdon County.

Trenton—includes most of Mercer County.

Union County—includes all of Union County except Springfield. Also includes a few towns in adjacent areas of Somerset and Middlesex counties.

Vineland—includes most of Cumberland County and towns in neighboring counties adjacent to Vineland.

NEW YORK

Elmira—includes Chemung, Tioga, and Schuyler counties. Also includes Tioga and Bradford counties in Pennsylvania.

Glens Falls—includes Warren and Washington counties, lower Essex County, and upper Saratoga County.

Kingston—includes eastern half of Ulster County.

New York Metropolitan Area—includes the five boroughs of New York City, Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk counties. For a total Jewish population of the New York metropolitan region, please include Fairfield County, Connecticut; Rockland, Putnam, and Orange counties, New York; and Northeastern New Jersey.

Syracuse—includes Onondaga County, western Madison County, and most of Oswego County.

Utica—southeastern third of Oneida County.

NORTH CAROLINA

Asheville—includes Buncombe, Haywood, and Madison counties.

Charlotte—includes Mecklenburg County. Also includes Lancaster and York counties in South Carolina.

OHIO

Cincinnati—includes Hamilton and Butler counties. Also includes Boone, Campbell, and Kenton counties in Kentucky.

Cleveland—for a total Jewish population of the Cleveland metropolitan region, please include Elyria, Lorain, and Akron totals.

Toledo—includes Fulton, Lucas, and Wood counties. Also includes Monroe and Lenawee counties, Michigan.

Youngstown—includes Mahoning and Trumbull counties. Also includes Mercer County, Pennsylvania.

PENNSYLVANIA

Ambridge—includes lower Beaver County and adjacent areas of Allegheny County. Also included in Pittsburgh total.

Bucks County (lower portion)—includes Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Trevose, Warrington, Yardley, Richboro, Feasterville, Middletown, Southampton, and Holland. Also included in Philadelphia total.

Philadelphia—includes Philadelphia City; Montgomery, Delaware, Chester, and Bucks counties. For a total Jewish population of the Philadelphia metropolitan region, please include the Cherry Hill, Salem, and Trenton areas of New Jersey, and the Wilmington area of Delaware.

Pittsburgh—includes all of Allegheny County and adjacent portions of Washington, Westmoreland, and Beaver counties.

Sunbury—includes Shamokin, Lewisburg, Milton, Selinsgrove, and Sunbury.

Wilkes-Barre—includes all of Luzerne County except southern portion, which is included in Hazleton totals.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Sumter—includes towns in Sumter, Lee, Clarendon, and Williamsburg counties.

TEXAS

Amarillo—includes Canyon, Childress, Borger, Dumas, Memphis, Pampa, Vega, and Hereford in Texas, and Portales, New Mexico.

Houston—includes Harris, Montgomery, and Ft. Bend counties, and parts of Brazoria and Galveston counties.

Waco—includes McLennan, Coryell, Bell, Falls, Hamilton, and Hill counties.

VIRGINIA

Fredericksburg—includes towns in Spotsylvania, Stafford, King George, and Orange counties.

Newport News—includes Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, James City, York County, and Poquoson City.

Richmond—includes Richmond City, Henrico County, and Chesterfield County.

Staunton—includes towns in Augusta, Page, Shenandoah, Rockingham, Bath, and Highland counties.

Winchester—includes towns in Winchester, Frederick, Clarke, and Warren counties, Virginia; and Hardy and Jefferson counties, West Virginia.

WASHINGTON

Seattle—includes King County and adjacent portions of Snohomish and Kitsap counties.

Tri Cities—includes Pasco, Richland, and Kennewick.

WEST VIRGINIA

Huntington—includes nearby towns in Ohio and Kentucky.

WISCONSIN

Milwaukee—includes Milwaukee County, Eastern Waukesha County, and Southern Ozaukee County.

Wausau—includes Stevens Point, Marshfield, Antigo, and Rhinelander.

Canada

National Affairs

CANADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS completed a new phase in 1992. Still hoping to get Quebec to endorse the 1982 constitution, which had been enacted without that key province's concurrence, the government held a national referendum in October on a package of constitutional amendments known as the Charlottetown accord. The major elements of the package included recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society"; an enhanced role for the provinces through reform of the Senate to make it an elected body with equal representation from each province; a change in the method of appointing Supreme Court justices and a transfer of some powers from the federal to the provincial governments; and granting of self-government to aboriginal peoples.

Proponents of the package contended that, after the failure of the Meech Lake accord in 1990 and Quebec's ensuing movement toward sovereignty, it was Canada's last best chance to satisfy Quebec's interests and thereby avert the threat of separation. As a result, the vote took on almost apocalyptic implications. Despite the calls to vote Yes in order to save Canada, most Canadians (about 54 percent) voted No, many in the belief that the accord weakened the power of the federal government. Six of the provinces, including Quebec and Alberta, voted No. The strongest support for the deal was found in parts of Atlantic Canada, which feared being cut off should Quebec separate. After the referendum's failure, there was widespread support for the idea of shelving the constitutional question, which had exhausted politicians and citizens alike for a decade. But Quebec's opposition Parti Québécois remained committed to the French-speaking province's independence and planned to hold a referendum on that question within a year of its next election victory, which it hoped would occur in 1994.

From the perspective of the Jewish community, Canadian unity was highly valued. With nearly 30 percent of the country's Jews living in Quebec, the prospect of Quebec independence, with its anticipated deleterious effect on the well-being of the community, remained anathema to the bulk of the Jews. Hence it was not surprising that the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), which speaks for the community on political and governmental issues, came out strongly for the Yes position. President Irving Abella described Charlottetown as "probably the most important

constitutional question in Canadian history since 1867. We owe it to ourselves as Canadians, not just as Jews, to vote to keep Canada together." Although some Jews were ambivalent about the accord—because of fears that the "distinct society" concessions to Quebec and other provisions would weaken the protection of individual rights in the country—ultimately it appeared that most Jews did vote Yes, accepting the view that support for the federalist side demanded such an action.

On other matters, a new political group, the Reform party, encountered some criticism from Michael Lublin, a disgruntled member, who claimed that racism and anti-Semitism were widespread at many levels. Tom Flanagan, the party's director of research, responded that in fact the party had been vigorous in expelling members of the racist Heritage Front who had joined, as well as a member who had defaced a Toronto synagogue. He claimed that Lublin's accusations were motivated by personal bitterness. Earlier, party leader Preston Manning had made it clear that he personally rejected anti-Semitism and racism and that his party did not adhere to such views.

Israel and the Middle East

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney named Norman Spector as ambassador to Israel in January, the first Jew to hold the post. Spector, who speaks Hebrew, had been Mulroney's chief of staff. Reactions to the appointment from official Arab spokespersons were quite pointed. James Kafieh, president of the Canadian Arab Federation, charged that Spector, who had no diplomatic experience, was chosen simply because of "his record as a loyal supporter of Israel." He also wondered whether Spector would "be serving Canadian or Israeli interests" and concluded that "his primary interest will be in serving the interests of the international Zionist movement. . . ." Jewish organizations welcomed the appointment. In February the prime minister responded to the critics, stating that the assignment would "eliminate the doubt in anyone's mind as to where we should stand on certain issues. Norman Spector is remarkably well-qualified to serve as Canada's ambassador to Israel." He used the opportunity of a diplomatic reception to reiterate his commitment to a strong relationship with Israel.

Spector, in an interview with the *Canadian Jewish News*, stated that he had no doubt that the Department of External Affairs had systematically excluded Jews from top diplomatic assignments in Israel. He said that Mulroney had been delighted to break the existing practice. Spector's assertion about diplomatic personnel practices was supported by a letter to the *Toronto Star* from foreign-service officer Aharon Mayne, who claimed that superiors had discouraged him from any involvement with Middle East affairs. B'nai Brith's director of governmental relations, Ian Kagedan, who had talked with several foreign-service officers with similar complaints, argued that what is "most troubling is that within the culture of External Affairs is the thought that Jews can't be fully Canadian."

Canada was actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations throughout

the year. Michael Bell, the outgoing ambassador to Israel, became an adviser to the Canadian delegation to the peace talks. He was optimistic early in the year, expressing the view that both sides were making a real effort to succeed. As part of the multilateral negotiations, Canada was asked to chair the working group on refugees. Bell, in a February interview, indicated that Canada was trusted by the Israelis and the Arabs "as a country that is fair-minded and solution-oriented."

The refugee talks held in Ottawa in May ran into trouble early. Israel declined to participate because Canada invited an "expanded Palestinian delegation," including representatives from outside the territories. Israel maintained that the multilaterals should operate according to the Madrid rules, which barred so-called diaspora Palestinians from the talks. However, both the United States and Canada contended that the multilaterals did not operate under the same rules. An underlying question was whether Palestinians have a right of return to Israel if they claim that they lived in that territory before 1948. As the Israeli embassy in Ottawa put it: "Inclusion of Palestinians from outside the Territories as partners to the peace process bestows legitimacy to their inevitable claim . . . for the 'right of return.' " The talks continued without Israel's presence, with Canada issuing a final communiqué expressing a broad consensus that negotiations on the refugees should not wait for progress in the bilateral negotiations. Both Syria and Lebanon were also absent as a protest against what they regarded as insufficient Israeli flexibility in the bilateral talks.

A number of specific refugee or asylum claims came up during the year. Wahid Kahlil Baroud, reportedly a former bodyguard for PLO head Yasir Arafat, applied for refugee status with his family, was allowed into Canada on bond, failed to appear at two immigration hearings, and was then arrested. He had reportedly been involved in terrorist actions in the past. Another Palestinian, Mahmood Abo Shandi, had been detained upon his arrival in 1991 with false papers, when he asked for political asylum, claiming to be in danger from the Mossad in Norway because of his previous PLO activities. The government opposed his claim on the grounds that he was "likely to engage in acts of espionage or subversion. . . ." Following a hearing on his claim in January, Shandi, who had been a Fatah colonel, was ordered deported by a federal court judge, who found, based on evidence presented by the government, that he had been more active in the PLO than he acknowledged. He was deported in February.

Another Palestinian terrorist, Mohammad Issa Mohammad, was more successful, clearing one of the two hurdles on the way toward refugee status. Even though he had taken part in a 1968 attack on a Greek plane in Athens in which an Israeli man died, a two-member immigration panel held in November that there was a credible basis for his claim. Jewish organizations urged the Immigration and Refugee Board to reject his application at the next stage.

Israel and Canada explored the possibilities of concluding a free-trade agreement, similar to the Israeli-U.S. pact of 1985, when Industry and Trade Minister Moshe Nissim visited Ottawa in March. International Trade Minister Michael Wilson stated that Canada had too many other priorities at the time, though he did hold

out hope for improved trade relations. In that light, the Canada/Israel Technology Co-operation Forum, held in March, provided an opportunity for Israeli companies to meet with Canadian counterparts in order to stimulate business. Cooperation in the legal area was also moving apace through the Canada-Israel Legal Co-operation Program. Law professor Irwin Cotler, who organized it, hoped that the exchange of ideas between lawyers and jurists in the two countries would culminate in Israel's eventual adoption of a bill of rights modeled on the Canadian version. The first undertaking of the group was a conference in Israel in December, involving top legal minds, on the treatment of human rights in the two countries.

Canada's agreement in September to sell three armed frigates to Saudi Arabia prompted an outcry from the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC). Executive Director Rob Ritter accused the government of a double standard because it authorized sales to Arab countries but not to Israel. Israeli ambassador Itzhak Shelef also opposed the sale, on the ground that the Saudis were still in a state of war with Israel.

The head of the Security Intelligence Review Committee told a parliamentary committee in May that the Mossad had operated illegally in Canada in 1990, specifically, that agents conducted activities without Canadian permission. The admission substantiated a charge by controversial author Victor Ostrovsky, who published an exposé of the Mossad, that two agents had come to his home to persuade him not to publish the book. Israeli officials were reportedly rebuked for the actions.

Anti-Semitism

There was a major new development in the case of Ernst Zundel, who was appealing his 1988 conviction for "spreading false news" through his Holocaust-denial publications. The Supreme Court of Canada declared in a 4–3 decision that the law under which he had been convicted was unconstitutional, that it violated protections of freedom of expression in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Jewish community spokespersons expressed outrage at the judgment. They had been backing the various legal actions against Zundel for nine years and had seen him convicted twice, only to see both convictions ultimately overturned on appeal. David Satok of the Canadian Jewish Congress Ontario Region declared that "Congress will no longer allow the likes of Ernst Zundel or anyone like him to spread hatred against our community," after laying a new complaint against Zundel under another section of the criminal code.

James Keegstra was convicted for a second time under the antihate provisions of the code in July, for promoting hatred against Jews as a high-school social-studies teacher. He was fined $3,000, but an appeal was planned. His case, too, had been in the courts for nearly a decade. Meanwhile, a New Brunswick court upheld an administrative decision to dismiss Malcolm Ross from his teaching job because of his anti-Semitic writings. He appealed to the provincial court of appeal, which heard the arguments in September and then reserved judgment.

British revisionist historical writer David Irving attempted another cross-country speaking tour in November. The ensuing uproar focused a great deal of attention on his Holocaust-denial efforts. The Simon Wiesenthal Center in Toronto tried to have him barred from the country on the grounds that a German law under which he had been convicted was equivalent to Canada's antihate law. The government agreed and notified Irving, who was by then in the United States, that he would not be admitted, thus jeopardizing planned speeches in at least seven locations. Irving managed to sneak into Canada and to speak in Victoria and Toronto before being taken into custody and deported to Britain. In a separate matter, Irving sued federal multiculturalism minister Gerry Weiner for defamation in connection with an earlier visit.

Anti-Semitic incidents continued to occur, although B'nai Brith Canada's annual accounting showed a decline in the total number of instances of harassment or vandalism, after annual increases since 1987. On a countrywide basis there were 150 incidents of harassment and 46 of vandalism, for a total of 196, compared with 251 in 1991. But this was still the third highest number in the 11 years that the survey had been conducted. The bulk of the incidents (97) occurred in Toronto, while Montreal and Ottawa had 25 each. A decline in the western provinces was attributed to tougher law enforcement.

Desecrations of cemeteries and synagogues distressed Jews in Montreal, where eight tombstones were defaced in February, and in Winnipeg, where a major synagogue was vandalized by neighborhood teenagers in April. Three Toronto area synagogues were defaced in June, and a Jewish community building in Ottawa was vandalized in July. A neo-Nazi rally planned for the end of July, in the town of Ste. Anne de Sorel, Quebec, attracted only about 70 participants. Vigorous action by the local authorities helped to discourage attendance.

A vacant house owned by a Kitchener, Ontario, Jewish woman who publicly opposed the speaking activities of David Irving burned down in November as the result of arson. In Ottawa, in December, many Jews and Jewish organizations received anti-Semitic material in the mail. Anti-Semitic stickers were also affixed to Jewish-owned businesses in the city.

A Jewish employee of the New York subsidiary of ScotiaMcLeod Inc., a large Canadian brokerage firm, alleged that anti-Semitic attitudes and practices were tolerated in the company. He contended that he and other employees had been targets of ethnic slurs on more than one occasion. After Simon Israel, the employee, was dismissed from his job, Jewish organizations in Canada intervened with the parent company. Eventually, two employees who had been accused of making anti-Semitic remarks were demoted. Several Jewish community officials claimed that such action came only after adverse media publicity, and that the company was only interested in damage control, rather than in rooting out discriminatory attitudes.

A doctoral dissertation at Université Laval in Quebec created controversy when its acceptance was inordinately delayed and some members of the committee ad-

vocated its rejection. The author, Esther Delisle, wrote on "Anti-Semitism and Extreme Right-Wing Nationalism in Quebec from 1929–39," arguing that anti-Semitism was central in the intellectual life of Quebec during that period, especially due to the influence of the late Lionel Groulx, a priest and historian who had a great influence on the development of Quebec nationalism. She also documented the frequency of anti-Semitic expressions in the Montreal newspaper *Le Devoir* during the 1930s, stating that "it was like *Der Sturmer*." The thesis was eventually accepted and then published as a book. Many Quebec intellectuals were outraged by her charges against Groulx, making her the object of considerable opprobrium.

Nazi War Criminals

Jacob Luitjens, a former professor in British Columbia who had collaborated with the Nazis in his native Holland during World War II, was stripped of his Canadian citizenship and deported to the Netherlands to stand trial, culminating a four-year legal struggle. After the Federal Court rejected his appeal in April, he was finally deported in November, in response to an extradition request from the Netherlands. Subsequently, he was jailed in Amsterdam while he appealed a 1948 conviction in absentia and a life sentence. The appeal was denied by a Dutch court at the end of the year. Nazi rocket scientist Arthur Rudolph, who tried to visit Canada, was also deported.

Imre Finta, who was acquitted in 1991 of charges under Canada's war-crimes legislation, faced an attempt by the Crown to appeal the verdict. Although the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to grant a new trial, on the grounds that any judicial error did not affect the outcome, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed in December to hear the appeal. Charges against Michael Pawlawski, accused of participating in the killing of 500 Jews and Poles in Belorussia in 1942, were dropped by the Crown following adverse rulings by the judge that made it impossible to present a case. Subsequently, Pawlawski was awarded costs by the court. In a new case, Radislav Grujicic, originally from Yugoslavia, was charged with ten counts of murder and other crimes for his activities as a police officer between 1941 and 1944.

In an analysis of the government's handling of war criminals during the five years since the passage of the law, B'nai Brith's David Matas was highly critical of the lack of action by the prosecutors and unsatisfactory progress in dealing with actual and potential cases. "There is no area of the law where action is more lethargic," he charged.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

Demography

First results from the 1991 census contained some surprises, most notably a reasonable growth in the Jewish population, a smaller than anticipated decline in Montreal, and large numbers of people who indicated some Jewish ethnic background but did not classify themselves as Jews by religion.

The census asks two questions that enable one to identify Jews: a religion question, which is usually straightforward, and an ethnicity question, which has changed from one census to the next and is a source of some ambiguity. In 1991, respondents were permitted to list a single response to the ethnicity question about the group to which their ancestors belonged or to give multiple responses. The number of people giving Jewish as a single response was 245,840, while those listing Jewish as one of two or more responses numbered 123,725. The total of 369,565 represents the high end of the estimate of the Jewish population because it undoubtedly includes among those giving multiple responses some people whose Jewish identity is extremely marginal. The religion question showed 318,070 Jews, which is certainly the lower end of the range. An accurate number is somewhere in between, including some of those who did not list their religion as Jewish but did give a Jewish ethnic identification.

In a recent analysis of the 1991 census data, Prof. Jim Torczyner and associates at McGill University cross-tabulated the ethnicity and religion measures to produce a combined Jewish variable that encompasses those who identify themselves as Jewish on both questions, those who are ethnically Jewish but give no other religion, and those who give their religion as Jewish. Thus, secular Jews with no religious affiliation are included, but Jews who have adopted another religion are excluded. On that basis, the total number of Jews in 1991 was 356,315, an increase of 44,215, or 14.2 percent, since 1981, using consistent methodology. (Jews represent about 1.3 percent of the Canadian population.) It should be noted that 49,460 people who list a Jewish ethnic origin identify with a religion other than Judaism. Of the 356,315 Jews, 281,680 give both religious and ethnic identities, 36,390 list Jewish religion but another ethnicity, and 38,245 list Jewish ethnicity but no religion.

The greatest percentage growth in the Jewish population between 1981 and 1991 occurred in Toronto (26.4), Ottawa (26.6), and Vancouver (31.0). People moving from Montreal and various smaller communities, plus immigrants, produced the large increase among the Jews of Ontario, with Hamilton and London experiencing double-digit percentage increases. Montreal, on the other hand, declined by 2.1 percent, but that was a lower drop than had been anticipated. The Montreal Jewish population fell from 103,425 in 1981 to 101,210 in 1991. As a result, Toronto is now home to nearly 46 percent of Canada's Jews, and Montreal's share is down to about 28 percent (in contrast to the 1970s, when the proportions of Jews in the two cities were about equal).

Eleven cities (defined as Census Metropolitan Areas, CMAs) have Jewish populations of 1,500 or more. The following table is based on the analysis of Torczyner and his colleagues.

The Jews of Canada continue to be an aging population: 17.3 percent are over 65 and 17.5 percent between 35 and 44, compared to 10.8 percent and 16.2 percent in the general population. At the same time, 21.0 percent of Jews are younger than 15, the same proportion as in the general population, and the proportions of 45–64-year-olds are similar, 19.1 percent among Jews and 19.9 percent in the population at large.

The Jews continue to have higher education levels than the rest of the population: 52.1 percent of Jews aged 25–44 hold university degrees, compared to 16.5 percent of the total population. In general, of people over 15 years of age, Jews are two and a half times as likely to have a bachelor's degree or some college and four times as likely to have an advanced degree as the general population. In terms of occupation, they are three times as likely to be professionals and twice as likely to be managers and administrators.

Some 18,270 people listed Israel as their birthplace, including 16,770 who are permanent residents and 1,500 who are in Canada on some kind of temporary permit. This statistic of course understates the Israeli population in Canada, because it omits those who were born outside of Israel, made *aliyah*, lived in Israel, and subsequently emigrated to Canada.

Some 6,595 people listed Yiddish as their home language while another 1,425 listed Yiddish and another language. Interestingly, 6,955 listed Hebrew as their home language and 1,790 listed Hebrew and another language. This is probably the first time that the number of Hebrew speakers outnumbered the Yiddish speakers

Census Metropolitan Areas	Jewish Population	Percent Change from 1981
Toronto	162,605	+26.4
Montreal	101,210	− 2.1
Vancouver	19,375	+31.0
Winnipeg	15,050	− 6.2
Ottawa	11,555	+26.6
Calgary	7,155	+18.0
Edmonton	5,430	+16.4
Hamilton	5,145	+10.6
London	2,670	+14.6
Windsor	1,785	−16.0
Halifax	1,755	+20.6

in Canada by any measure. However, 25,375 people listed Yiddish as their mother tongue (down from 32,760 in 1981), while 11,895 listed Hebrew. All told, there were 53,420 people in Canada who said they could speak Yiddish and 52,455 who could speak Hebrew. The most Yiddish speakers (23,485) were in Montreal, while Toronto had the most Hebrew speakers (26,345). In Winnipeg, which once boasted a vibrant Yiddish-speaking community, only 3,330 reported that they could speak Yiddish.

Communal Affairs

One of the dominant themes during the year was the financial crisis faced by the community. As the economy generally sputtered in recession, the fallout in the community was serious. The problem was exacerbated by the restructuring necessitated by the free-trade pact with the United States. The crowning blow was the collapse of the Reichmann financial and real-estate empire in Toronto, though the Reichmann disaster was only the most visible sign of a process that affected the community deeply. Given the dependence of local federation fund-raising campaigns on the big givers, the economic downturn caused serious pressures on community agencies, in terms of both demand for services and resources available. Agencies noted an upsurge in requests for financial assistance, vocational counseling to find alternative employment, and help in dealing with the psychological and family problems related to job loss and deteriorating personal financial situations. Such difficulties even reached into the middle and upper-middle classes.

The recession's effects were felt in organizational budgets, which often had to be cut back just as demands for services and financial assistance were reaching record high levels. Schools, for example, found that families were less able to pay their tuition fees, while community funds to offset these shortfalls were less likely to be available. Organizations serving senior citizens were equally hard hit, and health-care agencies found it necessary to reduce spending at a time when their services were in demand. In Montreal, the budget of Federation CJA for local needs was reduced by about $400,000 to just over $12 million between 1991 and 1992. Some agencies saw their allocations drop by as much as 12 percent.

In Toronto, when the federation was compelled by its auditors to write off $6.8 million in unpaid pledges to the United Jewish Appeal from earlier years, it became necessary to reduce the annual allocation to Israel as the alternative to crippling local agencies. Israel, through the United Israel Appeal, had expected to receive about $16 million; instead its allocation was slashed to $9 million. That compared with $11.5 million in 1991 and $17 million in 1990. Part of the problem was the diversion of funds to Operation Exodus, which had an impact on the regular campaign, but part was also due to the recession.

The financial bind of institutions that had depended on Reichmann largesse prior to the bankruptcy of Olympia and York Developments Ltd., the family real-estate company with worldwide holdings, complicated the situation immensely. Previ-

ously the Reichmanns reportedly donated millions of dollars annually to an array of community institutions, primarily but not exclusively Orthodox. Schools such as the Yeshiva and Mesivta Yesodei HaTorah, the Bais Yaacov School, and the Kolel Avreichim found themselves several million dollars in debt due to the abrupt cessation of subsidies from the Reichmann family interests. As the Reichmann funding dried up, institutions turned to the federation for support, precisely when the federation itself was experiencing serious difficulties. At the same time, the families utilizing the institutions were ill-equipped to undertake substantially higher financial burdens. A further problem in Toronto was the reduction by the United Way of allocations to its affiliated agencies, including Jewish ones.

Canadian Jewish Congress held its triennial plenary assembly in Toronto in May. In an interview before the plenary, outgoing president Les Scheininger raised questions about some of the trends in the community, in particular the focus on organizations for their own sake; he called on fellow activists to ensure that the purpose of service to the community was foremost in the mission of the various bodies. He also expressed fear that the financial crisis would lead to less emphasis on education, which he viewed as the primary tool to combat assimilation and intermarriage. At the plenary itself, the new president, Irving Abella, stressed the challenge of Jewish continuity and promised to focus programming on youth, especially on the nation's university campuses.

The plenary passed a number of resolutions on the Middle East, anti-Semitism, human rights, and community relations. The most controversial and divisive resolution was one that was defeated 72–28. Backed by Canadian Friends of Peace Now, it called for Israel to cease "further settlement in the territories during peace negotiations." Debate on the resolution from both sides was intense.

Sociologist Steven M. Cohen and pollster Martin Goldfarb presented findings from recent surveys concerning Jewish life in Canada. Goldfarb pointed to the importance of visiting Israel as a factor in maintaining an individual's Jewish identity and commitment at home. In general he found that Jewish ritual practice in Canada was quite high throughout the different age cohorts. Cohen, reinforcing the point, asserted that Canadian Jews were more deeply committed to Jewish values and institutions than American Jews.

The Montreal community continued to be concerned about its future. The revived threat of Quebec independence during the constitutional turmoil of the early 1990s highlighted the heavy toll that political uncertainty can take on the vitality of community life. The knowledge that young people had moved out of the community in significant numbers during the past 20 years was a source of consternation, not only because decline in any part of the community is troubling, but also because of the likely effect on the community's future of a shortage of young people and a gap in that age cohort.

Between 1990 and 1992, various groups under federation auspices began investigating the problem and developing strategies to combat it. What emerged was a project known as ProMontreal. One of the key objectives of the new group was to

identify job opportunities for young people, especially with Jewish employers, who were most likely to be responsive to initiatives from the community. Other objectives included the promotion of positive aspects of living in Montreal, especially from a Jewish perspective, and the stimulation of an appreciation for the French language and Quebec culture. Overall, backers of the ProMontreal initiative hoped that they could stem the tide of outmigration among the young and perhaps even attract some of the Jewish students from elsewhere who attend university in Montreal to settle in the city. Even after the defeat of the October constitutional referendum, which generally had been supported by the city's Jews, there was a more positive feeling in the community than there had been for a few years. Certainly the deliberate community efforts were one factor in the change of mood.

The attempt to revive spirits in the Montreal community was accompanied by a greater appreciation of the role of the Sephardim in community life. The predominantly French-speaking group, a rapidly growing segment of the community, had become more assertive in general and seemed more aware of its strategic situation as a link between the Jews and the majority French Québécois society. Senior community leader Charles Bronfman addressed the annual meeting of the Communauté Sépharade du Québec (CSQ) in February, calling on French-speaking Jews to seek an enhanced role in the federation and communitywide fund-raising. "You have a major responsibility in helping to ensure the continuity of a vibrant and vital Jewish community in Montreal," he told them. Joseph Gabay, the new president of the CSQ, lamented the underrepresentation of Sephardim in key community bodies and committed himself to trying to remedy the situation.

Both of the major federations changed their names during the year. Toronto Jewish Congress became the Jewish Federation of Greater Toronto (JFGT) in order both to make clear that it has no connection with the Canadian Jewish Congress and to stress the expansion of Jewish life beyond the city's traditional boundaries. In Montreal, Allied Jewish Community Services changed to Federation CJA, a name that could be used in either English or French and that emphasized the connection between the fund-raising of the Combined Jewish Appeal and the spending of the federation. In Toronto, the JFGT and CJC's Ontario Region agreed on a new division of responsibilities, shifting control over cultural activities, including Yiddish programming, archives, and Holocaust-related events, from CJC to the federation. The Council of Jewish Federations, based in New York, made its Canadian office in Toronto more autonomous by setting up a separate Canadian division known as CJF Canada. Backers of change believed that the new structure would be helpful in dealing with issues that are unique to Canada or are different from similar issues in the United States.

In an abrupt move, CJC Ontario Region dismissed Edmond Lipsitz as its executive director in June, for reasons that were not fully explained publicly. Some officers complained that they had been left out of the process that led to the decision. The matter was taken up by the council in July, but the termination remained in effect.

The Canadian Zionist Federation (CZF) canceled its planned election of delegates

to the World Zionist Congress. In a February decision, the CZF simply allocated the seats by agreement among the constituent groups, thus saving the $250,000 cost of holding the election. The action was permitted under World Zionist Organization rules because a consensus existed. The allocation of delegates was as follows: United Torah Coalition—5, Kadima—4, Mercaz-Canada—3, Labor-Zionist Movement—3, Herut-Likud—2, Zionist Organization of Canada—2, Friends of Pioneering Israel—1, Confederation of United Zionists—1. The total of 21 delegates represented an increase of two over Canada's allocation to the 1988 Congress.

In other communal affairs, new Jewish community centers were dedicated in Hamilton, Ontario, and in Kelowna, British Columbia, the latter serving the growing community in the Okanagan region. The Canadian Association for Ethiopian Jews disbanded after 12 years, satisfied that its efforts had succeeded in helping to resettle the community in Israel.

Education

Ontario's Jewish community continued to press for provincial government aid to the day schools, but without success. A key underlying consideration was the fact that Roman Catholic schools in Ontario did receive state support. Early in the year, a group of parents, aided by CJC, initiated a lawsuit to try to compel government funding, on the grounds that existing policy violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically, equality and freedom-of-religion guarantees. In the case, heard in the Ontario Court of Justice in May, lawyer John Laskin argued that compulsory school attendance, coupled with a commitment to freedom of religion, obligated the government to fund the schools. The decision of the court, handed down in August, went against the Jewish parents, who decided to appeal. Justice William Anderson accepted the assertion that rights had been denied, but found the limitations on rights to be "acceptable" within the meaning of the constitution. Meanwhile, in Montreal, the Association of Jewish Day Schools (AJDS) was exploring the possibility of associate status with either the Protestant or Catholic school board, in order to gain access to increased funding. Financial pressures prompted the move for the schools, which received partial funding under the Private Education Act. Quebec government approval would be required for any new arrangement.

Several new educational facilities opened during the year. In Montreal, the Hebrew Academy erected its own building on land purchased from Federation CJA after renting for many years, while United Talmud Torahs expanded and remodeled its Herzliah High School's Snowdon campus. The first Jewish day school in Richmond, British Columbia, opened in the fall.

Five ultra-Orthodox schools in Toronto faced severe financial problems due to the ending of Reichmann funding. Yeshiva Bnei Zion of Bobov threatened to close because of an inability to meet its obligations. These schools had not been funded by the Board of Jewish Education because they failed to meet the necessary criteria. Some 2,000 children attended the five schools in question.

Community Relations

In the aftermath of the failure of the Meech Lake accord in 1990, some Jewish leaders began to work together with other ethnic groups in order to promote national unity and enhance understanding of the complexity of the Quebec problem among Canadians in the rest of the country. The lead for this initiative came from CJC people in Montreal, who forged a coalition that also included the Hellenic Canadian Congress and the National Congress of Italian Canadians. After traveling across the country for over a year, the coalition was ready to swing into action to enlist ethnic support for an agreement to renew the Canadian federation. The message was straightforward: keep Canada united but recognize Quebec's uniqueness. In February, the coalition submitted a comprehensive brief to a federal committee exploring the parameters of a renewed Canada. It also was instrumental in building ethnic support for the October referendum. Despite the failure of the Charlottetown accord, the exercise proved useful in that it produced an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the three ethnic communities on matters of common interest.

A Mordecai Richler publication again precipitated a community-relations crisis for Montreal's Jews. This time it was the appearance of his book *Oh Canada! Oh Quebec!* in which he enlarged on the themes that he had identified the previous year in his controversial *New Yorker* article. Even though the main thrust of the book was criticism of Quebec's language laws, Richler's assertions about anti-Semitic influences in the province remained the major focus of debate. His writings provoked intense discussion as to whether Quebec had really changed from the 1930s and 1940s, when anti-Semitism was prevalent. Critics contended that Quebec society had indeed changed, while Richler still observed incidents that made him uncomfortable.

There were other discussions about the place of Jews in Quebec as well. In May, Université du Québec political scientist Julien Bauer and CJC community-relations professional Jack Jedwab had a sharp exchange at a public meeting in Montreal. Bauer contended that Jews remained marginalized in Quebec politics, that anti-Semitism was common among the elite, and that Jews suffered disabilities in some respects. Jedwab countered that French Québécois genuinely wanted to achieve rapprochement with Jews more than ever before. In a panel discussion held in Toronto, also in May, McGill professor Harold Waller argued that Quebec nationalism did not threaten Jews as Jews, even though most, including French-speaking Jews, were strongly opposed to the idea of Quebec independence. Jedwab went even further, suggesting that Montreal was the best place on the continent to "maintain a Jewish identity." Both speakers agreed that, although the declining Jewish population should be lamented, it did not necessarily mean that the community had no future. At a meeting in January, a Parti Québécois vice-president tried to convince Jewish community leaders that independence was inevitable and that Jews should support it and become part of the movement. The 150 leaders present gave him a

cool reception, reflecting continuing hostility toward the idea.

A number of issues involving the media arose during the year. The Montreal newspaper *La Presse* apologized for a front-page cartoon linking Richler and Hitler that appeared in October. In November, Montreal broadcaster Claude Jasmin described Hassidic Jews as racist during a broadcast. Earlier in the year, he had referred to Jews as "racists . . especially practicing Jews." Both CJC and B'nai Brith were sharply critical of the incidents.

In other developments, Ontario finally decided to allow Sunday shopping, thereby concluding a lengthy battle that involved Sabbath observers, among others. Manitoba decided to abolish prayer in the schools. In Toronto, in April, an observant lawyer's request to adjourn a court proceeding late on Friday afternoon was denied. Bert Raphael, president of the Jewish Civil Rights Educational Foundation of Canada, declared that "this shows that anti-Semitism is alive and well in Toronto in 1992." The Quebec government's failure to provide kosher food to Jewish prison inmates provoked some internal conflict between Lubavitch representatives and federation officials over how to deal with the problem.

The Quebec government and Federation CJA in Montreal cooperated in efforts to bring about 400 Jews from the former Soviet Union to settle in Quebec. Russian Jew Dmitri Berman was finally able to leave the Canadian embassy in Moscow after many months of trying to avoid what he regarded as an unfair prosecution. He then was able to go to Israel.

Religion

The Conservative movement faced serious disaffection within the Toronto rabbinate. Canadian Jewry in general is somewhat more traditional in patterns of religious observance and synagogue practices than American Jewry, and the Toronto members of the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly (RA) had strong reservations about the direction of the movement, especially in terms of egalitarianism. At a meeting of the Ontario Region of the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism in Richmond Hill in June, rabbis Erwin Schild and Benjamin Friedberg criticized recent developments within their movement. Rabbi Schild expressed the view that "we seem to have lost our sense of direction and are steering by the winds of change rather than tradition." Rabbi Friedberg added that "instead of teaching Halakhah, we're trying to change it. We're watering things down." A threat by several rabbis to withdraw from the RA, at a meeting of the 18 RA members in Ontario held later in June, would have replicated an earlier split by the Conservative cantors of the Toronto area. According to Rabbi Wayne Allen, the regional chairman, among the issues that motivated the rabbis were ideology, decision-making processes, and the general direction of the movement. Rabbi Lawrence Troster said that the immediate stimulus for withdrawal was the adoption earlier in the year by the movement's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of resolutions dealing with gender equality, homosexuality, and human sexuality.

An August visit to the discontented rabbis by Rabbi Joel Meyers, executive vice-president of the RA, quieted things briefly, although Rabbi Allen reported continued unhappiness among many of his members. There were reports that several rabbis would join the rabbinic fellowship of the Union for Traditional Judaism (UTJ). Then Rabbi Allen resigned as regional chairman at the end of August, stating that "the gap is irreparable. There's no going back." In an effort to keep the dissident Toronto rabbis within the fold, Chancellor Ismar Schorsch of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America visited Toronto in December. He warned his colleagues not to join the UTJ, which he described as "marginal." He added, "We need the Yiddishkeit of Toronto."

Despite frantic efforts to raise necessary funds, the Conservative Shaareh Haim Synagogue, in the Toronto suburb of Richmond Hill, was forced to close in June. A Reform congregation, Rodeph Shalom, that had served the Montreal suburb of Dollard des Ormeaux for 26 years, decided to close after its membership had dwindled to only 38. It sold its building to a new Sephardic congregation and donated its ritual articles to the Reform movement, after holding its last service in July. Meanwhile, approximately 300 gays formed a new synagogue in Toronto, Congregation Keshet Shalom. In total there were approximately 65 Orthodox, 10 Conservative, and 10 Reform synagogues in Toronto. The new Vancouver Traditional Congregation decided to affiliate with the UTJ and to restrict the role of women in the service. The leadership of the new synagogue tried to establish a middle ground between contemporary Orthodox and Conservative practice, exemplified by distinct sections for separate and mixed seating.

Five medical doctors in the Toronto-Hamilton area became the first Reform Jews to be certified as *mohelim* (ritual circumcisers) by the Berit Milah Board of Reform Judaism. Quebec's newly revised Civil Code removed from religious congregations the responsibility to register births and deaths for official state purposes.

Culture

The 500th anniversary of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain was commemorated in Montreal by the yearlong series of events known as Sepharad '92, which was jointly sponsored by Federation CJA and the Communauté Sépharade du Québec (CSQ) in an effort to enhance the appreciation of Sephardic Jewish culture. The events included an exhibition of the works of the painter Raphael Abecassis entitled "*De l'Exil à aujourd'hui*" (From the Exile to Today), a special Mimouna celebration at the end of Passover, lectures, a film series, puppet workshops, and a photographic exhibit about the Jews of Morocco. An exhibit produced by the Spanish Foreign Ministry was shown in Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, and several U.S. cities.

The Stars of the Ester Kaminska Theater from Warsaw made their first Canadian appearance, presenting *The Joys of Yiddish* in Toronto in June. The same month, Yiddish theater director Dora Wasserman and French-Canadian playwright Michel

Tremblay collaborated on a production of a Yiddish translation of Tremblay's *Les Belles Soeurs* (The Beautiful Sisters) in Montreal. A new film by Simcha Jacobovici, *The Sephardim—A Passion for Life*, traces the Sephardic odyssey since the expulsion of 1492. The National Film Board's documentary *Des lumières dans la grande noirceur* (A Vision in the Darkness) tells the story of Lea Roback, a political activist, trade unionist, and feminist looking back on her accomplishments at the age of 89.

Srul Irving Glick's symphonic poem "The Reawakening" had its premiere by the Toronto Symphony Orchestra, under guest conductor Victor Feldbrill, in January. Another new Glick composition, "Artist's Life: A Portrait in Six Poems," is based on the work of the late Yiddish poet Rochel Korn. Its premiere was in Montreal in November. The Hazzan Mendelson Music Foundation of Montreal sponsored an International Jewish Song Competition in November. Some 170 songs were entered, with the top 15 being performed at the competition. Five songs, written by artists from England, Canada, the United States, Australia, and Israel, won prizes.

Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, established a chair in Jewish studies. The first professor to hold the chair is Reena Zeidman, a specialist in rabbinics. Prof. Emil Fackenheim returned to Toronto from his home in Jerusalem to speak at a symposium on the occasion of his 75th birthday in March. He stressed the importance of the Holocaust and the Six Day War as formative events in his intellectual development.

Montreal's Saidye Bronfman Center, dedicated to the arts, celebrated its 25th anniversary in February with a gala evening of ballet and musical presentations. "Tur Malka" (Royal Mountain, in Aramaic), an exhibition commemorating 200 years of Jewish life in Montreal, opened in May at the Jewish Public Library. In a lecture on the Jewish experience in Canada, in April, in Montreal, Prof. Irving Abella of York University described what he considered to be the golden age of Canadian Jewry, the 1840s, when Jews were in the vanguard of the fight for human rights. Turning to the present, he observed that "Canadian Jews are the envy of every Jewish community in the world. . . ."

Publications

Gerald Tulchinsky's *Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jewish Community* traces the development of the community from 1760 to 1920, trying to distinguish the Canadian experience from the American. The fact that Canada was more likely than the United States to foster separate ethnic identities helped maintain a more intense Jewish life and a strong commitment to Zionism.

Ruth Wisse confronts controversial contemporary issues in *If I Am Not for Myself: The Liberal Betrayal of the Jews*, in which she argues that Israel's well-being is endangered by the guilt of Jewish liberals in both Israel and the Diaspora, at a time when Arab hostility still constitutes a danger and anti-Semitism has taken on new forms.

The Stones That Speak, by David Rome and Jacques Langlais, chronicles two

centuries of the "common history" of Jews and French Québécois and asserts that, despite historical and contemporary tensions, Quebec has been a hospitable place for Jews to live. In contrast, Mordecai Richler's *Oh Canada! Oh Quebec! Requiem for a Divided Country* accentuates the negative aspects of Quebec nationalism, especially the language laws of the last 15 years.

The theme of anti-Semitism in Quebec is documented in much greater detail in *Le traître et le Juif: Lionel Groulx, Le Devoir et le délire du nationalisme d'extrême-droite dans la province de Québec, 1929–1939* (The Traitor and the Jew: Lionel Groulx, *Le Devoir*, and the Development of Extreme Right-Wing Nationalism in the Province of Quebec, 1929–1939) by Esther Delisle. She focuses on the influential daily newspaper *Le Devoir*, citing over 1,000 anti-Semitic articles, many on the front page and many written by Groulx, the father of modern Quebec nationalism. Alan Davies edited *Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation*.

Other nonfiction works published during the year included *The Jews in a Polish Private Town: The Case of Opatow in the Eighteenth Century* by Gershon Hundert, which won the J.I. Segal Award from the Jewish Public Library in Montreal; *Que sais-je? Les partis religieux en Israel* by Julien Bauer; *Itineraires sépharades 1492–1992* by Yossi Levy and Yolande Cohen; *Unholy Alliances* by Warren Kinsella, which demonstrates how Libya funds right-wing and anti-Semitic groups in Canada; *The Un-Canadians* by Len Scher, the story of the harassment of leftists by government agencies during the McCarthy period; *Religion and Culture in Jewish Family Law* by John Syrtash; *Canadian Families in Transition* by Ben and Rachel Schlesinger; *Fackenheim: German Philosophy and Jewish Thought*, a festschrift in honor of the philosopher's 75th birthday, edited by Louis Greenspan and Graeme Nicholson; and *Phoenix from the Ashes* by Saul Levine.

Among new works of fiction were *Ship of the Hunted* by Yehuda Elberg; *The Number Game* by Abraham Boyarsky; and a work based on the life of a Jewish pioneer, *Aaron Hart: Sieur de Becancour/La Vie Mouvementée du Premier Juif Etabli au Québec au XVIIIe Siècle* by Michel Solomon. New works of poetry included Ray Shankman's *For Love of the Wind*, Shel Krakofsky's *The Reversible Coat*, and Henry Pollack's *The He and the She of It*. Solly Levy published a book of songs, plays, and poetry entitled *Those Were the Days*. The book was written in Haquetia, a language spoken by Spanish Jews before the expulsion.

New reference books included David Mendel Harduf's *English-Yiddish, Yiddish-English Dictionary*, volume 4. The feminist quarterly *Fireweed* devoted its volume 35 to the topic of Jewish women. It was the first collection of feminist Jewish writings published in Canada.

Marianne Langner Zeitlin won the City of Toronto Book Award for her novel *Next of Kin*. Rabbi Gedalia Felder won the Penina Rubinoff Memorial Prize in Biblical and Rabbinic Scholarship posthumously for *Yesodai Yeshurun: A Collection of Comments and Notes on Maseches Avos*.

Personalia

Judge Rosalie Silberman Abella was appointed to the Ontario Court of Appeal, that province's highest court. Other judicial appointments included Joel Guberman to the Quebec court and Sheila Ray to the Ontario criminal court. Ray is the first Sephardi Jew to serve as a judge in Ontario. Jacqueline Holzman was elected mayor of Ottawa, the first Jewish woman to hold that position. Ruth Wisse left McGill University to inaugurate a new chair in Yiddish studies at Harvard University, and Cheryl Jaffee became curator of the Jacob M. Lowy Collection of Hebraica and Judaica at the National Library. Bernard Dolansky was elected president of the Canadian Dental Association. Dror Zeigerman was appointed consul general of Israel in Toronto, succeeding Benjamin Abileah.

Irwin Cotler was appointed to the Order of Canada; the Order of Ontario was conferred on Rose Wolfe and Harry Rasky and the Order of British Columbia on Joseph Segal. Dorothy Reitman received the Governor General's Award in Commemoration of the Persons Case for her work to achieve equality for women. Bert Raphael was awarded the Law Society Medal by the Ontario bar association. King Hassan II of Morocco conferred the Al Istihqaq Al-Watan Medal, one of his country's highest honors, on Simon Keslassy. Dr. Ken Rosenthal won the Canadian Foundation for AIDS Research Industry Research Award.

Within the community, Irving Abella and Charles Zaionz were elected president and chairman of the national executive of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Other new CJC leaders include Gerda Frieberg as chairwoman of the Ontario Region and Manuel Shacter as her counterpart in Quebec. Rabbi Allan Nadler was appointed research director of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York, and Rabbi Howard Joseph became president of the Canadian Christian-Jewish Consultation. Gabe Nachman was elected president of B'nai Brith Canada, and Gerald Halbert became president of UIA Canada. Manuel Prutschi added the job of executive director of the Ontario Region of CJC to his community-relations job there. George Wasserstein became chairman of the National Budgeting Conference.

Among leading Jews who died in 1992 were the following: Florence Hutner, former executive director of the United Jewish Welfare Fund and the first woman to head a major Jewish organization in Canada, in January, aged 84; Dr. Martin Fischer, psychiatrist, in January, aged 78; Samuel Lewin, a longtime official of CJC, in February, aged 80; Barbara Frum, one of Canada's leading broadcast journalists, in March, aged 54; Jack Cowan, a founder of *Canadian Jewish Outlook* and former president of the United Jewish People's Order, in March, aged 91; Harry Orlinsky, eminent Bible scholar, in April, aged 84; Henry Blatt, founding president of B'nai Brith Canada, in April, aged 81; Dave Stitz, community leader, in April, aged 66; Cecil Linder, acclaimed actor, in April, aged 71; Hy Fogelman, community professional, in May, aged 66; Joseph Diamond, noted educator and founder of the Jewish Teachers Seminary, in May, aged 87; Sam Malmed, a one-man *bikur holim* society, in May, aged 95; Max Frieberg, a leader of Herut-Likud Canada, in June, aged 70;

Louis Soupcoff, community activist, in June, aged 78; David Weiss, social worker, in July, aged 77; Rabbi Mordechai Weinberg, dean of Yeshiva Gedolah Mercaz Hatorah, in July, aged 63; Sam Berger, owner of a professional sports team and former president of the Canadian Football League, in August, aged 92; Jaan Saber, engineering professor, in August, aged 46; Faye Tanenbaum, philanthropist, in September, aged 89; Jack Burke, pioneer educator, in October, aged 77; Joseph Tanenbaum, businessman and noted philanthropist, in November, aged 87; Jacob Rabinovitch, Yiddish journalist, in November, aged 83; Morris Lax, president of the Shiloh Institutions for Israel, in December, aged 71; and Rabbi Eli Bohnen, former president of the Rabbinical Assembly, in December, aged 83.

HAROLD M. WALLER

World Jewish Population, 1992

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS UPDATES, for the end of 1992, of the Jewish population estimates for the various countries of the world.[1] The estimates reflect some of the results of a prolonged and ongoing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry.[2] Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of a worldwide set of estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties.

Since the end of the 1980s, important geopolitical changes have affected the world scene, particularly in Eastern Europe. The major event was the political breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states. The Jewish population has been sensitive to these changes, large-scale emigration from the former USSR being the most visible effect. In the present article, each republic of the former USSR is included as a separate country and listed in Europe or Asia, as appropriate. Similarly, new estimates appear for the several successor states of the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

In spite of the increased fragmentation of the global system of nations, about 94 percent of world Jewry is concentrated in ten countries. The aggregate of these major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of the size of total world Jewry, estimated at 12.9 million persons at the end of 1992. The country figures for 1992 were updated from those for 1991 in accordance with the known or estimated changes in the interval—migrations, vital events (births and deaths), and identificational changes (accessions and secessions). In addition, corrections were introduced in the light of newly accrued information on Jewish populations. Corresponding corrections were also applied retrospectively to the 1991 figures, which appear below in revised summary (see table 1), so as to allow adequate comparison with the 1992 estimates.

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[1]The previous estimates, as of 1991, were published in AJYB 1993, vol. 93, pp. 423–45.

[2]Many of these activities are carried out by, or in coordination with, the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The authors acknowledge with thanks the collaboration of the many institutions and individuals in the different countries who have supplied information for this update.

In recent years, new data and estimates have become available for the Jewish populations of several countries. Some of this ongoing research is part of a coordinated effort to update the profile of world Jewry that began at the outset of the 1990s.[1] Two important sources that have yielded results on major Jewish populations are the official population census of the Soviet Union held in 1989 and the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) in the United States completed in 1990. The respective results basically confirmed the estimates we had reported in previous AJYB volumes and, perhaps more importantly, our interpretation of the trends now prevailing in the demography of world Jewry.[2] More recently, results of national censuses were released for Canada and Australia, and Jewish sociodemographic surveys were completed in South Africa and Mexico. While allowing for improved population estimates for the year 1992 under review here, these new data highlight the increasing complexity of the sociodemographic and identificational processes underlying the definition of Jewish populations—hence the estimates of their sizes—the more so at a time of enhanced international migration.

A full review of the major conceptual problems appeared in the 1992 volume of AJYB and will only be briefly summarized here. Users of population estimates should be aware of these difficulties and of the consequent limitations of the estimates.

Presentation of Data

The detailed estimates of Jewish population distribution in each continent and country (tables 2–7 below) aim at the concept of "core" Jewish population. We define the core Jewish population as the aggregate of all those who, when asked, identify themselves as such; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews. The core Jewish population includes all those who converted to Judaism or joined the Jewish group informally. It excludes those of Jewish descent who formally adopted another religion, as well as other Jewish individuals who did not convert out but currently disclaim being Jewish. The so-called extended or enlarged Jewish populations—including Jews, ex-Jews, non-Jews of Jewish parentage, and the respective non-Jewish household members—may result in significantly higher estimates (not reported below).

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[1]Following the 1987 international conference on Jewish population problems, sponsored by the major Jewish organizations worldwide, an International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) was established. Cochaired by Dr. Roberto Bachi of the Hebrew University and Dr. Sidney Goldstein of Brown University, ISAC coordinates and monitors Jewish population data collection internationally. See Sergio DellaPergola and Leah Cohen, eds., *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies* (Jerusalem, 1992).

[2]See U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB 1981, vol. 81, pp. 61–117; U.O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984); Sergio DellaPergola, "Israel and World Jewish Population: A Core-Periphery Perspective," in *Population and Social Change in Israel*, ed. C. Goldscheider (Boulder, 1992), pp. 39–63.

We provide separate figures for each country with at least 100 resident core Jews. Residual estimates of Jews living in other smaller communities supplement some of the continental totals. For each of the reported countries, the four columns in the following tables provide the United Nations estimate of midyear 1993 total population,[1] the estimated end-1992 Jewish population, the proportion of Jews per 1,000 of total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate.

There is wide variation in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries it would be best to indicate a range (minimum-maximum) rather than a definite figure for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. Yet, the figures actually indicated for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range of the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely to the accuracy of the estimate.

ACCURACY RATING

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each estimate are the nature and quality of the base data, the recency of the base data, and the method of updating. A simple code combining these elements is used to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of the Jewish population figures reported in the detailed tables below. The code indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates: (A) base figure derived from countrywide census or relatively reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period; (B) base figure derived from less accurate but recent countrywide Jewish population investigation; partial information on population movements in the intervening period; (C) base figure derived from less recent sources, and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of Jewish population in the particular country; updating according to demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends; (D) base figure essentially conjectural; no reliable updating procedure. In categories (A), (B), and (C), the years in which the base figures or important partial updates were obtained are also stated. For countries whose Jewish population estimate of 1992 was not only updated but also revised in the light of improved information, the sign "X" is appended to the accuracy rating.

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[1]See United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, *World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revision* (New York, 1993). Estimated total populations for the new successor states of the former USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were obtained from Michel Louis Levy, "Tous les pays du monde," *Population et Sociétés*, no. 282 (Paris, 1993).

Distribution of World Jewish Population by Major Regions

Table 1 gives an overall picture of Jewish population for the end of 1992 as compared to 1991. For 1991 the originally published estimates are presented along with somewhat revised figures that take into account, retrospectively, the corrections made in 1992 in certain country estimates, in the light of improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase in world Jewry's 1991 estimated size by 65,500. This change resulted from upward corrections for Canada (+46,000), Mexico (+2,000), Russia (+19,000), Azerbaijan (+10,000), and Ethiopia (+3,000); and downward corrections for Iran (−1,000) and South Africa (−13,500). Some explanations are given below for the countries whose estimates were revised. The geographic breakdown in table 1 is slightly different from that in previous AJYB volumes, the main change being the division of the former USSR into its European and Asian components. In addition, due to the nearly complete emigration of Jews from Ethiopia, we withdrew the previous "Central Africa" category and incorporated the tiny residual in North Africa. The 1991 data, too, are presented here in the new format.

The size of world Jewry at the end of 1992 is assessed at 12,922,000. According to the revised figures, between 1991 and 1992 there was an estimated gain of 7,000 people, or about +0.1 percent. Despite all the imperfections in the estimates, it is clear that world Jewry has reached "zero population growth," with the natural increase in Israel barely compensating for the demographic decline in the Diaspora.

The number of Jews in Israel rose from a figure of 4,144, 600 in 1991 to 4,242,500 at the end of 1992, an increase of 97,900 people, or 2.4 percent. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora declined from 8,770,400 (according to the revised figures) to 8,679,500—a decrease of 90,900 people, or 1.1 percent. These changes primarily reflect the continuing Jewish emigration from the former USSR. In 1992, the Israel-Diaspora estimated net migratory balance amounted to a gain of about 49,500 Jews for Israel.[6] Internal demographic evolution produced further growth among the Jewish population in Israel and further decline in the Diaspora. Recently, instances of accession or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the emigration process from Eastern Europe and the comprehensive provisions of the Israeli Law of Return (*Hok Hashvut*). The Law of Return grants immigrant rights to all current Jews and to their Jewish or non-Jewish spouses, children, and grandchildren, as well as to the spouses of such children and grandchildren. The return or first-time accession to Judaism of some of such previously unincluded or unidentified individuals appears to have contributed to a moderate slowing down in the pace of decline of the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations, and some further gains to the Jewish population in Israel.

Just about half of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with over 46 percent

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[6]Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993*, no. 44 (Jerusalem, 1993), p. 44.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENTS AND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS, 1991 AND 1992

Region	1991			1992		% Change 1991–1992
	Original	Revised				
	Abs. N.	Abs. N.	Percent	Abs. N.	Percent	
World	12,849,500	12,915,000	100.0	12,922,000	100.0	+0.1
Diaspora	8,704,900	8,770,400	67.9	8,679,500	67.2	−1.1
Israel	4,144,600	4,144,600	32.1	4,242,500	32.8	+2.4
America, Total	6,319,000	6,367,000	49.3	6,409,700	49.6	+0.6
North[a]	5,885,000	5,931,000	45.9	5,976,000	46.2	+0.7
Central	49,700	51,700	0.4	51,700	0.4	—
South	384,300	384,300	3.0	382,000	3.0	−0.6
Europe, Total	2,009,800	2,028,800	15.8	1,924,800	14.9	−5.1
EC	986,900	986,900	7.6	992,300	7.7	+0.5
Other West	44,000	44,000	0.3	44,000	0.4	—
Former USSR[b]	868,100	887,100	6.9	780,400	6.0	−12.1
Other East and Balkans[b]	110,800	110,800	0.9	108,100	0.8	−2.4
Asia, Total	4,298,100	4,307,100	33.3	4,378,600	33.9	+1.7
Israel	4,144,600	4,144,600	32.1	4,242,500	32.8	+2.4
Former USSR[b]	121,900	131,900	1.0	109,600	0.9	−16.9
Other[b]	31,600	30,600	0.2	26,500	0.2	−13.4
Africa, Total	129,000	118,500	0.9	114,300	0.9	−3.5
North[c]	11,900	14,900	0.1	11,200	0.1	−24.8
South[d]	117,100	103,600	0.8	103,100	0.8	−0.5
Oceania	93,600	93,600	0.7	94,600	0.7	+1.1

a U.S.A. and Canada.
b The Asian regions of Russia and Turkey are included in Europe.
c Including Ethiopia.
d South Africa, Zimbabwe, and other sub-Saharan countries.

in North America. One-third live in Asia—including the Asian republics of the former USSR (but not the Asian parts of the Russian Republic and Turkey)—most of them in Israel. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey, accounts for about 15 percent of the total. Less than 2 percent of the

world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania. Among the major geographical regions listed in table 1, the number of Jews in Israel—and, consequently, in total Asia—increased in 1992. Moderate Jewish population gains were also estimated for North America, the European Community, and Oceania. South America, Eastern Europe, Asian countries out of Israel, and Africa sustained decreases in Jewish population size.

World Jewry constitutes about 2.3 per 1,000 of the world's total population. One in about 435 people in the world is a Jew.

Individual Countries

THE AMERICAS

In 1992 the total number of Jews in the American continents was estimated at over 6.4 million. The overwhelming majority (93 percent) resided in the United States and Canada, less than 1 percent lived in Central America (including Mexico), and about 6 percent lived in South America—with Argentina and Brazil the largest Jewish communities (see table 2).

United States. The 1989–1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations and the North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB), provided new benchmark information about the size and characteristics of U.S. Jewry—the largest Jewish population in the world—and the basis for subsequent updates.[7] According to the official report of the results of this important national sample study, the core Jewish population in the United States comprised 5,515,000 persons in the summer of 1990. Of these, 185,000 were not born or raised as Jews but currently identified with Judaism. An estimated 210,000 persons, not included in the previous figures, were born or raised as Jews but had converted to another religion. A further 1,115,000 people—thereof 415,000 adults and 700,000 children below age 18—were of Jewish parentage but had not themselves been raised as Jews and declared a religion other than Judaism at the time of the survey. All together, these various groups formed an extended Jewish population of 6,840,000. NJPS also covered 1,350,000 non-Jewish-born members of eligible (Jewish or mixed) households. The study's enlarged Jewish population thus consisted of about 8,200,000 persons. The 1990 Jewish population estimates are within

[7]The 1989–1990 National Jewish Population Survey was conducted under the auspices of the Council of Jewish Federations with the supervision of a National Technical Advisory Committee chaired by Dr. Sidney Goldstein of Brown University. Dr. Barry Kosmin of the North American Jewish Data Bank and City University of New York Graduate Center directed the study. See Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1991); and Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," AJYB 1992, vol. 92, pp. 77–173.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, END 1992

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	27,755,000	356,000	12.8	A 1991
United States	257,840,000	5,620,000	21.8	A 1990
Total North America	285,721,000[a]	5,976,000	20.9	
Bahamas	268,000	300	1.1	D
Costa Rica	3,270,000	2,000	0.6	C 1986
Cuba	10,907,000	700	0.1	C 1990
Dominican Republic	7,621,000	100	0.0	D
Guatemala	10,029,000	800	0.1	C 1983
Jamaica	2,495,000	300	0.1	B 1988
Mexico	89,998,000	40,000	0.4	A 1991 X
Netherlands Antilles	175,000	400	2.3	D
Panama	2,563,000	5,000	2.0	C 1990
Puerto Rico	3,626,000	1,500	0.4	C 1990
Virgin Islands	107,000	300	2.8	C 1986
Other	25,330,000	300	0.0	D
Total Central America	156,389,000	51,700	0.3	
Argentina	33,487,000	211,000	6.4	C 1990
Bolivia	7,705,000	700	0.1	B 1990
Brazil	156,578,000	100,000	0.6	C 1980
Chile	13,813,000	15,000	1.1	C 1988
Colombia	33,985,000	6,500	0.2	C 1986
Ecuador	11,310,000	900	0.1	C 1985
Paraguay	4,643,000	900	0.2	B 1990
Peru	22,913,000	3,000	0.1	B 1988
Suriname	446,000	200	0.5	B 1986
Uruguay	3,149,000	23,800	7.7	C 1990
Venezuela	20,618,000	20,000	1.0	C 1989
Total South America	309,574,000[a]	382,000	1.3	
Total	751,684,000	6,409,700	8.5	

a Including countries not listed separately.

the range of a sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 percent.[8] This means a range between 5.3 and 5.7 million for the core Jewish population in 1990.

Since 1990, the international migration balance of U.S. Jewry should have generated an actual increase in Jewish population size. According to HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), the main agency involved in assisting Jewish migration from the former USSR to the United States, the number of assisted migrants was 32,714 in 1990, 35,568 in 1991, and 46,083 in 1992.[9] These figures include a small number of individuals who settled in Canada, and, more significantly, are based on the "enlarged" Jewish population concept, incorporating non-Jewish members of mixed households. The actual number of former Soviet Jews resettling in the United States was thus somewhat smaller, though still quite substantial.

In retrospect, it can be seen that the influence of international migration between 1971 and 1990 was less than might have been expected. The first National Jewish Population Study, conducted in 1970–71, estimated the U.S. Jewish population at 5.4 million; the 1990 NJPS estimated a core Jewish population of 5.5 million, a difference of 100,000. However, since Jewish immigration contributed 200,000–300,000 in this period, it is clear that the balance of other factors of core population change over that whole 20-year period must have been negative. First detailed analyses of the new NJPS data actually provide evidence of a variety of contributing factors: low levels of Jewish fertility and the "effectively Jewish" birthrate, increasing aging of the Jewish population, increasing outmarriage rate, declining rate of conversion to Judaism (or "choosing" Judaism), rather low proportions of children of mixed marriages being identified as Jewish, and a growing tendency to adopt non-Jewish rituals.[10] A temporary increase in the Jewish birthrate occurred during the late 1980s, because the large cohorts born during the "baby boom" of the 1950s and early 1960s were in the main procreative ages; however, this echo effect is about to fade away, as the much smaller cohorts born since the late 1960s reach the stage of parenthood.

Taking this evidence into account, our estimate of U.S. Jewish population size at the end of 1992 starts from the NJPS benchmark core Jewish population of 5,515,000, and attempts to account for Jewish population changes that occurred in the latter part of 1990—after completion of NJPS—in 1991, and in 1992. Assuming a total net migration gain of about 60,000 Jews from the USSR, Israel, and other origins for the whole of 1990, we apportioned 20,000 to the final months of that year.

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[8]See Kosmin et al., p. 39.

[9]See HIAS, *Annual Report 1992* (New York, 1993). See also Barry R. Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States: An Analysis of Their Linguistic and Economic Adjustment," *Economic Quarterly*, July 1991, no. 148, pp. 188–211 (Hebrew), and *International Migration Review*, 1993 (English).

[10]See Goldstein, AJYB 1992; see also U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography* (American Jewish Committee, New York, 1988); and Sergio DellaPergola, "New Data on Demography and Identification Among Jews in the U.S.: Trends, Inconsistencies and Disagreements," *Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 12, 1992, pp. 67–97.

A further 40,000 were added for 1991, and 45,000 for 1992, to account for immigration net of emigration, as well as some further attrition based on current marriage, fertility, and age-composition trends in the U.S. core Jewish population. We thus suggest an estimate of 5,620,000 Jews in the United States at the end of 1992. This estimate is still conditional on further detailed scrutiny and interpretation of the NJPS findings.

The research team of the North American Jewish Data Bank, which was responsible for the primary handling of NJPS data files, has also continued its yearly compilation of local Jewish population estimates. These are reported elsewhere in this volume.[11] NAJDB estimated the U.S. Jewish population in 1986 at 5,814,000, including "under 2 percent" non-Jewish household members. This was very close to our own pre-NJPS estimate of 5,700,000. The NAJDB estimate was updated as follows: 1987—5,943,700; 1988—5,935,000; 1989—5,944,000; 1990—5,981,000; 1991—5,798,000. These changes in the main do not reflect actual sudden growth or decline, but rather corrections and adaptations made in the figures for several local communities—some of them in the light of NJPS regional results, others based on new local community studies. It should be realized that compilations of local estimates, even if as painstaking as in the case of the NAJDB, are subject to a great many local biases and tend to fall behind the actual pace of national trends. This is especially true in a context of vigorous internal migrations, as in the United States. In our view, the new NJPS figure, in spite of sample-survey biases, provides a more reliable national Jewish population baseline.

Canada. Results of the 1991 Canadian census were released, providing a new baseline for the estimate of the local Jewish population. As customary in Canada, the census included questions on both religion and ethnic origin, besides information on year of immigration of the foreign-born and languages. An intensive special processing of the data concerning Jews was produced by a joint team of researchers from McGill University's Consortium for Ethnicity and Strategic Social Planning, Statistics Canada, and Council of Jewish Federations Canada, directed by Prof. Jim Torczyner.[12] The new census enumerated 318,070 Jews according to religion; of these, 281,680 also reported being Jewish by ethnicity (as one of up to four options to the latter question), while 36,390 reported one or more other ethnic origins. Another 38,245 persons reported no religion and a Jewish ethnic origin, again as one of up to four options. After due allowance is made for the latter group, a total core Jewish population of 356,315 was estimated for 1991—an increase of 44,255 (14.2 percent) over the corresponding estimate of 312,060 from the 1981 census. A

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[11]The first in a new series of yearly compilations of local U.S. Jewish population estimates appeared in Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986," AJYB 1987, vol. 87, pp. 164–91. The 1993 update appears elsewhere in the present volume.

[12]Jim L. Torczyner, Shari L. Brotman, Kathy Viragh, Gustave J. Goldmann, *Demographic Challenges Facing Canadian Jewry: Initial Findings from the 1991 Census* (Montreal, 1993).

further 49,640 Canadians who reported being Jewish by ethnic origin but identified with another religion (such as Catholic, Anglican, etc.) were not included in the 1991 core estimate. Including them would produce an extended Jewish population of 405,955.

In comparison with the 1981 census, the 1991 data revealed an increase of 21,645 (7.3 percent) in the number of Jews defined by religion. A more significant increase occurred among those reporting a Jewish ethnicity with no religious preference: 22,610 persons, or more than twice (+144.6 percent) as many as in 1981. The increase was comparatively even larger among those reporting a partially Jewish ethnic ancestry and among ethnic Jews with another religion. Besides actual demographic and identificational trends, changes in the wording of the relevant questions in the two censuses may have influenced these variations in the size of both the core and the ethnically (or, in our terminology, extended) Jewish population of Canada.[13]

Most of the 1981–1991 Jewish population increase was due to international migration: out of the total increase of 44,255 core Jews, 25,895 (59 percent) appear to have arrived in Canada since 1981. The principal country of origin is the former USSR (6,230), followed by Israel (4,975), the United States (3,630), and South Africa (2,855).[14] Practically all the rest of the Jewish population growth consists of ethnic Jews who did not report a religion, including many whose reported Jewish ethnicity is only one among several others. The latter are quite certainly children of intermarriages, whose frequency indeed increased in Canada by about 33 percent over the 1980s.[15] All this implies that the 1981–1991 demographic balance of the Jewish population living in Canada in 1981 was close to zero or slightly negative. Taking into account as well the increasingly aged Jewish population structure, it is suggested that since the 1991 census, the continuing migratory surplus may have roughly offset the probably negative balance of internal evolution. Thus, for the end of 1992, we adopted an estimated round figure of 356,000—sufficient to make Canada the world's fifth largest Jewish population.

Central America. A Jewish-sponsored population survey of the Jews in the Mexico City metropolitan area was completed in 1991.[16] The results point to a community definitely less affected than others in the Diaspora by the common trends of

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[13]The results of preceding censuses can be found in Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada; Population: Ethnic Origin; Religion* (Ottawa, 1983, 1984); and Statistics Canada, *Population by Ethnic Origin, 1986 Census: Canada, Provinces and Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas* (Ottawa, 1988).

[14]See Torczyner et al., *Demographic Challenges. . .*, *Appendices*, p. 22.

[15]See Torczyner et al., *Demographic Challenges. . .*, p. 20.

[16]Sergio DellaPergola and Susana Lerner, *Perfil demografico, social y cultural de la poblacion judia de Mexico, 1991; Resultados segun comunidades de muestreo, Informe sumario* (Jerusalem-Mexico, 1993). The project, conducted cooperatively by the Centro de Estudios Urbanos y de Desarrollo Urbano (CEDDU), El Colegio de Mexico, and the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, was sponsored by the Asociacion Mexicana de Amigos de la Universisad Hebrea de Jerusalen.

low fertility, intermarriage, and aging. Some comparatively more traditional sectors in the Jewish community still contribute a current surplus of births over deaths, and overall—thanks also to some immigration—the Jewish population has been quite stable or even moderately increasing. The new Jewish population estimate was put at 37,500 in the Mexico City metropolitan area and at 40,000 nationally. This amounts to an upward revision of 2,000 compared with our last estimate. Official Mexican censuses over the years have provided rather erratic and unreliable Jewish population figures. This was the case with the 1990 census, which came up with a national total of 57,918 Jews (aged five and over). As in the past, most of the problem derived from unacceptably high figures for peripheral states. The new census figures for the Mexico City metropolitan area (33,932 Jews—aged five and over—in the Federal District and State of Mexico) are quite close—in fact are slightly below—our survey's estimates. Panama's Jewish population—the second largest in Central America—is estimated at about 5,000.

South America.[17] The Jewish population of Argentina, the largest in that geographical region, is marked by a negative balance of internal evolution. A number of local surveys conducted at the initiative of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina—AMIA, the central Jewish community organization—consistently point to growing aging.[18] Since the 1960s, while the pace of emigration and return migration was significantly affected by the nature of economic and political trends in the country, the balance of external migrations was generally negative. Accordingly, the estimate for Argentinian Jewry was reduced from 213,000 in 1991 to 211,000 in 1992.

In Brazil, the official population census of 1980 showed a figure of 91,795 Jews. Since it is possible that some otherwise identifying Jews failed to declare themselves as such in the census, a corrected estimate of 100,000 was adopted for 1980 and has been kept unchanged through 1992, assuming that the overall balance of Jewish vital events and external migrations was close to zero. The national figure of approximately 100,000 fits the admittedly rough estimates that are available for the size of local Jewish communities in Brazil.

On the strength of fragmentary information available, the estimates for Uruguay and Peru were slightly reduced, while those for Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia were not changed.

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[17]For a more detailed discussion of the region's Jewish population trends, see U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Latin American Jewry," AJYB 1985, vol. 85, pp. 51–102; and Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends of Latin American Jewry," in J. Laikin Elkin and G.W. Merks, eds., *The Jewish Presence in Latin America* (Boston, 1987), pp. 85–133.

[18]Rosa N. Geldstein, *Censo de la Poblacion Judia de la ciudad de Salta, 1986; Informe final* (Buenos Aires, 1988); Yacov Rubel, *Los Judios de Villa Crespo y Almagro: Perfil Sociodemografico* (Buenos Aires, 1989); Yacov Rubel and Mario Toer, *Censo de la Poblacion Judia de Rosario, 1990* (Buenos Aires, 1992).

EUROPE

Of the approximately two million Jews estimated to be in Europe at the end of 1992, 54 percent lived in Western Europe and 46 percent in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries—including the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey (see table 3). In 1992 Europe lost 5.1 percent of its estimated Jewish population, mainly through the continuing emigration from the former USSR. As a consequence, for the first time, literally, in many centuries, there are now more Jews in Western than in Eastern Europe.

European Community. At the end of 1992, the 12 countries that form the European Community (EC) had an estimated combined Jewish population of about one million. Overall, only very minor change was recorded as against the 1991 estimate, although different trends affected the Jewish population in each member country.[19]

The estimated size of French Jewry has been assessed for several years at 530,000. Since the breakup of the USSR, France has had the third largest Jewish population in the world, after the United States and Israel. Monitoring the plausible trends of both the internal evolution and external migrations of Jews in France suggests little net change in Jewish population size since the major survey that was taken in the 1970s.[20] A study conducted in 1988 at the initiative of the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU) confirmed the basic demographic stability of French Jewry.[21]

Periodic reestimations of the size of British Jewry are carried out by the Community Research Unit (CRU) of the Board of Deputies. Based on an analysis of Jewish deaths during 1975–1979, the population baseline for 1977 was set at 336,000 with a margin of error of plus or minus 34,000.[22] The vital statistical records regularly compiled by the CRU show an excess of deaths over births in the range of about 1,000–1,500 a year. Further attrition derives from emigration and some assimilatory losses. Indeed, a study of Jewish synagogue membership indicated a decline of over 7 percent between 1983 and 1990.[23] A new national estimate, mainly based on an evaluation of Jewish death records in the period 1984–1988, was recently completed by the CRU, suggesting an estimate of 308,000 for 1986.[24] Allowing for a further continuation of these well-established trends, we adopted a provisional revised

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[19]See Sergio DellaPergola, "Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges," AJYB 1993, vol. 93, pp. 25–82.

[20]Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris, 1984).

[21]Erik H. Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté* (Paris, 1991).

[22]Steven Haberman, Barry A. Kosmin, and Caren Levy, "Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975–79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, ser. A, 146, pt. 3, 1983, pp. 294–310.

[23]Marlena Schmool and Frances Cohen, *British Synagogue Membership in 1990* (London, 1991).

[24]Steven Haberman and Marlena Schmool, *Estimates of British Jewish Population 1984–88* (London, 1993).

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, END 1992

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Belgium	10,010,000	31,800	3.2	C 1987
Denmark	5,169,000	6,400	1.2	C 1990
France[a]	57,379,000	530,000	9.2	C 1990
Germany	80,606,000	50,000	0.6	C 1990
Greece	10,208,000	4,800	0.5	B 1990
Ireland	3,481,000	1,800	0.5	B 1990
Italy	57,826,000	31,000	0.5	B 1990
Luxembourg	380,000	600	1.6	B 1990
Netherlands	15,270,000	25,600	1.7	C 1990
Portugal	9,870,000	300	0.0	B 1986
Spain	39,153,000	12,000	0.3	D
United Kingdom	58,039,000	298,000	5.1	B 1991
Total European Community	347,391,000	992,300	2.9	
Austria	7,805,000	7,000	0.9	C 1990
Finland	5,020,000	1,300	0.3	B 1990
Gibraltar	31,000	600	19.4	C 1981
Norway	4,310,000	1,000	0.2	B 1987
Sweden	8,692,000	15,000	1.7	C 1990
Switzerland	6,862,000	19,000	2.8	C 1980
Other	771,000	100	0.1	D
Total other West Europe	33,491,000	44,000	1.3	
Belarus	10,300,000	46,600	4.5	B 1992
Estonia	1,600,000	3,400	2.1	A 1992
Latvia	2,600,000	13,500	5.2	B 1992
Lithuania	3,800,000	6,500	1.7	B 1992
Moldova	4,400,000	19,400	4.4	B 1992
Russia[b]	149,000,000	415,000	2.8	B 1992 X
Ukraine	51,900,000	276,000	5.3	B 1992
Total former USSR in Europe	223,600,000	780,400	3.5	

TABLE 3.—*(Continued)*

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4,000,000	300	0.1	D X
Bulgaria	8,926,000	1,900	0.2	C 1990
Croatia	4,400,000	1,400	0.3	D X
Czech Republic	10,300,000	3,800	0.4	D X
Hungary	10,493,000	56,000	5.3	D
Poland	38,518,000	3,600	0.1	C 1990
Romania	23,377,000	16,000	0.7	B 1988
Slovakia	5,300,000	3,800	0.7	D X
Slovenia	2,000,000	100	0.0	D X
Turkey[b]	59,577,000	19,500	0.3	C 1990
Yugoslavia[c]	9,800,000	1,700	0.2	C 1988 X
Total other East Europe and Balkans	181,991,000[d]	108,100	0.6	
Total	786,473,000	1,924,800	2.4	

a Including Monaco.
b Including Asian regions.
c Serbia and Montenegro.
d Including countries not listed separately.

estimate of 300,000 for 1991 and revised it downward to 298,000 for 1992.

In 1990, Germany was politically reunited. In the former (West) German Federal Republic, the 1987 population census reported 32,319 Jews. Immigration used to compensate for the surplus of deaths over births in this aging Jewish population. Estimates for the small Jewish population in the former (East) German Democratic Republic ranged between 500 and 2,000. While there is a lack of certainty about the number of recent immigrants from the former USSR, according to some reports as many as 20,000 have settled in unified Germany since the end of 1989. Jewish community records reported 27,711 affiliated Jews at the end of 1989, 28,468 in 1990, 33,692 in 1991, and 37,498 in 1992.[25] Allowing for some time lag between immigration and registering with the organized Jewish community, our estimate for unified Germany was 35,000 in 1989, 40,000 in 1990, 42,500 in 1991, and is now increased to 50,000 at the end of 1992, including the unaffiliated.

[25]Zentralwohlfartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland, *Vierteljahresmeldung über den Mitgliederstand* (Frankfurt, 1993).

Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands each have Jewish populations ranging around 30,000. There is a tendency toward internal shrinkage of all these Jewries, but in some instances this is offset by immigration. In Belgium, the size of Jewish population is probably quite stable, owing to the comparatively strong Orthodox section in that community. In Italy, until 1984, Jews were legally bound to affiliate with the local Jewish communities, but then membership in these communities became voluntary. Although most Jews reaffiliated, the new looser legal framework may facilitate the ongoing attrition of the Jewish population.

Other EC member countries have smaller and, overall, slowly declining Jewish populations. An exception may be Spain, whose Jewish population is very tentatively estimated at 12,000.

Other Western Europe. Countries that are not EC members together account for a Jewish population of 44,000. Switzerland's Jews are estimated at below 20,000. Austria's permanent Jewish population is estimated at 7,000. While there is evidence of a negative balance of births and deaths, connected with great aging and frequent outmarriage, immigration may have offset the internal losses. The Jewish populations in Scandinavian countries are, on the whole, numerically rather stable.

Former USSR (European parts). Since 1989, the demographic situation of East European Jewry has been changing rapidly as a consequence of the dramatic geopolitical changes in the region. The economic and political crisis that culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state in 1991 generated an upsurge in Jewish emigration. After rapidly reaching a peak in 1990, emigration continued, slightly attenuated, in 1991 and 1992. While mass emigration is an obvious factor in population decrease, the demography of East European Jewry has been characterized for years by very low levels of "effectively Jewish" fertility, frequent outmarriage, and heavy aging. As a result, the shrinking of Jewish population in that region must be comparatively rapid.

Data on nationalities (ethnic groups) from the Soviet Union's last official population census, carried out in January 1989, revealed a total of 1,450,500 Jews.[25] The figure confirmed the declining trend already apparent since the previous three censuses: 2,267,800 Jews in 1959, 2,150,700 in 1970, and 1,810,900 in 1979.

Our reservation about USSR Jewish population figures in previous AJYB volumes bears repeating: some underreporting is not impossible, but it cannot be quantified and should not be exaggerated. One should cautiously keep in mind the possible conflicting effects on census declarations of the prolonged existence of a totalitarian regime: on the one hand, stimulating a preference for other than Jewish nationalities in the various parts of the Soviet Union, especially in connection with mixed marriages; on the other hand, preserving a formal Jewish identification by coercion, through the mandatory registration of nationality on official documents such as passports. Viewed conceptually, the census figures represent the core Jewish

[25]Goskomstat SSSR, *Vestnik Statistiki* 10 (1990), pp. 69–71. This figure omits the Tats (Mountain Jews); see below.

population in the USSR. They actually constitute a good example of a large and empirically measured core Jewish population in the Diaspora, consisting of the aggregate of self-identifying Jews. The figures of successive censuses appear to be remarkably consistent with one another and with the known patterns of emigration and internal demographic evolution of the Jewish population in recent decades.[27]

A substantial amount of unpublished data was known to exist about the demographic characteristics and trends of Jews in the former USSR, but it was inaccessible. Systematic analysis of such material has now become possible and is producing important new insights into recent and current trends.[28] The new data confirm the prevalence of very low fertility and birthrates, high frequencies of outmarriage, a preference for non-Jewish nationalities among the children of outmarriages, aging, and a clear surplus of Jewish deaths over Jewish births. These trends are especially visible in the Slavic republics, which hold a large share of the total Jewish population.

The respective figures for the enlarged Jewish population—including all current Jews as well as any other persons of Jewish parentage and their non-Jewish household members—must be substantially higher in a societal context like that of the USSR, which has been characterized by high intermarriage rates for a considerable time. It is not yet possible to provide an actual estimate of this enlarged Jewish population for lack of appropriate data. Nor can any information about the ratio of Jews to non-Jews in an enlarged Jewish population in the USSR be derived from the statistics of immigrants to Israel. Due to the highly self-selective character of *aliyah*, non-Jews have constituted a relatively small minority of all new immigrants from the USSR.[29] It is obvious, though, that the broad provisions of Israel's Law

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[27]U.O. Schmelz, "New Evidence on Basic Issues in the Demography of Soviet Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 16, no. 2, 1974, pp. 209–23; Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (Westport, 1987).

[28]Viacheslav Konstantinov, "Jewish Population of the USSR on the Eve of the Great Exodus," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 3 (16), 1991, pp. 5–23; Mordechai Altshuler, "Socio-demographic Profile of Moscow Jews," ibid., pp. 24–40; Mark Tolts, "The Balance of Births and Deaths Among Soviet Jewry," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 2 (18), 1992, pp. 13–26; Leonid E. Darsky, "Fertility in the USSR; Basic Trends" (paper presented at European Population Conference, Paris, 1991); Mark Tolts, "Jewish Marriages in the USSR: A Demographic Analysis" (Moscow, 1991); Mark Tolts, "Trends in Soviet Jewish Demography Since the Second World War" (paper presented at conference, "From Revolution to Revolution: The Soviet Jews Under the Soviet Regime," Jerusalem, 1992); Mark Kupovetsky, "From Village Settlers to Urban Integration: Jews in the Soviet Union Between the Two World Wars," ibid.

[29]Israel's Ministry of Interior records the religion-nationality of each person, including new immigrants. Such attribution is made on the basis of documentary evidence supplied by the immigrants themselves and checked by competent authorities in Israel. According to data available from the Interior Ministry's Central Population Register, 90.3 percent of all new immigrants from the USSR during the period October 1989-August 1992 were recorded as Jewish. The annual trends clearly point to a growing proportion of non-Jews among the immigrants. See Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Context of the Soviet Aliya," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 3 (16), 1991, pp. 41–56.

of Return (see above) apply to virtually the maximum emigration pool of self-declared Jews and close non-Jewish relatives. Any of the large figures attributed in recent years to the size of Soviet Jewry, insofar as they are based on demographic reasoning, do not relate to the core but to various measures of an enlarged Jewish population. The evidence also suggests that in the USSR core Jews constitute a smaller share of the total enlarged Jewish population than in some Western countries, such as the United States.

Just as the number of declared Jews evolved consistently between censuses, the number of persons of Jewish descent who preferred not to be identified as Jews was rather consistent too, at least until 1989. However, the recent political developments, and especially the current emigration urge, have probably led to greater readiness to declare a Jewish self-identification by persons who did not describe themselves as such in the 1989 census. In terms of demographic accounting, these "returnees" imply an actual net increment to the core Jewish population of the USSR, as well as to world Jewry.

With regard to updating the January 1989 census figure to the end of 1992 for each of the republics of the former USSR, Jewish emigration has played the major role among the intervening changes. An estimated 71,000, thereof about 62,000 declared Jews, left in 1989, as against 19,300 in 1988, 8,100 in 1987, and only 7,000 during the whole 1982–1986 period. In 1990, according to Soviet, Israeli, American, and other sources, an estimated 205,000 emigrated from the USSR, including 179,000 declared Jews, the balance being composed of non-Jewish family members. In 1991, 148,000 immigrants from the former USSR arrived in Israel, another 35,000 went to the United States, and possibly 12,000 went to other countries. We estimate that of these total 195,000 migrants, about 159,000 were Jewish. In 1992, 65,000 immigrated to Israel, another 45,000 went to the United States, and possibly up to 20,000 settled elsewhere. Of these 130,000, an estimated 96,000 were Jewish.[30] These apparently declining emigration figures should not be misconstrued: when compared with the similarly declining Jewish population figures for the former USSR, they actually demonstrate a remarkably stable desire to emigrate. At the same time, the heavy deficit of internal population dynamics continued and even intensified due to the great aging that is known to have prevailed for many decades. Aging in the communities of origin was exacerbated by the significantly younger age composition of the emigrants.[31]

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[30]The figures reported here have been revised from our estimates in previous volumes of AJYB. See Sidney Heitman, "Soviet Emigration in 1990," *Berichte des Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, vol. 33, 1991.

[31]Age structures of the Jewish population in the Russian Federal Republic in 1970 and 1979 were reported in Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, vol. 4, table 33 (Moscow, 1973); Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda*, vol. 4, part 2, table 2 (Moscow, 1989); Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda* (Moscow, 1991). Age structures of recent Jewish migrants from the USSR to the United States and to Israel appear, respectively, in HIAS, *Statistical Abstract*, vol. 30, no. 4 (New York, 1990), and unpublished data kindly communicated to the authors; Israel Central Bureau

On the strength of these considerations, our estimate of the core Jewish population in the USSR was reduced from the census figure of 1,450,500 at the end of 1988-beginning of 1989 to 1,370,000 at the end of 1989, to 1,157,000 at the end of 1990, and to 990,000 at the end of 1991.[32] The current update, beside taking into account changes during 1992, also corrects for the past omission of Tats, also known as Mountain Jews—a group mostly concentrated in the Caucasus area that enjoys full Jewish status and all the prerogatives granted by Israel's Law of Return. According to the 1989 census, there were 30,669 Tats in the USSR—thereof 19,420 in the Russian republic and 10,239 in Azerbaijan. These numbers, only slightly reduced in consideration of the demographic dynamics in the intervening years, have been integrated in our current estimates.

The Jewish population for the total of the former USSR was estimated at 890,000 at the end of 1992. Of these, 780,400 lived in the European republics and 109,600 in the Asian parts of the former USSR (see below). The pace of change of Jewish population in the different former republics has been significantly different because of variable propensities to emigrate, different rates of assimilation and natural decrease (or, in rare instances, increase), and some geographic redistribution across the different republics. The largest Jewish population in the former USSR's European parts remains in Russia (415,000, including a 19,000 upward revision to take into account the Tats). The Jewish population in Russia, though declining, is currently the fourth largest in the world. Jews in Ukraine, which in recent years has experienced large-scale emigration, are estimated at 276,000. A further 46,000 Jews are estimated to live in Belarus, 19,400 in the Moldovan Republic, and a combined total of 23,400 in the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Other East Europe and Balkans. The Jewish populations in Hungary and Romania and the small remnants in Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak republics, Poland, and the former Yugoslavia are all reputed to be very overaged and to experience frequent outmarriage. In each of these countries, the recent political transformations have permitted greater autonomy of the organized Jewish communities and their registered membership, including the freedom to emigrate. Although some Jews or persons of Jewish origin have come out in the open after years of hiding their identity, the inevitable numerical decline of Jewish populations in Eastern Europe is reflected in reduced estimates for 1992.

The size of Hungarian Jewry—the largest in Eastern Europe outside the former USSR—is quite insufficiently known. Our estimate of 56,000 only attempts to reflect the declining trend that prevails there, too, according to the available indicators.

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of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel 1991*, Special Series, no. 944 (Jerusalem, 1993); and Yoel Florsheim, "Immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1990," *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 2 (15), 1991, pp. 5–14.

[32]We greatly appreciate the collaboration of Dr. Mark Tolts, of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, in preparing these estimates. See Mark Tolts, "Recent Trends in the Jewish Population of the Former USSR (from the 1989 Census to the End of 1992)," unpublished report (Jerusalem, 1993).

Jewish emigration continued to flow from Romania. The January 1992 census of Romania indicated a Jewish population of 9,100. However, based on the detailed Jewish community records available there, our estimate for the end of 1992 was 16,000. Yugoslavia, torn apart by a devastating civil war and economic crisis, finally split into five separate republics. The overall core Jewish population, reduced through emigration—especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina—was estimated at 3,500 at the end of 1992. Of these, roughly 2,000 lived in the now reduced territory of Yugoslavia (Serbia with Montenegro), 1,400 in Croatia, and less than 100 each in Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. Czechoslovakia, too, split into two new states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The number of Jews in each was tentatively estimated at 3,800.

The Jewish population of Turkey, where a surplus of deaths over births has been reported for several years, is estimated at about 20,000.

ASIA

Israel. Israel accounts for 97 percent of all the nearly 4.4 million Jews in Asia, including the Asian republics of the former USSR, but excluding the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey (see table 4). By the end of 1992, Israeli Jews constituted nearly 33 percent of total world Jewry. Israel's Jewish population grew in 1992 by about 98,000, or 2.4 percent. This compared with growth rates of 6.2 percent in 1990 and 5 percent in 1991. Although the number of new immigrants declined from 199,500 in 1990 and 176,100 in 1991 to 77,100 in 1992, it was still the seventh highest immigration year in Israel's history. About 51 percent of Jewish population growth in 1992 was due to the net migration balance. The remaining 49 percent of Jewish population growth reflected natural increase, including some cases of immigrants from the former USSR who were previously listed as non-Jews being reregistered as Jews.[33]

Former USSR (Asian parts). The total Jewish population in the Asian republics of the former USSR was estimated at about 109,600 at the end of 1992. The fear of Muslim fundamentalism in Central Asia and the various ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus area caused concern and stimulated high emigration rates. Internal identificational and demographic processes were less a factor of attrition among these Jewish populations than was the case in the European republics of the former USSR. At the beginning of the 1990s, minimal rates of natural increase still existed among the more traditional sections of these Jewish communities, but the conditions were rapidly eroding this residual surplus.[34] Reflecting these trends, the largest commu-

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[33]Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1993* (Jerusalem, 1993). For a comprehensive review of sociodemographic changes in Israel, see U.O. Schmelz, Sergio DellaPergola, and Uri Avner, "Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look," AJYB 1990, vol. 90, pp. 3–204; see also Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Changes in Israel in the Early 1990s," in *Israel's Social Services 1992–93*, ed. Y. Kop (Jerusalem, 1993), pp. 57–115.

[34]Tolts, "The Balance of Births and Deaths. . . ."

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, END 1992[a]

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Israel	5,195,900[b]	4,242,500	816.5	A 1992
Armenia	3,500,000	300	0.1	B 1992
Azerbaijan	7,200,000	21,000	2.9	B 1992 X
Georgia	5,500,000	18,000	3.3	B 1992
Kazakhstan	17,200,000	14,500	0.8	B 1992
Kyrgyzstan	4,600,000	3,700	0.8	B 1992
Tajikistan	5,700,000	5,000	0.9	B 1992
Turkmenistan	4,000,000	1,900	0.5	B 1992
Uzbekistan	21,600,000	45,200	2.1	B 1992
Total former USSR in Asia[a]	69,300,000	109,600	1.8	
Hong Kong	5,845,000	1,000	0.2	D
India	896,567,000	4,500	0.0	C 1981
Iran	63,180,000	16,000	0.3	C 1986 X
Iraq	19,918,000	200	0.0	D
Japan	124,959,000	1,000	0.0	C 1988
Korea, South	44,508,000	100	0.0	D
Philippines	66,543,000	100	0.0	C 1988
Singapore	2,798,000	300	0.1	B 1990
Syria	13,762,000	1,200	0.1	C 1992
Thailand	56,868,000	200	0.0	C 1988
Yemen	12,977,000	1,600	0.1	B 1990
Other	1,918,506,100	300	0.0	D
Total other Asia	3,226,431,100	26,500	0.0	
Total	3,300,927,000	4,378,600	1.3	

a Not including Asian regions of Russia and Turkey.
b End 1992.

nity remained in Uzbekistan (45,200), followed by Azerbaijan (21,000)—revised upward by 10,000 to take into account the Tat Mountain Jews who had been omitted from previous estimates—Georgia (18,000), and Kazakhstan (14,500).

Other countries. It is difficult to estimate the Jewish population of Iran for any

given date, but it continues to dwindle. Based on partial available estimates from the 1986 population census,[35] the estimate for 1992 was reduced to 16,000. In other Asian countries with small veteran communities—such as India, or several Muslim countries—the Jewish population tends to decline. The reduction was more notable in Syria, where for the first time in many years Jews were officially allowed to emigrate. Very small Jewish communities, partially of a transient character, exist in several countries of Southeast Asia.

AFRICA

Fewer than 115,000 Jews were estimated to remain in Africa at the end of 1992. The Republic of South Africa accounts for 87 percent of total Jews in that continent (see table 5). The last official population census, carried out in March 1991, did not provide a reliable new national figure of Jewish population size. The question on religion was not mandatory, and only about 66,000 people declared themselves as Jewish. In 1980, according to the previous official census, there were about 118,000 Jews among South Africa's white population.[36] Substantial Jewish emigration since then was only partially compensated for by Jewish immigration and return migration of former emigrants. An incipient negative balance of internal changes was producing some further attrition. The results of a Jewish-sponsored survey of the Jewish population in the five major South African urban centers, completed in 1991, confirm the ongoing demographic decline.[37] Based on the new evidence, the estimate for the end of 1992 has been revised to 100,000, substantially below our previous estimate of 114,000.

In recent years, the Jewish community of Ethiopia has been at the center of an international rescue effort. In the course of 1991, the overwhelming majority of Ethiopian Jews—about 20,000 people—were brought to Israel, most of them in a dramatic one-day airlift operation. (A few of these migrants were non-Jewish members of mixed households.) In connection with these events, it was assumed that the size of Ethiopian Jewry could be evaluated on a more accurate basis than previously, and the core Jewish population was estimated at 1,500 at the end of 1991. However, 3,650 immigrants from Ethiopia arrived in Israel in 1992, demonstrating that once again the number of Jews there had been underestimated. Based on the possibility that more Jews may appear requesting to emigrate to Israel, and the as yet unresolved status (and unknown numbers) of the Christian relatives of Ethiopian Jews, an estimate of 1,500 Jews is tentatively suggested for the end of 1992.

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[35]Kindly provided by Dr. Mehdi Bozorghmehr, Von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles.

[36]Sergio DellaPergola and Allie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," AJYB 1988, vol. 88, pp. 59–140.

[37]The study was directed by Dr. Allie A. Dubb and supported by the Kaplan Centre for Judaic Studies, University of Cape Town.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, END 1992

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Egypt	56,060,000	200	0.0	C 1988
Ethiopia	54,628,000	1,500	0.0	C 1992 X
Kenya	26,090,000	400	0.0	B 1990
Morocco	26,954,000	7,500	0.3	D
South Africa	40,774,000	100,000	2.5	C 1991 X
Tunisia	8,579,000	2,000	0.2	D
Zaire	41,166,000	400	0.0	C 1990
Zambia	8,885,000	300	0.0	C 1990
Zimbabwe	10,898,000	1,000	0.1	B 1990
Other	427,990,000	1,000	0.0	D
Total	702,024,000	114,300	0.2	

The remnants of Moroccan and Tunisian Jewry tend to shrink slowly through emigration, mostly to France and Canada. It should be pointed out, though, that some Jews have a foothold in Morocco or Tunisia and also in France or other Western countries, and their geographic attribution is therefore uncertain.

OCEANIA

The major country of Jewish residence in Oceania (Australasia) is Australia, where 95 percent of the estimated total of nearly 94,000 Jews live (see table 6). The April 1991 census of Australia, in which the question on religion is optional, enumerated 74,386 declared Jews.[38] This represented an increase of 5,303 (7.7 percent) over the figure reported in the 1986 census. In 1991, over 23 percent of the country's whole population either did not specify their religion or stated explicitly that they had none This large group must be assumed to contain persons who identify in other ways as Jews. However, a survey in Melbourne, Australia's largest Jewish community, revealed that less than 7 percent of the Jewish respondents had not identified as Jews in the census.[39] The Melbourne survey actually depicted a very

[38]Bill Rubinstein, "Census Total for Jews Up by 7.7 Percent; Big Gains in Smaller States," unpublished report (Geelong, Victoria, 1993).

[39]John Goldlust, *The Jews of Melbourne: A Report of the Findings of the Jewish Community Survey, 1991* (Melbourne, 1993).

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, END 1992

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	17,843,000	90,000	5.0	B 1991
New Zealand	3,487,000	4,500	1.3	C 1988
Other	6,617,000	100	0.0	D
Total	27,947,000	94,600	3.4	

stable community, even if one affected by growing acculturation. Australian Jewry has received migratory reinforcements during the last decade, especially from South Africa, the former USSR, and Israel. At the same time, there are demographic patterns with negative effects on Jewish population size, such as strong aging. Taking into account these various factors, we revised our estimate for 1992 to a figure of 90,000—substantially more than the official census returns, but less than would be obtained by adding the full proportion of those who did not report any religion in the census. The Jewish community in New Zealand is estimated at 4,500.

Dispersion and Concentration

Table 7 demonstrates the magnitude of Jewish dispersion. The 91 individual countries listed above as each having at least 100 Jews are scattered over all the continents. In 1992, more than half (57 out of 90 countries) had fewer than 5,000 Jews each. In relative terms, too, the Jews were thinly scattered nearly everywhere in the Diaspora. There is not a single Diaspora country where they amounted even to 25 per 1,000 (2.5 percent) of the total population. In most countries they constituted a far smaller fraction. Only three Diaspora countries had more than 10 per 1,000 (1 percent) Jews in their total population; and only 11 countries had more than 5 Jews per 1,000 (0.5 percent) of population. The respective 11 countries were, in descending order of the proportion, but regardless of the absolute number of their Jews: United States (21.8 per 1,000), Gibraltar (19.4), Canada (12.8), France (9.2), Uruguay (7.7), Argentina (6.4), Ukraine (5.3), Hungary (5.3), Latvia (5.2), United Kingdom (5.1), and Australia (5.0). The other major Diaspora Jewries, having lower proportions of Jews per 1,000 of total population, were Russia (2.8 per 1,000), South Africa (2.5), and Brazil (0.6).

In the State of Israel, by contrast, the Jewish majority amounted to 817 per 1,000 (81.7 percent) in 1992, compared to 819 per 1,000 (81.9 percent) in 1991—not including the Arab population of the administered areas.

TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S JEWS, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION (PER 1,000 POPULATION) IN EACH COUNTRY, END 1992

Number of Jews in Country	Total	Jews per 1,000 Population				
		0.0–0.9	1.0–4.9	5.0–9.9	10.0–24.9	25.0+
		Number of Countries				
Total	91[a]	57	22	8	3	1
100–900	26	21	4	—	1	—
1,000–4,900	25	23	2	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	7	4	3	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	20	7	11	2	—	—
50,000–99,900	3	1	—	2	—	—
100,000–999,900	8	1	2	4	1	—
1,000,000 or more	2	—	—	—	1	1
	Jewish Population Distribution (Absolute Numbers)					
Total	12,922,000[b]	383,800	819,000	1,498,300	5,976,600	4,242,500
100–900	10,000	7,800	1,600	—	600	—
1,000–4,900	58,900	51,000	7,900	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	43,900	26,000	17,900	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	462,900	149,000	276,600	37,300	—	—
50,000–99,900	196,000	50,000	—	146,000	—	—
100,000–999,900	2,286,000	100,000	515,000	1,315,000	356,000	—
1,000,000 or more	9,862,500	—	—	—	5,620,000	4,242,500
	Jewish Population Distribution (Percent of World's Jews)[c]					
Total	100.0[b]	3.0	6.3	11.6	46.3	32.8
100–900	0.1	0.1	0.0	—	0.0	—
1,000–4,900	0.5	0.4	0.1	—	—	—
5,000–9,900	0.3	0.2	0.1	—	—	—
10,000–49,900	3.6	1.2	2.1	0.3	—	—
50,000–99,900	1.5	0.4	—	1.1	—	—
100,000–999,900	17.7	0.8	4.0	10.2	2.8	—
1,000,000 or more	76.3	—	—	—	43.5	32.8

[a]Excluding countries with fewer than 100 Jews.
[b]Including countries with fewer than 100 Jews.
[c]Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

TABLE 8. ELEVEN COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATIONS, END 1992

Rank	Country	Jewish Population	% of Total Jewish Population			
			In the World		In the Diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	United States	5,620,000	43.5	43.5	64.8	64.8
2	Israel	4,242,500	32.8	76.3	—	—
3	France	530,000	4.1	80.4	6.1	70.9
4	Russia	415,000	3.2	83.6	4.8	75.3
5	Canada	356,000	2.8	86.4	4.1	79.4
6	United Kingdom	298,000	2.3	88.7	3.4	82.8
7	Ukraine	276,000	2.1	90.8	3.2	86.0
8	Argentina	211,000	1.6	92.4	2.4	88.4
9	Brazil	100,000	0.8	93.2	1.2	89.6
10	South Africa	100,000	0.8	94.0	1.2	90.8
11	Australia	90,000	0.7	94.7	1.0	91.8

While Jews are widely dispersed, they are also concentrated to some extent (see table 8). In 1992, 94 percent of world Jewry lived in the ten countries with the largest Jewish populations; and over 76 percent lived in the two largest communities—the United States and Israel. Similarly, ten leading Diaspora countries together comprised about 92 percent of the Diaspora Jewish population; three countries (United States, France, and Russia) accounted for 75 percent, and the United States alone for about 65 percent of total Diaspora Jewry.

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